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Taking War Seriously
A MODEL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON
THE USE OF FORCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Craig Martin†
I.

INTRODUCTION
A universal and perpetual peace, it is to be feared, is in the catalogue
of events, which will never exist but in the imaginations of visionary
philosophers, or in the breasts of benevolent enthusiasts. It is still
however true, that war contains so much folly, as well as wickedness,
that much is to be hoped from the progress of reason; and if any thing
1
is be hoped, every thing ought to be tried.

War. Few phenomena have caused as much human
pain, suffering, and death through the ages than the organized
armed conflict between tribes, realms, peoples, nations, and
nation-states. And unlike natural disasters, this misery is of
course attributable entirely to people and the systems we have
created. We have struggled with the problem of trying to limit
war from almost as far back as the beginning of recorded
history. We have come up with theories about the causes of
war, and we have developed legal systems to both constrain the
recourse to war (jus ad bellum) and govern the conduct of
†

Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. This
article is an abridged and revised version of one segment of a dissertation for an S.J.D.
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank the members of my
committee, Eric Feldman, Bill Burke-White, and Tom Ginsburg for all their invaluable
assistance and guidance in my work on the dissertation. There are many other people
who have provided help in various ways at different stages of the development of this
part of the project, and in particular I would like to thank Anita Allen, Eyal Benvenisti,
Lois Chiang, Sujit Choudhry, Benson Cowan, Michael Doyle, Diane Desierto, Karen
Knop, Mattias Kumm, Brian Langille, Gideon Parchomovsky, Deborah Pearlstein, and
Fernando Téson. I also had the benefit of presenting, and obtaining feedback on,
various versions of the article, and would like to thank in particular Claire Finkelstein
for the invitation to present it at the Foundations of International Law Conference at
the University of Pennsylvania, and the editors of the Brooklyn Law Review for the
opportunity to present it as part of their author spotlight series. Many thanks also to
colleagues who provided invaluable feedback at workshops at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and the University of Baltimore School of Law.
1
James Madison, Universal Peace, NAT’L GAZETTE (Phila.), Feb. 2, 1792.
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hostilities when armed forces clash (jus in bello).2 In the
twentieth century we developed an international legal
framework for the central purpose of promoting greater peace
and security in the world.3 This, combined with the spread of
constitutional democracy, and the observation that democracies
virtually never wage war among themselves, has bolstered the
once unlikely idea that we might achieve a more sustained
peace in the world.4 Yet, despite these developments the world
remains wracked by the scourge of war, and liberal
democracies themselves continue to wage war. And
notwithstanding the horrors and costs that attend this human
practice, recourse to war is subject to less legal constraint than
most other forms of collective activity.
This study, in the spirit of James Madison’s plea that
we ought to try everything to reduce the incidence of war,
advances an argument for how liberal democracies might
develop more effective legal constraints on the recourse to war.
More specifically, it develops a constitutional model (the
“Model”)5 for improved control over the decision to use armed
force, with the aims of enhancing compliance with the
international law regime governing the recourse to war, and of
engaging the core functions of democratic institutions for the
purposes of making the domestic decision-making process less
prone to the failures that can lead to irrational or illegitimate
use of force. It does so based on the well-established
understanding that the causes of war are to be found not only
in the structure and operation of the international system, but
also at the domestic level, in both the structure of states and in
2

The laws of war are separated into two quite separate regimes. The first,
jus ad bellum, comprises the laws that govern the resort to war or initiation of the use
of armed force—when a state can legally go to war. The second, jus in bello (now often
referred to as the laws of international armed conflict, or international humanitarian
law), comprises the laws that govern the conduct of armed forces in the course of armed
conflict—how armed forces may legitimately wage war. These two regimes are distinct,
such that a state may commence an illegal war but its forces may nonetheless conduct
themselves legally throughout the war. Conversely, the forces of a state may commence
fighting for legitimate reasons but engage in acts that are in violation of the jus in
bello.
3
The central purpose of the United Nations system is the maintenance of
peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 1. For a discussion of the historical development
of the modern jus ad bellum system, see infra Part III.C.
4
An idea developed most famously by Kant in the eighteenth century:
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), reprinted in
KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 93 (H.S. Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbett trans., 2d ed. 1991). The
ideas of Kant in Perpetual Peace are discussed infra Parts II.B-C.
5
See infra Part V.
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the systematic failures in the decision-making process of both
individuals and small-groups. If the causes of war operate at
both the domestic and the international level, it follows that
the legal constraints designed to limit the use of force should
engage those causes at both levels.
The Model also builds on the insight that until the end of
the eighteenth century there was a clearer understanding that
legal limits had to operate at both the international and
domestic levels; and the observation that in the spread and
development of constitutional democracy over the last halfcentury, there has been a tendency to ignore the need for
domestic legal constraints on war and overlook the relationship
between the domestic and the international systems when it
comes to governing armed conflict. Few democracies have
constitutional controls over the decision to use force that
effectively constrain unilateral executive authority, and fewer
still have any constitutional incorporation of international law
principles on the use of force. What is more, this failure to
implement the international law on the use of force within
domestic legal systems is anomalous, in stark contrast to the
increasing trend towards domestic implementation of other
international law regimes, from human rights to international
trade and intellectual property rights.
The Model is designed to achieve its objectives through
the operation of three separate but mutually reinforcing
elements—three aspects of a constitutional provision. The first
is a process-based constitutional incorporation of the prevailing
principles of international law that limit the use of armed force
(that is, the principles of the jus ad bellum regime). It is
process-based in the sense that it only requires decision makers
to sufficiently and demonstrably consider the legality of
proposed action under the international law principles, in
contrast to a substantive incorporation model which would
oblige decision makers to comply with those provisions. This
aspect of the Model does aim to increase compliance with the
international law directly, though it will do so in part by also
engaging domestic causes of war. The second element is a
provision that requires legislative approval of decisions to use
armed force rising above a specified de minimis level, thereby
increasing the separation of powers with respect to the crucial
decision to engage in armed conflict. This element would bring
the key functions of representative parliaments to bear on that
decision-making process, not only engaging the domestic causes
of war, but reinforcing the traction of the first element in
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enhancing compliance with international law. The third
element establishes jurisdiction and standing for a limited
power of judicial review over the decision-making process, to
extend the separation of powers to the third branch of
government, and to help ensure greater adherence to the
overall process. All three elements of the Model are designed to
engage, in a mutually reinforcing manner, the causes of war
that operate at all three levels, within the international system
and the domestic structures and institutions of states.
The case for this Model is made by employing a range of
perspectives on the causes of war from international relations
theory and political philosophy, a review of the historical
development of legal constraints on war, international law
compliance theory, and constitutional law ideas about the
operation of constitutions, the rule of law, and the role of
legislatures and the judiciary in democratic states. The article
thus engages current debates in a range of areas, including
international law and the use of force, constitutional war
powers, the effectiveness of constitutions in times of
emergency, and the role of courts in national security issues.
The article advances the argument that liberal democracies
ought to develop constitutional constraints on the decision to
engage in armed conflict in order to better comply with
international law, and to improve the level of democratic
accountability and deliberation in the constitutional process of
deciding on the use of force. Ultimately, the Model aims to
extend the reach of the “democratic peace,”6 and reduce the
incidence of illegitimate armed conflict.7 For while going to war
is one of the most important decisions a government can make,
and preventing war is the most central purpose of our
international law regime, liberal democracies have few
constitutional controls on the decision to engage in armed
conflict, and have made almost no use of their domestic legal
systems to implement and reinforce the international law
regime. If liberal democracies are to take war seriously, or
more precisely, if they are to take the constraint of war
6

The “democratic peace” is the term used to refer to the theory in
international relations that democracies do not wage war among themselves. See infra
Parts II.B-C.
7
The term “illegitimate” is used here deliberately to capture both (1) uses of
force in violation of established principles of international law and (2) decisions to use
force that involve deception of the public or some other characteristic that could be
construed as running counter to democratic accountability and the fundamental
features of deliberative democracy.
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seriously,8 then they must begin to develop the legal systems
necessary to engage the recognized causes of war, bringing the
powerful advantages of democratic institutions to bear on the
issue just as they have done in so many other realms.
Part II of this article examines the current theories on
the causes of war. It explains how the causes of war are
understood to operate at the level of the individual, the
structure of the state, and the international system, and argues
that the causes at all three levels thus have to be considered in
any attempt to reduce the prevalence of war. Part III provides
a brief review of the modern development of the law and legal
thinking on controlling the resort to war. This examination
suggests that historically there was some understanding of the
need for legal limits to engage the causes of war at all three
levels, but in the last century we have come to rely almost
exclusively on the international law system to control the
recourse to war, and have ignored domestic mechanisms for
limiting the use of armed force.
Part IV of the article sets out the theoretical support for
the development of the Model, explaining how elements of
different
theories
of
international
law
compliance,
constitutional law, and democratic theory ground the argument
that the proposed elements of the Model would operate to
better engage the causes of war at all three levels, and thus
reduce the incidence of illegitimate armed conflict. Finally,
Part V provides draft language for the three elements of the
Model, explaining how they would operate in practice, and—
drawing upon the experiences of other nations—why certain
choices were made in their design.
It should also be noted at the outset that while the
analysis in this study draws upon the American experience and
addresses aspects of the U.S. “war powers” debate, it is not a
proposal for amendment to the U.S. Constitution. While a
constitutional amendment might be unrealistic any time soon
in the U.S., there are several other countries—Japan, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain, to name just a few—in
which there have been serious steps taken towards altering the
legal control over the decision to use armed force. Several are
contemplating either constitutional amendments or new
legislative regimes, and even the U.S. has had a formal
8

To borrow a concept from RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
204 (1977); see also infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing the concept in
more detail).
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commission examining ways to resolve some of the war powers
issues.9 This study seeks to address such developments in
liberal democracies broadly construed, and to contribute to the
deliberations wherever there is serious consideration of
enhancing the domestic legal constraints on the use of armed
force.
II.

THE CAUSES OF WAR

In beginning to think about how to improve the legal
constraints on the resort to war, it is essential to consider the
causes of international armed conflict.10 The question of what
causes war is the subject of a massive amount of research and
debate, stretching back literally thousands of years.11 The focus
of the various theories on the causes of war range from the
individual decision makers, through small-group dynamics, the
structure of the state itself, all the way to the structure and
operation of the international system of states.12 Thucydides,
whose analysis of the Peloponnesian War is one of the earliest
studies of the subject known to us, set the stage with a complex
explanation for the causes of that war that included the
individual attributes of decision makers, the nature and
structure of the leading city-states, and the nature of the
interstate system itself.13 Kenneth Waltz continues this
classification by defining the three levels as “Images”: the
individual or human level (“Image I”), the level of the state
structure or organization (“Image II”), and the level of the
international system (“Image III”).14 And despite the differing
theories, disagreements, and areas of emphasis, there is a
widely shared acceptance that all three Images play a role in
explaining the causes of war, albeit to varying degrees
9

These developments are explored infra Part III.D.
Ryan Goodman, International Institution and the Mechanisms of War, 99
AM. J. INT’L L. 507, 507 (2005) [hereinafter Goodman, International Institution] (review
essay of John Norton Moore, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace).
11
Thucydides, who produced one of the first known analyses of the issue,
wrote History of the Peloponnesian War in the waning years of the fifth century BCE.
See M.I. Finley, Introduction to THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 9
(Rex Warner trans., rev. ed. 1972).
12
For a good survey of the entire field, see GREG CASHMAN, WHAT CAUSES
WAR? AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1993).
13
THUCYDIDES, supra note 11; see also MICHAEL DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND
PEACE 49-53 (1997) (offering an excellent account of Thucydides’ “complex realism,” in
the context of a comparative analysis of the varying approaches to war).
14
KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (2001).
10
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depending on one’s theoretical perspective.15 While it is not
necessary for us to examine the various theories in detail, it will
be helpful to get a flavor for some of the more important ideas as
they relate to each of the three Images, as I will refer back to
these ideas to support the argument for the proposed Model.
A.

Image I—The Level of the Individual

There are a wide variety of theories, and indeed a
number of different sublevels within the Image I—the
individual level—perspective on the causes of war. Some of
these focus on aspects such as human nature itself and the
inherent aggression of man.16 But the theories that relate to
both the psychology of decision makers, and a number of
systemic problems in small-group decision making are of
greatest significance for the argument being advanced here.
Beginning with individual psychology, one set of theories focus
on the personality traits that are common among those who
tend to reach the highest offices of government as factors that
contribute to unsound judgments regarding the use of armed
force. Empirical studies suggest that a number of traits that
tend to be overrepresented in national leaders—such as
authoritarian and domineering tendencies, introversion (which
is perhaps counter-intuitive, but Hitler and Nixon are both
prime examples of this trait), narcissism, and high-risk
tolerance—also tend to correlate with much higher levels of
confrontation and the use of force to resolve conflicts.17
Psychological theories also focus on problems of
misperception. There is powerful evidence that people are
prone to systematic patterns of misperception, and that such
misperception in government leaders contributes significantly
to irrational decisions.18 In particular, decision makers
frequently form strong hypotheses regarding the intentions
15

See, e.g., id.; DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13.
CASHMAN, supra note 12, at chs. 2-3; WALTZ, supra note 14, at ch. 2.
17
CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 40-42; see also Lloyd Etheredge, Personality
Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 434 (1978).
18
Jervis’s Perception and Misperception in International Politics is the seminal
and fascinating study of this phenomenon, which focuses on a cognitive theoretical
explanation of misperception. ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976). Janis and Mann’s Decision Making provides a different
approach that focuses on motivational factors in explaining misperception, particularly
within conflict situations. IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977). For a
discussion of the differences, see CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 70-73.
16
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and capabilities of potential adversaries, and there is a strong
tendency to then dismiss or discount information that is
inconsistent with the hypothesis, and to interpret ambiguous
information in a manner that is consistent with and reinforces
the hypothesis.19 Such misperception often constitutes a
significant factor in the path to war.20
Another set of theories that relate to the Image I causes
of war focus not on the individual alone, but on how decisions
are made within groups and organizations. Contrary to the
expectation that government agencies generally operate in
accordance with rational choice theory, studies suggest that
group decision making is often characterized by dynamics that
can lead to irrational and suboptimal decisions. One such
characteristic is excessive “incrementalism” and “satisfycing”—
the tendency to make small incremental policy shifts, coupled
with the sequential analysis of options and adoption of the first
acceptable alternative, a process captured in the aphorism “the
good is the enemy of the best.”21 A second theory suggests that
the dynamic of competing bureaucratic and departmental
interests—interests which are often inconsistent with the
larger national interest, but which nonetheless command
greater loyalty and mobilize greater effort among department
or division members—subvert the decision-making process.22
Moreover, each department will itself approach the decision
making within the constraints of its own perspectives and
mindsets, standard operating procedures, and capabilities. This
is the famous “where you stand is where you sit” explanation of
internal government politics,23 often referred to as the
19

JERVIS, supra note 18, at chs. 4-5, 7.
See generally id. ch. 3 (analysis of the effects of misperception in the
context of spiral theory and deterrence).
21
CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 79-81. Herbert Simon earned the Nobel Prize in
economics for this insight. It should be noted that from some perspectives,
incrementalism and satisfycing are indeed rational approaches to decision making
generally, since the cost, time, and effort of exhaustive examination of all options and
thorough cost-benefit analysis of each would be prohibitive and often counterproductive.
Id. at 81. But it will also frequently lead to dangerously suboptimal decisions, and, in
foreign policy, incremental policy shifts tend to feed into the misperception problems of
one’s counterparts. See JERVIS, supra note 18, at 77-78, 191-92.
22
The seminal work on this model is Allison and Zelikow’s Essence of
Decision. GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999). See, in particular, chapter 5. For a short version of
his original argument, see Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban
Missile Crisis, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 689 (1969); see also MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL.,
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS & FOREIGN POLICY (1974).
23
Rufus E. Miles, The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 399, 399 (1978).
20
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“bureaucratic politics model.”24 For example, the senior
representatives of the U.S. Air Force, with obviously vested
interests, strongly argued in favor of the continued strategic
bombing of North Vietnam in 1967, even though the Secretary
of Defense and others in the Nixon administration had
determined that it was at best pointless and at worst
counterproductive.25
Finally, there is the phenomenon known as
“groupthink.”26 This theory suggests that some decision-making
groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader,
considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence,
and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a
deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis
during the decision-making process.27 Decision-making groups
that suffer from groupthink are particularly vulnerable to the
kind of systemic misperception discussed above, but they suffer
from other weaknesses as well, all stemming from a failure to
challenge received wisdom, consider alternate perspectives, or
bring to bear exogenous criteria or modalities in assessing
policy options.28
These theories do not, of course, explain all of the
problems in decision making in all situations. Groupthink and
the bureaucratic politics model generally do not operate at the
same time in the same groups. But the studies of each of these
phenomena suggest that these systemic patterns can be a
significant factor in the less-than-rational and suboptimal
decision making about the use of armed force. And these
theories together show the importance of introducing
exogenous criteria for assessing the merit of competing policy
options, and the kinds of checks and balances that might lessen
the probability that these tendencies could affect the decision
to go to war.
24

ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 22. Originally, Allison had formulated two
separate models, the “organizational behavior model” and the “governmental politics
model,” but later combined them in the “bureaucratic politics model.” See Graham T.
Allison & Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications, in THEORY AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Raymond Tanter
& Richard H. Ullman eds., 1972).
25
BARBRA W. TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY: FROM TROY TO VIETNAM 345
(1984).
26
The foundational study on groupthink is Janis’s Groupthink. IRVING L. JANIS,
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982).
27
Id.
28
CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 112-20; JANIS, supra note 26. In particular, see
id. at ch. 8 for discussion of theoretical implications of groupthink.
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Image II—The Level of the State

The causes of war also operate at the level of the state
itself. Again, there is an extensive range of theoretical
explanations for the causes of war that focus on factors at the
state level, but those that are central to Image II relate to the
actual structure or form of the government of the state.29 The
essential idea is that some forms of government are inherently
less prone to wage war than others. This idea has been central
to liberal theories of the state and international relations since
the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the argument
that liberal democratic states are less inclined to initiate wars
than autocratic or other nondemocratic states. These
arguments were founded upon a number of strands of liberal
political theory, including the nature of individual rights
within democracies and the manner in which respect for such
rights would influence how the state would behave within the
international society.30 They also drew upon liberal ideas about
the influence of capitalist economies, arguing that laissez-faire
capitalist systems would operate to reduce the incentives for
war in liberal democratic states.31 But perhaps the most
important argument among these liberal claims, is that the
very structure of government, both in terms of its leaders being
representative of and directly accountable to an electorate, and
the separation of political power between the executive and a
more broadly representative legislature, would operate to
reduce the likelihood that such governments would embark on
military adventures.32
Rousseau and Madison both wrote about the
ramifications of the democratic structure of the state on the
propensity for war.33 But it was Immanuel Kant who developed
the argument most fully in the eighteenth century with his

29

See CASHMAN, supra note 12, at ch. 5 for a review of these other theories.
See generally DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 6.
31
These arguments were founded upon the ideas of John Locke, Jeremy
Bentham, Adam Smith, and, later, Joseph Schumpeter, respectively. See DOYLE, WAYS
OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at chs. 6-7.
32
KANT, supra note 4; Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1. This
argument is discussed in greater detail infra Parts III-IV.
33
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 251-60 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) [hereinafter FEDERALIST NO. 41 (Madison)]; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, STATE OF
WAR (1756), reprinted in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL
WRITINGS 162-77 (Victor Gourevitch ed., 1997); Madison, Universal Peace, supra note
1. For an analysis, see DOYLE, THE WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 4.
30
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short work Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.34 Writing
at a time when there were less than a handful of fledgling
democratic “republics” in the world,35 Kant argued that a
perpetual peace would result from the spread of the republican
form of government among the nations of the world and the
development of a form of pacific federation among these free
states.36 His argument thus straddled the second and third
images, and I will return to discuss his overall theory more
fully below when we turn to consider Image III. But one of his
arguments for why republics would be inherently less likely to
wage war is still very much at the heart of current liberal
theories relating to Image II. His point was that, in the kind of
republic he envisioned, the consent of citizens would be
required for decisions to go to war. Those who would “call[]
down on themselves all the miseries of war,” not only fighting
and dying in the conflict but also paying for it and suffering the
resulting debt, would be much less likely to agree to such an
adventure than the heads of state in other kinds of political
systems such as monarchies, who can “decide on war, without
any significant reason.”37
As we will see, Kant himself did not argue that the
development of democratic structures within any given state
would be sufficient to prevent it from going to war, and his
theory of perpetual peace also rested on the requirement that
the republican form of government be also spread throughout
the international system. Indeed, one of the problems with
liberal theories that rely upon governmental structure as an
explanation for the cause of war is that the extensive empirical
research and analysis on the subject suggest that liberal
democracies are almost as prone to engaging in war as
nondemocratic states, at least as against nondemocratic
countries.38 Some have tried to argue that liberal democracies
nonetheless do not initiate wars to the same degree, and thus
34

KANT, supra note 4.
By “republican” he meant a representative form of government in which
there is a separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. Depending
on how precisely one defines “republic,” at the time the U.S. and France were generally
considered republics, and the Netherlands also fit most definitions. Less clear was
Poland. See George Athan Billias, American Constitutionalism and Europe, 1776-1848,
in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD 21-26 (George Athan Billias ed., 1990).
36
KANT, supra note 4, at 100-01.
37
Id. at 100.
38
The most exhaustive empirical study of the incidence of wars is the socalled Correlates of War Project. See J. DAVID SINGER & MELVIN SMALL, RESORT TO
ARMS: INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WARS, 1816-1980 (1982).
35
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are inherently less aggressive than other forms of government,
but even that claim is very difficult to sustain from the
perspective of traditional international law conceptions of
aggression and self-defense.39
What has emerged from this line of research, however, is
the widely accepted proposition that liberal democracies do not
commence wars against other liberal democracies. The so-called
“democratic peace” encompasses both this empirical fact and the
principle said to explain it.40 While there remains some residual
debate over the validity of the principle,41 persuasive evidence
suggests that, with the possible exception of two instances of
armed conflict between what might be considered democratic
states, there have been no wars between liberal democracies
during the period between 1816 and 1965.42 The assertion has
been made, and often cited, that the democratic peace is close to
being an empirical law in international relations.43
There is less agreement over the best explanation for
the democratic peace. There are two main theoretical positions:
(1) normative and cultural explanations, and (2) institutional
The
normative-cultural
and
structural
constraints.44
explanations argue that the shared norms of democracies, and
particularly the shared adherence to the rule of law and
commitment to peaceful dispute resolution internally, inform
and influence the approach of democratic governments to
39

See, for example, JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE:
BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (2004), and the critique of this argument by Ryan
Goodman in Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 508; see also
MELVIN SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, INTERNATIONAL WAR: AN ANTHOLOGY VI (2d ed.
1989). For a discussion of this in the context of constitutional control of the decision to
use force, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANS’L L. 449, 454-60 (1998).
40
The literature on the democratic peace is huge. See generally 4 R.J.
RUMMEL, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR (1979); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE
DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993).
41
See, for example, DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown et
al. eds., 1996), particularly Part II for the essays criticizing the democratic peace theories.
42
CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 129 (citing R.J. Rummel, Libertarianism and
International Violence, 27 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 27, 40-47 (1983); Melvin Small & J.
David Singer, The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965, 1 JERUSALEM J.
INT’L REL. 50, 67 (1976)).
43
CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 129 (citing Jack S. Levy, Domestic Politics and
War, in THE ORIGIN AND PREVENTION OF MAJOR WARS 88 (R. Rothberg & T. Rabb eds.,
1988)); Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 507 (citing Jack S. Levy,
The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 139, 160 (1998));
see also Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, 12 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 205, 213, 224 (1983).
44
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed.
1979); Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, supra note 39, at 456.
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resolving disputes that may arise as between democracies.
Moreover, there is a shared respect for the rights of other
people who live in a similar system of self-government. These
shared beliefs, norms and expectations tip the cost-benefit
analysis toward peaceful resolution of disputes when they arise
as among democracies.45
The structural-institutional advocates argue that the
elements of the liberal democratic legal and political system
operate to constrain the government from commencing armed
conflicts. This is entirely in line with the insights of earlier
writers such as Madison, Kant, and Cobden, regarding the
lower likelihood of war when representatives of those who will
pay and die for the war are deciding, since it is more politically
risky for democratic leaders to gamble the blood and treasure
of the nation in war unless it is clearly viewed by the public as
being necessary.46 The arguments are also based in part on the
broader idea that structural checks and balances typical of
democratic systems, and the operation of certain other
institutional features of deliberative democracy, will reduce the
incidence of war.47 We will return to some of these arguments in
more detail below.
The initial insight in this structural argument was
based in part on the understanding that there would be a
significant separation of powers on the decision to go to war in
liberal democracies, which, as will be discussed below, has not
materialized fully in the practice of most modern democracies.
Nonetheless, it continues to be argued that the greater
accountability for decisions and the higher political risk
domestically of initiating war, makes democratic leaders less
likely to wage war.48 While these mechanisms do not seem
45

Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of
Democratic Peace, 1946-1986, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 624, 625 (1993); see also HENKIN,
HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44, at 60-68; Damrosch, Use of Force and
Constitutionalism, supra note 39, at 456; Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, at 230 (explaining how this is an aspect of the second
definitive article in Kant’s Pacific Union).
46
See generally FEDERALIST NO. 41 (Madison), supra note 33; KANT, supra
note 4; Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1. On Richard Cobden, see generally 2
RICHARD COBDEN, SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (John Bright & J.E.
Thorold Rogers eds., 1908), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com
_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=931&Itemid=27.
47
Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1; see also infra Parts III-IV.
48
See generally, e.g., Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, supra
note 39, at 456-57; Maoz & Russett, supra note 45; John R. Oneal et al., The Liberal
Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950-85, 33 J. PEACE
RES. 11 (1996). A recent work suggests that democratic governments will only initiate
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sufficient to have prevented democracies from initiating wars
as against nondemocratic states, they are understood to be part
of the explanation for the democratic peace. One reason for this
is that these mechanisms tend to effectively signal information
to the democracy on the other side, preventing the escalation of
disputes with other democracies, while such signals may be
misunderstood or missed entirely by nondemocratic states.49
These structural reasons are of course not mutually
exclusive of the normative-cultural explanations for the
democratic peace. Michael Doyle has argued that Kant’s theories
provide insight into why liberal democracies might be less
peaceful in their relations with nondemocratic states. Part of
Kant’s theory relied upon the operation of the law of nations,
which in his view would facilitate peace because it would require
a degree of respect for and accommodation of the peoples of other
republics who are similarly self-governing, enjoy the same rights,
and thus share a comparable world view.50 Doyle argued that in
their approach to nondemocratic counterparts, on the other hand,
the behavior of liberal democracies is characterized by what
Hume called an “imprudent vehemence.”51 The rights and
interests of illiberal states and their people are excessively
discounted, and conflicts tend to take on an ideological flavor that
can escalate into crusades. In dealing with strong illiberal states,
this translates into systemic failures to negotiate and missed
opportunities for accommodation, while with weaker illiberal
states it can manifest itself in military interventions and
imperialistic policies.52 These failures flow from an inherent
mistrust and suspicion of the governments of illiberal states, the
more limited commercial and cultural intercourse with them, and
the lack of any sense of shared values at all levels of interaction
wars when there is a substantial probability of winning, or, put another way, the costbenefit analysis is weighted heavily in favor of the benefits. DAN REITER & ALLAN C.
STAM, DEMOCRACIES AT WAR ch. 2 (2002). It is argued that this is the reason that
democracies tend to “win” most of the wars that they initiate. Id.
49
Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, supra note 39, at 456-57.
For a detailed analysis of the signaling value of democratic institutions, albeit in the
context of a war-powers argument against legislative involvement in the decision to use
force, see Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE
L.J. 2512 (2006).
50
Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43,
at 230. For an explanation of the actual structure of Kant’s theory, and the three
definitive articles, see infra text accompanying notes 79-83.
51
Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2, 12
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 324 (1983) (citing David Hume, Of the Balance of Power, in
ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 346-47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963)).
52
Id. at 324.
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between the liberal democracies and the illiberal states.
Moreover, these tendencies are exacerbated by the vulnerabilities
of liberal democratic government to pressure from special interest
groups internally, which can tend to fan the flames of conflict
when mistrust and suspicion is running high.53
These explanations are borne out by more recent
research, grounded in social identity theory in psychology. One
model, referred to as the “identification model,” validates the
insight that the propensity of states to initiate armed conflict
depends to a significant degree on the content of the relations
between the states, and the extent to which the government
and people of the initiating state can “identify” with those of
the counterpart with which a dispute has arisen.54 Moreover,
there is a tendency to ascribe malicious intent to “outsiders”
(non-democracies), and conversely to interpret the actions of
other democracies in a favorable fashion.55
A second model, referred to here as the “emulation model,”
suggests that the tendency to go to war is influenced in part by
the extent to which important states within the international
system have institutionalized and legitimized the use of force in
particular circumstances.56 The examples these states provide
tend to create norms that over time become internalized within
other states, encouraging more aggressive behavior when similar
circumstances arise, even to the point of acting in a manner that
is objectively inconsistent with the functional and strategic
imperatives of the situation.57 It is analogous to how the
individual employment of violence to defend “honor” has been
historically normalized in some macho cultures.58
These two explanations are complementary, and both
help explain why democracies are more peaceful in their
53

Id. at 326.
Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 510-11 (citing
Margaret G. Herann & Charles W. Kegley Jr., Rethinking Democracy and International
Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology, 39 INT’L STUD. Q. 511, 515-17 (1995)).
55
Id. at 510. Goodman notes that there is empirical evidence that this
tendency is common to all states, in that autocracies will “identify” with other
autocracies, and that conflict among like states is lower generally. Id. at 511. Doyle has
argued that, while this is true to some extent, the empirical evidence demonstrates
that the effect is far stronger among democracies. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and
Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, at 222.
56
Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 511-12 (citing JOHN
A. VASQUEZ, THE WAR PUZZLE 161 (1993)).
57
Id. at 511; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory
of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1765-80 (2003).
58
Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 511.
54
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relations among themselves but not necessarily in their
relations with illiberal regimes. These explanations dovetail
with the older cultural-normative arguments, which center on
the influence of such democratic institutions as the rule of law,
and on the identification of people in democracies with those in
other states with similar values and systems. And these new
explanations help to further reconcile the broader debate over
the issue of which explanation for the democratic peace—the
structural-institutional or the normative-cultural—is the most
accurate; for it is likely that they are both valid to varying
degrees in any particular circumstance, and that they operate
together in a mutually-reinforcing manner. And both have
implications for constitutional models aspiring to develop
increased institutional constraints on the use of armed force.
There is something of a dilemma created by this
difference in the propensity of democracies to wage war,
depending upon the nature of its counterparty in any given
circumstance, such that they can be quite aggressive in their
relations with illiberal states. This is because some of the
characteristics that tend to make democracies more prone to
use force in their relations with illiberal states are also the
very characteristics of liberal democracy that give rise to the
democratic peace.59 So how does one address the causes of war
with illiberal states without also undermining factors that
contribute to the democratic peace? I will refer to this as the
“Kantian dilemma,” and it will be an important consideration
in this study of how best to design a constitutional model to
constrain the use of force. For the dilemma requires the
development of mechanisms that will operate to address the
factors that give rise to the “imprudent vehemence” that
facilitates war with illiberal states, while at the same time
ensuring that the mechanisms do not undermine or weaken the

59

Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43,
at 235, in particular identifies this as the key challenge in trying to reduce democratic
tendencies to wage war. The characteristics that help explain the democratic peace, but
which may be factors in the tendency to engage in war with illiberal states, include (1)
the extent to which popular perceptions regarding the political systems and
fundamental values of potential adversaries influence foreign policy, resulting in
respect for and identification with the rights of other democratic peoples, but suspicion,
mistrust, and discounting of the rights of those governed by authoritarian regimes; and
(2) structurally, the manner in which the formation of foreign policy is vulnerable to
undue influence by special interests. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs, Part 2, supra note 51, at 324-27. These ideas also tie in nicely with the liberal
theories of international law compliance, discussed infra Part IV.
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very features of liberal democracy that operate to produce the
democratic peace.60
C.

Image III—The Level of the International System

Turning to the last level, that of the international
system itself, there is again a wide range of theories about the
causes of war that focus on the nature and operation of the
international system.61 Of the relevant theories, the proposition
that the permissiveness of the international system is a
primary cause of war is the most significant, and is central to
our analysis here. It is this explanation that is at the heart of
Waltz’ Image III causes of war.
The Image III explanations focus on the anarchical
structure of the international system of states as the primary
explanation for armed conflict between states.62 The emphasis
on the nature of the interstate system goes back as far as
Thucydides, who argued that one of the central reasons for the
Peloponnesian War was the dynamics of—and responses to—
shifting power among the city-states.63 In the modern era,
Thomas Hobbes provided the most influential argument for the
idea that the anarchy within the interstate system is key to
understanding the reasons for armed conflict.64 As is well
known, Hobbes argued that man in the state of nature is in a
perpetual state of fear and insecurity, not knowing who to trust
and therefore, quite rationally, trusting no one and treating all
as potential enemies. The state of nature is thus a state of war
of all against all. And while man in civil society has been able
to escape from this state of nature by surrendering some
sovereignty to a central authority, a Leviathan with a

60

Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2, supra note 51,
at 344 (“[T]he goal of concerned liberals must be to reduce the harmful impact of the
dilemmas without undermining the successes.”).
61
Some of these theories are not germane to the argument here, for instance,
focus on long-term economic cycles and other systemic explanations that are not
susceptible to law and policy prescriptions. See CASHMAN, supra note 12, at ch. 9.
62
WALTZ, supra note 14, at ch. 6.
63
THUCYDIDES, supra note 11. Michael Doyle described Thucydides as a
“complex realist” for contemplating causes in all three images. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR
AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 1.
64
See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin
Classics 1985) (1651).
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monopoly over the legitimate use of force to impose law and
order upon society, the same is not true of states.65
According to the Hobbesian view, states similarly exist in
a state of nature, but they have not emerged into any form of
civil society, and there is no Leviathan to impose law and order
upon the system.66 Thus, the anarchical system of states
continues to be in a perpetual state of war of all against all—not
in the sense of a continuous and perpetual armed conflict of
course, but in the sense of perpetual enmity and tension that can
at any moment blossom into open hostilities.67 Fear and selfpreservation govern the rational behavior of states, each of
which confronts a profound security dilemma. In a system
characterized by anarchy and comprised of fearful states that
are entirely reliant upon their own use of force for their survival,
the occurrence of armed conflict is virtually inevitable.68 Given
these assumptions, a rational approach to international
relations requires one to focus on the capabilities of states rather
than professed intentions, and the internal dynamics of states
are seen as being much less significant than the external
pressures and security dilemmas created by the international
system itself. This conceptualization of the international system
had a profound impact on thinking within political philosophy
and international relations, and it continues to be one of the
foundational ideas in modern realist international relations
theory, a school to which such influential modern scholars and
practitioners as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry
Kissinger subscribed.69
A somewhat more attenuated view of the nature of the
international system is advanced by what some refer to as the
“liberal realist” school, or the British school of international
relations. Hedley Bull, one of the most important advocates for
this perspective, himself calls it the “Grotian” or
“internationalist” idea of international relations.70 This
65

Id. There is a massive literature on Hobbes, but for the analysis of Hobbes
in the context of the development of legal thinking about war, I have relied upon
Doyle’s Ways of War and Peace, supra note 13, at ch. 3, and Tuck’s The Rights of War
and Peace. RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 4 (1999).
66
DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at 116-17.
67
Id. at 114.
68
Id. at 114-17, 128.
69
See, e.g., GEORGE F. KENNAN, REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1966);
HENRY A. KISSINGER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (expanded ed. 1974); HANS J. MORGENTHAU,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973).
70
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 23 (2d ed. 1995).
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perspective accepts the Hobbesian idea that the international
system is characterized by a certain degree of anarchy. But
rather than complete anarchy, in which there is perpetual
conflict and a total absence of what Hobbes called “sociability,”
Bull argues that there is a society of states within this
somewhat anarchical system. This “anarchical society” is
characterized by a certain degree of order, in which the
conflicts between states are limited and governed by certain
rules and institutions.71
International law is the source of many of these rules
and is one of the fundamental institutions which functions to
create order. In contrast to some realists who dismiss entirely
the effectiveness of international law, or question whether it is
really law properly so called,72 the liberal-realist perspective
accepts that international law operates most fundamentally to
give shape to the system itself. In particular, it does so as the
source of the concept of the sovereign state, which is the
primary constitutive principle of world politics. But it also
provides the corpus of rules of coexistence for those sovereign
states within the anarchical society, and it helps to mobilize
compliance with those rules. The problem, according to this
school of thought, is that while it is generally recognized that
there is a very substantial degree of conformity with
international law generally, that compliance is not necessarily
motivated by respect for the law or because international law
exercises a powerful force over state action.73 When state
interest diverges from compliance, particularly on issues
relating
to
national
security
and
self-preservation,
international law is not always by itself capable of restraining
state action.74 Thus, in this respect, the internationalist school
shares to some degree the Hobbesian realist view that the
permissiveness of the international system constitutes one of
the causes of war.
71

Id. at 25.
See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that the behavior of states in international society
is a function of self-interest, and that international law does not shape such behavior
as much as it merely reflects and results from coordination and cooperation aspects of
state interaction); MORGENTHAU, supra note 69, at ch. 18 (arguing that while
international law exists, and plays a role in international relations, it is largely and
necessarily decentralized, which makes it ineffective as enforceable law); see also
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44, at Introduction, ch. 1 (discussing the
realist skepticism towards international law).
73
BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY, supra note 70, at 135.
74
Id. at 137.
72
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Moreover, Bull argues that war itself continues to be one
of the institutions that operates within the international society
to maintain order. He concedes that this function is much
attenuated relative to its role up to the end of the nineteenth
century, largely due to the introduction of nuclear weapons into
the dynamic of balance of power politics.75 Nonetheless, the
internationalist perspective emphasizes that war has two
aspects: first, as a manifestation of disorder and a threat to the
continued structure of the society, for which reason international
society seeks to restrain it and keep it within the bounds of
limiting rules; and second, as a means by which the
international society sometimes enforces international law.76
This point will be returned to in both the discussion of the
history of the laws of war and in the examination of the modern
system, but it may be noted that collective security operations as
authorized by the U.N. Security Council constitute the use of
force for the purposes of imposing peace and security, and
enforcing international law norms.
Turning to the liberal view of the causes of war at the
international level, it was mentioned earlier that Kant’s own
theory on perpetual peace straddled Image II and Image III, but
was rooted primarily in the latter.77 The establishment of a
constitutional republican system at the domestic level was
necessary, but not sufficient. Kant also accepted the Hobbsesian
idea of states being in a perpetual state of war, and he thus
argued that the state of peace must be formally instituted
through the development of a form of federal system among
republics.78 This federal system would be founded on a multi-level
constitutional order, involving three kinds of rights operating on
both the domestic and the international levels. These three rights
were given form in three “definitive articles” of the perpetual
peace, which have been described as “articles in a metaphorical
‘treaty’” that would be the foundation of the federation.79
The first article related to the “rights of man,” the
protection of which required the embrace of the republican
form of constitutional government at the domestic level, which
75

Id. at 181-83, 187-88.
Id. at 181-83.
77
DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 8.
78
KANT, supra note 4, at 98, 102. In this sense, some have argued that Kant
was very much in the humanist school. See, e.g., TUCK, supra note 65, at 207-08.
79
Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, at 225.
For Kant’s articulation of the three definitive articles, see KANT, supra note 4, at 99-108.
76
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we discussed above in the Image II analysis. The second
definitive article related to the “right of nations,” which
required the creation of a federation of free states in which
these rights could be adequately secured without recourse to
war.80 The idea was that while states existing in the state of
nature would typically seek to enforce their rights by war, this
could be avoided by binding states in a federation and thereby
protecting their rights, just as the rights of man were secured
by entry into the constitutional order of the republican form of
government.81 Finally, the third definitive article similarly
related to the international level, but required that a
“cosmopolitan right” be enforced through the requirement that
foreigners be accepted without hostility, thereby facilitating
interstate relations and commercial relationships.82 The
underlying idea here was that increased interconnection and
the development of bonds of various kinds between states
would operate to further constrain the tendency towards
conflict, an idea that was more systematically developed by the
liberal economic theorist Adam Smith and his followers.83
What is striking about Kant’s theory, in the context of
the argument being advanced here, is that it clearly understood
the need to implement a system of interlocking constitutional
orders at both the domestic and the international level, as part
of a coherent and systematic design to reduce the incidence of
war. It recognized that any ambition to limit warfare must
target the state, interstate, and the transnational legal
structures if it is to maximize its chances of success.
Kenneth Waltz—the modern realist who developed this
very three-image framework—also embraced the idea that the
causes of war must be understood in terms of all three levels
simultaneously. He concluded his classic study by arguing that
no single image is ever adequate to explain the prevalence of
war, or sufficient for the purposes of developing prescriptions to
reduce the incidence of war.84 To be sure, Waltz—like most
realists—emphasized the importance of Image III explanations,
but he also cautioned that overemphasis of any one image will
80

KANT, supra note 4, at 102-05.
The other alternative, rather than war or federation, was a form of world
government or super-state, along the lines suggested by Rousseau, which Kant rejected
as likely to lead to tyranny. Id. at 102-05.
82
Id. at 105-08.
83
On the liberal economic theories as they relate to the causes of war, see
DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 7.
84
WALTZ, supra note 14, at 227.
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cause a distorted understanding of the problem. All causes, he
argued, are interrelated in vital ways. In particular, he
suggested that factors relating to Images I and II, such as
individual motives and misperceptions, the structures of the
states involved, and their specific histories, cultures, and
traditions, will be the immediate or “efficient cause” of any
given war. But it is the permissive nature of the international
system itself, together with the security dilemmas that it
creates, that will allow such wars to occur without restraint. As
he put it most succinctly:
That state A wants certain things that it can get only by war does
not explain war. Such a desire may or may not lead to war. My
wanting a million dollars does not cause me to rob a bank, but if it
were easier to rob banks, such desires would lead to much more bank
robbing. This does not alter the fact that some people will and some
will not attempt to rob banks no matter what the law enforcement
situation is. We still have to look to motivation and circumstance in
order to explain individual acts. Nevertheless one can predict that
other things being equal, a weakening of law enforcement agencies
will lead to an increase in crime. From this point of view it is social
structure—institutionalized restraints and institutionalized methods
of altering and adjusting interests—that count.85

The argument being developed in this article thus
begins with the premise that while international law plays an
important role in constraining the use of force, it is not
sufficient. At the same time, while the permissiveness of the
international legal system is an important cause of war
generally, the absence of legal constraints and structural
mechanisms at the domestic level, which could operate to
restrain the immediate or efficient cause of war in any
particular instance, is also significant.
A review of the historical development of the law and
legal theory on constraining the resort to war suggests that up
until the nineteenth century there was some understanding of
this requirement to address the causes of war at all three
levels. However, despite broad agreement in modern
international relations theory that factors at all three levels
are significant causes of war, in the twentieth century we have
increasingly placed our reliance solely upon the international
law system to limit armed conflict, and have ignored the
domestic mechanisms of legal constraint. In the next Part, I
explore those developments in more detail.
85

Id. at 231.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON WAR

The history of the laws of war, and of legal thinking
about war and peace, is obviously very long and quite
complicated,86 and there is no need to review the entire history
here. There are several reasons, however, why we need to
examine some aspects of at least the modern history of these
developments, including a review of the current state of legal
constraints on the use of armed force. First, in order to suggest
that the current systems are inadequate, we need to be sure we
understand the contours and operation of those systems—
hence the discussion of the current state of both international
and constitutional law constraints. Second, the examination of
the developments of the twentieth century and the operation of
the current systems more specifically illustrate that there is an
almost exclusive reliance upon international law, and disregard
for constitutional law and other domestic mechanisms for
limiting the use of armed force. Third, the review of the earlier
history, in addition to helping us understand the origins of
important elements of the current system, suggests that this
narrow reliance on legal constraints at the international level
is historically anomalous, which is yet another reason to
reconsider whether it is optimal to disregard the domestic
levels of control.
A.

Just War Theory—From Early Origins to the Nineteenth
Century

As with so much else, we can trace the seeds of modern
thinking about constraints on war back to Greek and Roman
history. While what we would call jus ad bellum was not well
developed in classical Greece, Thucydides wrote of legal norms
and peace treaties operating as potential constraints on the
86

For a recent work that does a magnificent job of providing a detailed
examination of the history of the legal constraints on war, upon which I have relied
extensively, see STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY
(2005). Also, for an ambitious and sweeping exploration of the historical relationship
among strategy, law, and history in the evolution of war and constitutional forms, see
PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY
(2002); DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER (2002).
This treatment of the development of the laws on war is focused almost exclusively on
Western legal systems. As Neff points out, there were important developments in both
Islamic law and Chinese thinking regarding legal constraints on war, but neither of these
systems ultimately had much influence on the later development of modern international
law or on the origins of Western constitutional democracy, which are the two legal
systems that I am most concerned with here. NEFF, supra, at 39-45.
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recourse to war,87 and the Romans had a fairly elaborate legal
code, the jus fetiales, which governed how and on what basis the
Republic could use force against other peoples.88 Of greatest
significance for our purposes, however, was the Greek
philosophers’ development of the idea of “natural law,” the
concept that there was a set of universal norms that applied to all
peoples at all times. Originating with Aristotle, the concept was
more fully elaborated and refined by the Stoics in the third
century BCE.89 Cicero, in the later period of the Roman republic,
combined these ideas of natural law with the basic principle
within the jus fetiale that Rome required some legally sanctioned
justification to commence armed conflict.90 Cicero elaborated a
universal principle according to which there were two specific
natural law justifications for the resort to war: the punishment of
an enemy for wrongdoing, and repelling an attack. The
overarching purpose of the universal principle—that the aim of
war should be to achieve peace—also served as a limitation.91
Built upon these origins, Christian theologians
developed the moral and legal framework for thinking about
war, what would come to be called “just war theory.” It was the
dominant legal paradigm on recourse to war well into the
eighteenth century, and vestiges of it inform the current legal
system.92 St. Augustine (354-430 CE) wove together Stoic ideas
of natural law, Christian theology on pacifism and nonviolence,
and Cicero’s arguments regarding war being waged justly for
the purposes of establishing peace, and developed the principle
that war could be waged so long as it was: (i) “waged for a ‘just
cause’”; (ii) “waged [for the] ‘right intention,’ [meaning] to do
87

See DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at 58-59. Thucydides
recounts how the Corinthians appealed to the Athenian Assembly just prior to the
outbreak of the war, attempting to persuade the Athenians not to become involved in
the likely hostilities between Corinth and Corcyra. The Corinthians explicitly grounded
their arguments against any Athenian use of force in legal and moral terms. The
appeal was unsuccessful, Corcyra having successfully played upon Athenian fears and
insecurities so as to obtain Athenian support, but the account nonetheless suggests the
existence of widely understood and acknowledged legal and moral norms governing
recourse to war. THUCYDIDES, supra note 11, at 53-62; see also Adriaan Lanni, The
Laws of War in Ancient Greece, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 469, 471 (2008).
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[hereinafter Draper, Grotius]; G.I.A.D. Draper, The Origins of the Just War Tradition, 46
NEW BLACKFRIARS 82, 82-83 (2007); see also NEFF, supra note 86, at 27-29.
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NEFF, supra note 86, at 32-34.
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good or to avoid evil”; and (iii) “waged on the authority of a
[P]rince.”93 Implicit in this, of course, was the notion that only
one side in a war could legitimately claim to have a just cause.94
From this foundation, just war theory became increasingly
elaborate and sophisticated over the next several centuries,
with St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-74) refining the doctrine and
greatly increasing its influence.95
It is important to recall, however, that prior to the
establishment of the Westphalian system in 1648 there was not
an international system of sovereign states, and there was no
separate body of law governing the relations among the
princely realms that did exist.96 Moreover, “war” was not a legal
state, but rather was simply a term used to describe organized
violence, whether it involved conflict between or among clans,
regions, princely states, nonstate entities such as the papacy,
bandits, or rebellious peasants.97 The key point is that there
was only one overarching body of law, derived from natural
law, which governed all aspects of war on an individual level.98
The state did not yet have legal identity, and was not the
subject of the law as we now understand it to be in
international law.99 The only subject of natural law was the
individual, and thus the single system of law operated to
constrain all entities that might be involved in the activity of
war through the individuals directing it or engaging in the
conflict. As such, the single system of natural law operated to
93

Draper, Grotius, supra note 88, at 180.
NEFF, supra note 86, at 47; Draper, Grotius, supra note 88, at 180; see also
WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (Michael Byers trans.,
rev. ed. 2000); M.H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 65-66 (1965).
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There were also theoretical schisms in the later medieval period, and the
differences would continue to echo in thinking about the laws of war into the twentieth
century, but we need not delve into those differences here. For a detailed analysis of
the difference between the scholastics and the humanist schools of just war theory, see,
for example, TUCK, supra note 65.
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NEFF, supra note 86.
97
Bobbitt notes that even as late as 1500, there were over 500 princely
domains, city-states, and disputed regions within Europe. BOBBITT, supra note 86, at
96. For a fascinating if depressing account of the wars waged by the Papacy during
part of this period, see TUCHMAN, supra note 25, at ch. 3.
98
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distinctions made between legal regimes at all. Thus, for instance, distinct from the
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was derivative of Roman military law, and these two systems were not merged until
the sixteenth century. KEEN, supra note 94, at 9-15; NEFF, supra note 86, at 69-70.
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NEFF, supra note 86, at 56. For more discussion of the evolution of the
state, and the relationship between war, law, and the constitutional structure of the
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address the causes of war at all levels that then existed. And
there is evidence that actual practice in relation to the waging
of war was to some degree influenced by this body of law.100
The emergence of a dual system of law, in which there
was a truly independent legal system that governed the
recourse to war at the interstate level, and which formed the
foundation for modern international law, came with the
emergence of the sovereign territorial state in the Westphalian
system and the development of the law of nations in the early
seventeenth century. The major innovation of Hugo Grotius,
who is generally credited with the elaboration of the law of
nations in his On the Law of War and Peace (first published in
1625, just as the Westphalian system was coming into
existence), was the concept of a distinct “law of nations”—a
legal system not entirely divorced from natural law, but in
which the rights and duties of sovereign states was the primary
focus.101 Most significantly, states were the subject of this
system of law. It was positivist in nature and derived in part
from the actual practice of states, and it was the conduct of and
relations among states that were governed by the law. As it
related to the recourse to war, the law of nations governed
state action, rather than that of individuals as in all earlier
laws of war.102 There thus developed a dual aspect to the legal
thinking about war, in which the law of nature continued to
form the foundation of the framework, but a “voluntary law”
comprising the law of nations supplemented the natural law
principles, with ever-increasing importance over time.103
Even within this dual system, however, both systems of
law were understood to govern and constrain the resort to war.
Grotius elaborated the just causes for which a state had a right
to engage in war, and these just causes were understood to be
100

NEFF, supra note 86, at 69.
See TUCK, supra note 65, at 81-83. The Peace of Westphalia actually
comprised several separate peace treaties entered into over a period of decades,
culminating in a peace Congress convened in 1644. Negotiations at the Congress
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and Spain. BOBBITT, supra note 86, at 501-08. In this sense, the publication of Grotius’s
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influence by the time of the final peace conference.
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NEFF, supra note 86, at 85; see also TUCK, supra note 65, at ch. 3
(presenting a rather different analysis of Grotius’s theory); Hedley Bull, The
Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 88.
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principles of the law of nations.104 Nonetheless, they were in
part derived from the law of nature, and grew directly out of
the earlier just war theory. Indeed, a state’s offenses against
the laws of nature constituted one of the just causes that
provided other states with the right to wage war against it in
order to impose punishment and enforce the law. The broad
proposition was that violations of the laws of nature by a state
on the domestic level could provide the justification under the
law of nations for other states to wage war against the
offender.105 While this example relates to the justification for
war rather than its legal constraints, implicit in it is an
understanding of a close relationship between the domestic
operation of the law of nature and the legitimacy of war under
the international law of nations. Indeed, as Neff puts it, the
two systems formed a kind of partnership, and over time the
strands of both would be woven together to develop the modern
system of international law—but in the seventeenth century
there remained a distinct duality in their approaches to the
issues of war and peace.106 As such, in terms of the three Images
on the causes of war, the natural law system continued to
operate so as to address individual and group dynamics at the
domestic level, and the new law of nations began to govern the
conduct of states at the third level, in the emerging system of
truly sovereign states.
This Grotian conceptualization of the laws of war, with
the dual elements of natural law and a law of nations that was
still very much infused with just war theory, became the
mainstream perspective in the late sixteenth and seventeenth
century. It was also becoming more clearly established within
this perspective that war constituted a legal state that
triggered the operation of a lex specialis, rather than being a
simple description of a particular kind of violence, and
moreover, states alone could legitimately engage in the use of
armed force under the laws of war.107 But in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, aspects of the mainstream view came
under pressure from two other schools of thought on the laws of
104

Id. at 96-102.
It was also a rather convenient justification for the imperialist conduct of
European states, particularly the Netherlands, to which Grotius was trying to return
from exile. See BOBBITT, supra note 86, at 510-12; TUCK, supra note 65, at 102-04. It
thus appears that the basis for concerns that humanitarian intervention may serve as
a pretext for self-interested policy has ancient roots.
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war. Both of these accepted the dual operation of natural law
and the law of nations, and that war constituted a legal state,
but they had very different understandings of how the two
systems of law operated in times of war and peace. For very
different reasons, both of these schools adhered to the view
that can be summed up in the phrase “might makes right.” One
of the schools was of course associated with Thomas Hobbes,
and his ideas that war was the normal state of nature for
states and that the use of armed force was entirely justifiable
for self-preservation.108
We need not worry about the details of that intellectual
conflict here, but the result was that by the end of the
eighteenth century the conflict had left a somewhat incoherent
jus ad bellum system with little in common with its just war
origins, and even less real normative power as a legal
constraint on the use of armed force. Indeed, international law
generally, and the law of war in particular, was increasingly
understood to bear little relationship to any overarching
natural law system. This humanist and positivist view of the
law was increasingly utilitarian, technocratic in outlook, and
rationalist.109 As part of this development, in the nineteenth
century war was elevated to the status of an “institution” of
international law.110 In part this was a reflection of the
development of a robust jus in bello regime; but war was also
an institution in the sense that it was viewed as being simply
one among many tools of statecraft. In Clausewitz’ famous
dictum, war was merely policy pursued by other means.111 It
was not only justifiable for self-preservation along Hobbesian
lines, but also had become a permissible means to further the
vital interests of the state.
This shift away from the last vestiges of just war
theory—the notion that war had to be justified in terms of selfdefense, restoring that which was owed, or punishment for
violations of natural law—and the move to ideas according to
which armed force could be employed whenever it would
further the state’s vital interests, essentially emasculated the
108

See HOBBES, supra note 64, at 223-28; see also NEFF, supra note 86, at 13337; TUCK, supra note 65, at 126-39.
109
NEFF, supra note 86, at 161-62.
110
Id. at 177, 186-89. Here, “institution” means that there was a highly
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and consequences of war once the legal state of war had been triggered. Id. at 177.
111
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds.,
trans., 1976) (1832).
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jus ad bellum regime altogether. In legal terms, the use of
armed force, the commencement of war, did not constitute a
wrong either to the state that was attacked or to the broader
community of states.112 Indeed, war became a legitimate means
of settling disputes, and could give rise to legal rights and
establishing claims. The question of justification for the resort
to war was relegated to the domain of morality and ethics,
while the decision itself was governed only by the utilitarian
calculus of policy imperatives. As a result, the distinction
between self-defense and aggression became essentially
meaningless in terms of international law.113 In this sense, the
centuries-long conception of legal constraints on the use of
force, which had at least in theory addressed the causes of war
at both the domestic and the international levels, receded into
dormancy in the nineteenth century.
B.

Early Constitutional Constraints

Even as state practice in Europe increasingly reflected
the more realist premises of the two dissenting schools, and the
influence of the mainstream theory on the legal limits on war
began to fade into irrelevance, there emerged new ideas about
legal constraints on the use of force within the domestic legal
systems. These ideas, which held out some promise of
addressing the causes of war at the domestic level just as the
combined natural law and law of nations constraints receded,
developed from new thinking about the internal distribution of
power and authority, in what would later be called
constitutional law. The early developments as they related to the
waging of war can be traced in their modern form to the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England.114 In the Bill of Rights,
which was the product of the settlement between the English
Parliament and the King, the monarchy was prohibited from
raising standing armies in times of peace without parliamentary
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GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE 5 & n.3, 15, 322-23 (1999). For further discussion of
the relationship between the rise of constitutional control over the military and the use
of force, and international law, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Interface of National
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DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-60
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consent.115 Parliament also gained control over the budget, and
thus with these two powers gained a degree of control over the
executive’s ability to take the state to war, though the decision
itself remained entirely within the Royal Prerogative.116
These ideas took root in the new constitutional
experiment that was undertaken in the United States one
hundred years later. The Articles of Confederation, the first
constitution of the thirteen colonies, ratified in 1781, placed the
power to declare war in the central government (being the
States in Congress), but prohibited the central government
from engaging in war, granting letters of marque or reprisal in
time of peace, or entering into any alliances, “unless nine
States assent to the same.”117 The U.S. Constitution further
developed these ideas on the constitutional control of the use of
armed force, ideas that were to a considerable extent grounded
in concerns over the relationship between domestic
constitutional structure and international relations.118 The
Constitution not only included a broad legislative control over
the raising, maintaining, regulating, and funding of the
nation’s army and navy, as well as militias,119 but it provided
that the Congress had the power “[t]o declare war, grant letters
of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on
land and water.”120
This provision is at the heart of the ongoing war powers
debate, with intense disagreement about the original meaning
and intent of the language and how it ought to be interpreted
today. But without getting mired in the details of that debate
here, this granting of authority to the legislature over the steps
that were then understood to constitute the initiation of war
was a legal mechanism designed to constrain the executive’s
115
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ability to go to war.121 James Madison, in particular, thought
that wars could only be avoided by developing domestic
constitutional mechanisms to make it difficult for governments
to decide to go to war. Foreshadowing Kant, he thought that
any solution to the scourge of war was to be found first in the
establishment of republican self-government, since once the
decision to go to war was subjected to the will of the people,
wars waged for the benefit of the rulers (which he viewed as
the most common class of war) would be unlikely.122 In order to
discourage wars fought on the instigation of society itself
(which he identified as the second and less common class of
war), Madison argued that the state required constitutional
mechanisms to ensure that the costs of the war would be
internalized and borne by the society, rather than being
externalized to other peoples and future generations.123
Similar ideas regarding legislative control over the
executive decision to wage war can be found in the short-lived
French revolutionary Constitution of 1791.124 It provided that
121

I use the word “war” here quite deliberately, as one of the flash-points of
the current debate is whether the provision constrained the executive power to use
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war could only be declared by the legislative body, acting on a
formal proposal by the monarch.125 In addition, however, it
included a provision authorizing the executive to act first in the
case of emergency, but requiring the King to obtain ex post
approval within a limited time frame, which the legislature
could withhold and thereby force an end to hostilities. Moreover,
and even more startling, the Constitution of 1791 provided for
the legislature to commence criminal prosecution of any
ministers of the Crown that were determined to have engaged in
“culpable aggression.”126 The Constitution of 1791 only survived
for a couple of years, victim to the unfolding dynamics of the
revolution, yet it reveals the currency of ideas at the time for
using constitutional mechanisms to constrain the government
from engaging in armed conflict. As we will see, these ideas have
not blossomed into more robust domestic systems in the
constitutional democracies of the twentieth century.
C.

The Twentieth Century Jus ad Bellum Regime127

In examining the current state of legal constraints, we
begin with the international law system as it developed in the
twentieth century. There was a strong revival of the legal
constraints on the recourse to war beginning at the end of the
nineteenth century, but only at the level of the international
system. While the nineteenth century was largely
characterized by the limited “cabinet wars” in Europe, which
reflected the Clausewitzian notion of using force for the
achievement of policy objectives that furthered the interests of
the state and maintained the balance of power, the American
Civil War in the second half of the century was a harbinger of
the modern war—war in which the whole nation, its entire
economy, and all of its industry and manpower were devoted to
an endeavor that was itself transformed by the technological
advances of the late nineteenth century.128 By the end of the
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century, there was a growing sense that some limits were
required. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were the
first efforts to place legal limits on the use of armed force as a
legitimate means of dispute resolution.129 But the relevant
provisions merely bound state parties to pursue negotiation
with the assistance of the good offices of friendly states prior to
making “an appeal to arms.”130
The effort to develop constraints on recourse to war
picked up steam after the potential horror of the modern total
war was fully manifested in World War I, referred to in its
aftermath as the “war to end all wars.” The Covenant of the
League of Nations, adopted in 1919 as a part of the peace
process, reestablished the just war theory premise that peace is
the natural state within the international society,131 and it took
the first tentative steps towards the establishment of a form of
collective security system.132 But it only prescribed cooling-off
periods and arbitration procedures that had to be fulfilled prior
to commencing war, and did not entirely prohibit recourse to
war itself, even in the form of aggression.133
In 1928, however, the Pact of Paris, or the KelloggBriand Agreement as it came to be known, became the first
multilateral treaty that purported to establish a true
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see also Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899,
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International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199 [hereinafter 1907 Convention];
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prohibition on the aggressive recourse to war.134 The agreement
itself purported to renounce all recourse to war, and it was
silent on the scope of the prohibition and the existence of any
exceptions, but there was an exchange of diplomatic notes
during the negotiations that articulated a shared
understanding that the proposed agreement did not extend to
the exercise of self-defense.135 The agreement also contained an
implicit collective security component, as the preamble
provided that any state party that violated the terms of the
agreement would be denied its benefits. In other words, states
would not be prohibited by the agreement from using armed
force against any state that stood in violation of the treaty.136
Over 40 states were party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact by 1929
when it came into force, and there are currently 69 parties to
the treaty.137 While it failed to provide for any enforcement
mechanism, it was the first modern international law
prohibition on the aggressive use of force.
Both the League of Nations system and the KelloggBriand Pact were discredited by their failure to prevent the
mounting incidences of aggressive war—the Japanese
occupation of Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia
being the most serious—which ultimately led to the complete
breakdown of the system in World War II. One of the
shortcomings of both the League of Nations Charter and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, quite apart from the absence of any
effective enforcement mechanism, was the focus on the concept
of “war” alone.138 This left a number of well established uses of
force that fell short of war as it was then understood—
particularly reprisals, interventions, and acts of necessity—
outside of the scope of the prohibition. Nonetheless, the
prosecutions of the former leaders of Nazi Germany and Japan
for aggression, or “crimes against peace,” were based on the
134
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breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, both re-affirming the
prohibition on aggressive recourse to war and creating personal
criminal liability for its violation.139
The final steps towards the development of the modern
jus ad bellum regime, and the establishment of a more robust
collective security system, were taken with the creation of the
United Nations in 1945. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”140 The only exceptions provided were for the exercise
of individual and collective self-defense upon the occurrence of
an armed attack (Article 51), or for collective use of force by
members as authorized and directed by the Security Council
upon a determination that there is a threat to or has been a
breach of the peace and security of the international
community (Articles 39, 42 and 43).
It will be noted that the word “war” is absent from the
prohibition in Article 2(4), and indeed from anywhere else in the
Charter other than the preamble. Learning from the failures of
the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the
prohibition extends to all uses and even threats of the use of
force. As such, it made irrelevant all the earlier debates over
how to distinguish between reprisals, interventions, acts of
necessity, and war, since all use of force was similarly
prohibited.141 The system also reflects a return to some aspects of
the Grotian perspectives on just war theory, in that it presumes
that the normal state of affairs in the international system is
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International Court of Justice to be quite low, and significantly lower than the scale
and intensity of force required to qualify as an “armed attack” that can justify the use
of force in self-defense. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua
v. U.S.]; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1355 (Nov. 6, 2003).
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one of peace,142 and the collective security system reflects
elements of the law enforcement character of just war theory.
The U.N. collective security system is implemented by
both the collective self-defense and collective security
components of the Charter. Collective self-defense, provided for
in Article 51, permits member states to use force against an
aggressor state in the event of its armed attack on some other
member, regardless of whether the attack constitutes any
immediate threat to the state responding with force to the
attack on the victim.143 This goes well beyond the notion of selfdefense in its original natural law sense, which was analogous
to the right of self-defense exercised by an individual, being a
proportionate use of force immediately necessary to prevent an
ongoing attack on oneself. It is much more in line with notions
of using armed force to enforce the law and punish
transgressions in the Grotian scheme.144 The modern rationale
is based on the view that any act of aggression constitutes a
threat to the entire international system, and that, like a
contagion, unchecked aggression has the tendency to spread,
creating costs and risks for other states initially unaffected.145
The second element of the collective security system, as
provided for in Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, contemplates the
United Nations itself using armed force, employing the armed
forces of contributing members, in order to restore or maintain
peace and security. By virtue of Article 2(6), this means that
the United Nations may use force against nonmember states,
and even nonstate entities.146 The operation of Article 42 has
evolved over time such that member states are typically
authorized by the United Nations Security Council to use force
on behalf of the United Nations to restore and maintain peace

142

U.N. Charter, preamble, art. 1.
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 25256; GRAY, supra note 141, 167-71.
144
The Grotian notion of “defensive war” was much more expansive than the
natural law right to self-defense. See NEFF, supra note 86, at 127. Interestingly, the
concept of individual self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is clearly a
restoration of the very narrow natural law conception, in contrast to the just war
theory notions of defensive war. NEFF, supra note 86, at 326.
145
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 25356; see also GRAY, supra note 141, at 138-41.
146
Article 2, paragraph 6 of the U.N. Charter provides, “The Organization
shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in
accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security.” For discussion of its operation, see DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 91-92.
143
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and security, as coalitions under American leadership have
most famously done in the Korean War and the Gulf War.147
The U.N. Charter is not the exclusive source of the
principles of jus ad bellum. Treaties such as the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea148 repeat the
principles, and there are a number of treaties, including the
Kellogg-Briand Pact itself, which predate the U.N. Charter but
remain in effect.149 More importantly, customary international
law is a distinct source of the rules of jus ad bellum. As the
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States
(Merits) held, there is considerable overlap between the treaty
regime and the principles of jus ad bellum in customary
international law (customary international law having evolved
over the last sixty years from the widespread state practice in
conformity with the U.N. Charter system), but there are
important reasons for making the distinction and
acknowledging the independent existence of the principles in
customary law.150 The Court noted that there are some
important differences between the treaty and customary
principles, particularly in the area of self-defense.151 Moreover,
customary international law will evolve over time, and so the
differences between the Charter regime and the customary
international law principles may well increase as a result, and
indeed have likely already developed somewhat since the
Nicaragua decision.152 These differences will be important in
147

THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 24-30 (2002) The exact nature and legal authority for
both these wars remain controversial. Dinstein, for instance, insists that the U.N.
Security Council resolutions did not authorize the use of force under Article 42 and
that these were collective self-defense operations under Article 51. DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 273-77, 292-96; see also GRAY,
supra note 141, at 258-59 (for a discussion that is much closer to Franck on this issue).
148
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 301, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
149
These would include the Pan American Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression
and Conciliation art. 1, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3363, 163 L.N.T.S. 393; see also
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 97-98.
150
Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at 93-97.
151
Id. Also, famously, Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion argued that
Article 51, with its condition precedent of an armed attack, constituted the codification
of only one of several legitimate grounds for the exercise of self-defense, though this
remains a minority view. See DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra
note 129, at 95-96, 183-85 (noting and refuting Judge Schwebel’s interpretation); GRAY,
supra note 141, at 171-73.
152
The response to the attacks by non-state actors on 9/11, in the form of the
invasion of Afghanistan under the asserted authority of collective self-defense pursuant
to Article 51, will likely have an impact on customary international law. See DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 207.
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our consideration of how best to operationalize the
constitutional incorporation of principles of jus ad bellum.
The jus ad bellum regime that has emerged since the
adoption of the U.N. Charter is unquestionably the most robust
and stringent of any system that has existed in the history of
legal constraints on recourse to war. And as was noted above, it
incorporates aspects of the earlier just war theory. But it is an
entirely positivist conceptualization of the laws of war, and in
many respects it has a far thinner theoretical and philosophical
foundation than prior systems of thought on war, and certainly
as compared to just war theory itself.153 The just war theory, both
before Grotius and after, was founded squarely in a deep
understanding of natural law, interwoven with theological and
ethical theories, while the U.N. Charter is the secular product of
lawyers and statesmen, operating in the wake of and in response
to the worst global conflict in our history.154 This is significant in
the context of international law’s role in mobilizing support for
and encouraging compliance with its rules. Without a deeper
philosophical foundation, which might operate to bind all the
states within the international society with a sense of shared
values and investment in the system, in the way that natural
law clearly did in medieval Europe, the U.N. Charter may have
difficulty in attracting sufficient compliance.
Certainly the incidence of illegitimate uses of force
continues apace, often comprising naked acts of aggression in
violation of Article 2(4) and frequently perpetrated by liberal
democratic states. Indeed, just ten years after the exhausted
allied powers ended the worst armed conflict in the history of
the world and established the United Nations system, two of
those countries conspired in an act of aggression in the Suez
crisis of 1956. Notwithstanding internal legal advice that there
was no legal basis in international law for the use of armed
force against Egypt after it nationalized the canal zone, the
government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden in Britain
conspired with the governments of France and Israel to create
a fraudulent pretext for intervention, and then invaded Egypt
according to plan, in violation of international law.155
153

NEFF, supra note 86, at 317.
Id.
155
BARRY TURNER, SUEZ 1956: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIRST OIL WAR
(2006). The senior legal advisor to the Foreign Office, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, argued
that “there was no legal basis for armed intervention of a neutral state to protect
property or to guarantee freedom of passage through a canal or to prevent further
violence.” Id. at 204. The conspiracy involved an agreement among the governments of
154
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What is more, Eden made the decision without even
consulting the entire cabinet, far less parliament.156 That there
were no constitutional or statutory limits on the prime
minister’s discretion to launch the country into a disastrous
war is striking. The fact remains that very few constitutional
democracies have domestic legal regimes that constrain in any
meaningful way how the executive branch of government
decides to go to war, an issue we turn to next.
D.

The Current Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force

During the same period in which the modern jus ad
bellum regime blossomed, the world also saw the spread of
democracy and constitutionalism. Seven distinct “waves” of
democratic constitution-making have been identified, and five
of these have occurred since the end of World War I, with most
of them coming after World War II.157 Although not all
democracies have constitutions, and not all the new
constitutional democracies would meet many definitions of
“liberal democracy,” the world has in some real sense seen the
materialization of Kant’s predicted spread of republicanism.
Yet, notwithstanding this spread of constitutional democracy,
there has been little systemic development of constitutional
constraints on the use of force.
Constitutional constraints can generally be divided into
two categories. The first, what we may call the “separation of
powers” class of constitutional limits, are primarily concerned
the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, for Israel to launch a limited attack against
Egypt in the Sinai, thereby creating a pretext for a British and French “intervention,”
involving an invasion of Egyptian territory around the Suez. Id. at 288-301.
156
Id.
157
Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanism in the Constitution-Making Process, 45
DUKE L.J. 364, 368-69 (1995). One recent study, which focused on only the 162
independent states with populations over 500,000, determined that 92 were democracies.
MONTY G. MARSHALL & BENJAMIN R. COLE, GLOBAL REPORT 2009: CONFLICT,
GOVERNANCE, AND STATE FRAGILITY (2009), available at http://www.systemicpeace.
org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf. The most recent Freedom House report states that that
there were 119 democracies in the world in 2009. Electoral Democracies 2009, FREEDOM
HOUSE (2009), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=477&year=2009. Most of
the expansion has come since 1946, at which time there were only twenty democracies
among the world’s independent states; the most rapid increase has been since the end of
the Cold War. MARSHALL & COLE, supra, at 11. It is not the case, of course, that all these
democracies have constitutions or are “constitutional democracies,” but a large
percentage are. One of the most widely recognized databases and studies for the
measurement of the degree of democracy among states is the Polity IV Project at the
University of Maryland. See POLITY IV PROJECT, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/
polity4.htm (last updated Sept. 9, 2010).
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with governing which branch of government has the authority to
initiate armed conflict or establish states of emergency requiring
a military response. The separation of powers limits, as we saw
earlier in the discussion of the English Bill of Rights, the U.S.
Constitution, and the French Constitution of 1791, were the first
constitutional provisions relating to the use of force to be
developed. Such provisions do not, however, bear in any way on
the legal justifications for engaging in armed conflict.
In contrast, the constitutional provisions comprising the
second category, what we may call the “international law” class of
constraints, are designed to implement or incorporate principles
of international law relating to the use of force. It was not until
the early twentieth century, when international law itself began
to move towards limiting the recourse to war, that the first
constitution articulated a prohibition on the use of force.158 The
first such constitution was the Constitution of the Philippines of
1935, which provided that the Philippines “renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation.”159
Its inspiration was the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation
of war clause, and provisions of the Weimer Constitution and the
Constitution of Spain for the clause adopting generally accepted
principles of international law.160
In this sense, the Philippine Constitution of 1935
illustrated both the general (provisions that make
international law as a whole the law of the land) and the
particular (provisions that purport to implement very specific
principles of international law) incorporation of international
law. The general incorporation of international law is much
158

The short-lived French Constitution of 1791 was ahead of its time, and the
development of international law, in providing for individual criminal liability for
complicity in executive decisions leading to acts of aggression.
159
CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 3 (Phil.) (translation from the Chan Robles
Virtual Law Library of the Laws of the Philippines, available at http://www.chanrobles.
com/1935constitutionofthephilippines.htm). For a helpful categorization of world
constitutional provisions relating in some way to the use of force, see Nishi Osamu, Sekai
no genkōkenpō to heiwashugi jōko [Pacifist Provisions of the World’s Modern
Constitutions] (Feb. 2006), http://www.komazawa-u.ac.jp/~nishi/Nishi-text/page001.htm
[hereinafter Nishi, Pacifist Constitutions]. Except in the cases of Germany, Italy, Japan,
and the Philippines, citations to foreign constitutions in Part III.B reference translations
from Axel Tschentscher, International Constitutional Law—Countries, INT’L CONST. L.,
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/index.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2009).
160
DIANE A. DESIERTO, FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT: UNIVERSALISM IN THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE PARTICULARIST
POWER (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 130, 134) (on file with author) (citing DIE
VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919, art. 4 (Weimer
Ger.); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, Dec. 9, 1931, art 7 (Spain)).
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more common among modern constitutions. The Constitution of
the United States, for instance, provides in Article VI that “all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”161
Similarly, the constitution of Japan, in Article 98(2), provides
that “[t]he treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of
nations shall be faithfully observed.”162 But such general
incorporation of international law, even in monist states, does
not tend to operate in a manner that effectively constrains
decision making on the use of armed force.163 The incorporation
of specific provisions of jus ad bellum, or promulgation of
constitutional provisions that specifically address the decision
making on the recourse to war, is far more likely to have a
substantive influence on the decision to use armed force. This
proposition is supported by the fact that the few states with
constitutions that do have specific international law-based
constraints on the use of force, as in the case of Japan, adopted
such provisions in addition to general provisions incorporating
international law into the domestic legal system. In considering
the constitutional constraints on the use of force, therefore, the
focus in our analysis here is on the incorporation of specific
provisions of the jus ad bellum regime.
Compared to the development and spread of other
constitutional principles in the last fifty years, particularly
with respect to the elaboration of individual rights and the
strengthening of such institutions as judicial review, there has
been relatively little development with respect to these two
types of constitutional provisions regarding the use of force
(that is, the separation of powers type provision, and the
specific incorporation of international law type provision). This
is particularly so among the larger states that might be
thought of as being most representative of the community of
liberal democracies.164
161

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 2 (Japan) (official
translation from the Government Printing Office, available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2).
163
For arguments on why Article VI and other provisions of the U.S.
Constitution should be understood to require government compliance with
international law principles on the use of force, see Jules Lobel, International Law
Constraints, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR 107-20 (Gary
M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994).
164
A complete and systematic study of the constitutions of all the democracies
listed by either Freedom House or The Center for Systemic Peace Report has not been
undertaken to ground this proposition. But a number of studies do support the claim.
162
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Of the two types of provision, the separation of powers
with respect to the decision to go to war is more common. Quite
a number of the states that are most representative of liberal
democracies have provisions that require legislative approval of
a declaration of war, along the lines of the U.S. Constitution.
For instance, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain all
have provisions that require that the government obtain
legislative approval prior to a declaration of war.165 The German
Basic Law does not have any such explicit provision, but the
Constitutional Court has interpreted the Basic Law as
requiring the government to obtain legislative approval of any
deployment of German forces for any “armed operation.”166 A
number of the constitutions of democracies among the so-called
nonaligned group of nations, such as Brazil, Mexico, and India,
similarly have provisions requiring legislative approval for the
declaration of war or a state of emergency relating to the threat
of war.167 But even the apparent spread of this form of provision
is somewhat misleading, for these provisions are typically
ineffective in constraining unilateral executive decisions to use
armed force. The operation of the provision in the United
States itself illustrates the problem.
The United States Congress has only ever declared war
five times since the Constitution was ratified.168 Indeed, since
the end of World War II, the declaration of war has virtually
disappeared from state practice, which raises questions as to
the current meaning and effect of constitutional provisions
See WOLFGANG WAGNER, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED
FORCES, PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF MILITARY MISSIONS: ACCOUNTING FOR
PLURALISM (2006), available at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en
&id=25262&nav1=5; Nishi, Pacifist Constitutions, supra note 159.
165
1958 CONST. art. 35 (Fr.); Arts. 78, 87(9) Costituzione (It.); GRONDWET
VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 17, 1983, art. 96
(Neth.); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, art. 63, Oct. 26, 1978 (Spain).
166
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [Federal Constitutional Court] July 12,
1994, 106 I.L.R. 320 (Ger.); see also Georg Nolte, Germany: Ensuring Political
Legitimacy for the Use of Military Forces by Requiring Constitutional Accountability, in
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 114, at 231 (providing analysis of the case).
167
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [CONSTITUTION] art. 49, para. II (Braz.);
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, as amended, art. 73, para. 12,
art. 89, para. 8, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); INDIA
CONST. arts. 352, 353.
168
They are the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War of 1846, the
Spanish-American War of 1898, and World Wars I and II. For a complete history of the
war powers, and the authority under which armed force has been employed by the
United States throughout history, see FISHER, supra note 116. For a brief overview, see
JAMES A. BAKER, III & WARREN CHRISTOPHER, MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS,
NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT 11-19 (2009).
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granting authority to legislators to declare war. There is a
robust and long-standing debate in the United States over the
exact meaning of the war powers provisions of the
Constitution. The better argument would seem to be that the
clear intention and understanding at the time of drafting and
ratification was that the executive would have to obtain
Congressional approval for the initiation of any armed
conflict.169 But there is a loud lobby in favor of the position that
the provision is limited quite literally to declarations of war
and the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal, and since
the initiation of armed conflict is no longer characterized by
any of the those acts, the provision has become an
anachronism.170 More importantly, the practice of the executive
has been ambiguous at best, with virtually every president
since Truman arguing that he was not required to obtain
Congressional approval to use force.171 Many of them have done
so in any event, but many significant actions have been
undertaken without Congressional approval, such as the
Korean war, aspects of the operations against Laos and
Cambodia during the Vietnam war, the invasions of Grenada
and Panama, the bombing of Libya in 1986, and the NATO airwar against the Serbs in the Kosovo war of 1999. The War
Powers Act of 1973 was enacted (over the veto of President
Nixon) for the very purpose of trying to reestablish
Congressional authority over the use of force, but it has been
utterly ignored by every president since its enactment, to the
detriment of the rule of law in the United States.172
Similarly, notwithstanding the requirement under
Article 35 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic that a
169

JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH ch. 1 (1993); FISHER, supra note 116, at ch. 1.
170
See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 242-52
(1996). Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have recently made the interesting and
persuasive argument that declarations of war in the context of the U.S. Constitution
should be understood to serve a different purpose from congressional approval of the
use of force, and that the latter is also required regardless of whether there has been a
declaration of war. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2057-61 (2005).
171
The administration of Jimmy Carter was the only one since World War II
that did not actually engage in the use of armed force, if one does not count the failed
mission to rescue the U.S. Embassy personnel being held hostage in Iran as a use of force.
172
BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 24-25; ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 169, at 48-49; see also War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No.
93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006)).
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declaration of war must be authorized by the legislature, the
executive in France has in practice almost exclusive control
over the use of force. In particular, the President is both the
Commander-in-Chief and the member of the executive upon
whom rests constitutional responsibility for guaranteeing
“national independence, the integrity of the territory and
observance of Community agreements, and of treaties.”173 As
such, he is able to initiate the use of armed force without any
involvement of the National Assembly.174 This was most
recently illustrated in the process by which France decided to
contribute forces to the Gulf War in 1991, and again in its
involvement in Rwanda in 1994.175 As in the American case, this
is largely because the clause “declaration of war” in Article 35
has been interpreted in a very restrictive manner.176 The
experiences of both Italy and Spain are virtually the same,
with the constitutional requirement to obtain legislative
approval for declarations of war having been interpreted to
mean that no legislative involvement is necessary for military
actions taken in the absence of a declaration of war.177
A study by Wolfgang Wagner of the Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (the “Geneva Study”)
examined the legal systems of the twenty-six states that were
both members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) (and thus economically well
developed), and were in the highest rank of democracies in the
POLITY IV database (and thus the most representative of
liberal democracies).178 Of the twenty-six states, only eight
ranked as having a high degree of parliamentary control over
the use of force, of which four were neutral states. These
include the small handful of macrostate democracies that have
constitutional provisions that require legislative approval for
the use of force regardless of a declaration of war. Most
notably, the constitutions of both Denmark and Sweden include
173

1958 CONST. arts. 5, 15 (Fr.).
Yves Boyer et al., France: Security Council Legitimacy and Executive
Primacy, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 114, at 289-90; see also Eisabeth Zoller, The War Powers in French
Constitutional Law, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 46 (1996).
175
Boyer, supra note 174, at 290-91.
176
Zoller, supra note 174, at 49.
177
WAGNER, supra note 164, at 45, 52. See Art. 78 Costituzione (It.);
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, art. 63, para. 3, Oct. 26, 1978 (Spain). But see discussion infra
note 195 and accompanying text, on new legislative constraints in Spain, which were passed
in response to the prior government’s policy of support for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
178
For more on the POLITY IV database see supra note 157.
174
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provisions that blend a requirement for legislative approval
with international law concepts of self-defense from the modern
jus ad bellum regime. Section 19(2) of the Danish Constitution
provides that “[e]xcept for the purposes of defence against an
armed attack upon the Realm or Danish Forces the King shall
not use military force against any foreign state without the
consent of the Parliament.”179 The Constitution of Sweden
provides that the government may only commit the armed
forces to battle if the parliament has assented, it is permitted
by law, and there is an obligation to take such action under
some treaty which as been approved by parliament—but the
government may unconditionally use the armed forces to repel
an armed attack on the country.180
Similarly, the Constitution of Ireland, which like Sweden
and Denmark maintains a defense policy grounded in the
concept of neutrality, provides that “[w]ar shall not be declared
and the State shall not participate in any war save with the
assent of the House of Representatives,” with the proviso that in
the event of invasion the government may take necessary steps
until the House of Representatives can be convened.181 Another
handful of states have constitutional provisions that require
some level of “consultation,” but not the prior approval of
parliament for the deployment of armed forces. These include
the very recent amendments to the Constitution of the
Netherlands, which increased the level of legislative
consultation, and amendments to the Constitution of Hungary
that actually reduced the level of parliamentary control.182
In contrast to these examples of varying levels of
constitutionally-mandated legislative control, there are of
course many major liberal democracies that do not have any
constitutional requirement that the legislature be involved in
the decision to go to war. Leading the list is the United
Kingdom, which is perhaps ironic given that it is where we saw
the first developments of mechanisms designed to achieve some
legislative check on the executive’s ability to use force. The
179

DANMARKSRIGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] June 5, 1953, sec. 19, para. 2 (Den.).
REGERINGSFORMEN [CONSTITUTION] 10:9(1) (Swed.).
181
IR. CONST., 1937, art. 28, paras. 3.1, 3.2.
182
A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁANYA [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 20, 1949, as
amended, art. 19 (Hung.); GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN
[CONSTITUTION] Feb. 17, 1983, as amended, art. 100 (Neth.). The amendments to the
Constitution of Hungary were largely a result of the accommodation seen as necessary
for participation in NATO operations when it joined NATO in 1999. See WAGNER,
supra note 164, at 44.
180
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decision to use force or go to war falls under the Royal
Prerogative, which in the common law is defined as the residue
of discretionary power left in the hands of the Crown, as
exercised by the cabinet.183 While parliament has been given the
opportunity to debate the issue of pending armed conflict in
advance of such recent engagements as the Gulf War and the
Kosovo operations, the government has never put the decision
in the hands of parliament in the form of a substantive
resolution requiring a vote of approval, and in many instances
the decision has been made without any consultation of
parliament.184 The same is true of other commonwealth
countries such as Canada and Australia, which similarly
operate under the Royal Prerogative.185
The second form of provision—that is, the kind of
provision that incorporates international law constraints on the
use of force—is even less common. There are only a small
handful of macrostate democracies that have provisions that
could be classified within this category. For obvious historical
reasons the three former Axis Powers lead this group. Both
Italy and Germany have provisions that explicitly prohibit
engaging in wars of aggression. More precisely, Article 11 of
the Italian Constitution provides,
Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom
of other peoples and as a means for settling international disputes.
Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the
limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order
183

Council of Civil Serv. Unions & Others v. Ministers of Civil Serv., [1985]
A.C. 374 (H.L.) 398 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton).
184
See CLAIRE TAYLOR, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, ARMED FORCES
(PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL FOR PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICT) BILL, 2005-06,
H.C. Research Paper 05/56 (U.K.); SELECT COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
TAMING THE PREROGATIVE: STRENGTHENING MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO
PARLIAMENT, 2003-04, H.C. 422 (U.K.) [hereinafter TAMING THE PREROGATIVE];
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN—ANALYSIS OF CONSULTATIONS
75-89 (2008); PAUL BOWERS, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, PARLIAMENT AND THE USE
OF FORCE, 2003-04, H.C. Standard Note SN/IA/1218. See generally Nigel White, The
United Kingdom: Increasing Commitment Requires Greater Parliamentary
Involvement, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 114.
185
See MICHEL ROSSIGNOL, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT OF CANADA,
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: PARLIAMENT, THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT, AND THE
DECISION TO PARTICIPATE (Background Paper BP-303E 1992), available at
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/bp303-e.htm; Deidre McKeown &
Roy Jordan, Parliamentary Involvement in Declaring War and Deploying Forces Overseas,
PARLIAMENT AUSTL. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BN/pol/
ParliamentaryInvolvement.htm. For a concise comparative review of the parliamentary
control of military operations in all OECD countries, see generally WAGNER, supra note
164.
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ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and
encourages international organizations furthering such ends.186

Article 26(1) of the German Basic Law provides that: “Acts
tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful
relations between nations, especially to prepare for war of
aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a
punishable offence.”187
The German Basic Law also includes a provision
authorizing German participation in international collective
security organizations.188 Thus, both the German and Italian
constitutions prohibit uses of force that would constitute acts of
aggression, but they also provide the authority for the use of
force pursuant to Security Council authority under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan on
the other hand prohibits any use of force beyond that necessary
for individual self-defense (or even for individual self-defense,
depending on the interpretation), and the denial of all rights of
belligerency.189
In addition to the three former Axis Powers, the
Constitution of the Philippines of 1935 had a similar
renunciation of war provision, and that language has been
retained in the Constitution of 1987.190 There are a small
186

Art. 11 Costituzione (It.) (translation from Senato della Repubblica, the
Parliamentary Information, Archives and Publications Office of the Senate Service for
Official Reports and Communications, available at http://www.senato.it/documenti/
repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf).
187
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (BASIC LAW)
[CONSTITUTION] art. 26, para. 1 (Ger.) [hereinafter GERMAN BASIC LAW] (official
translation published by the German Budestag, Public Relations Division, available at
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf).
188
Id. art. 24, para. 2.
189
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, in full, provides as follows:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan). For my analysis of the provision,
see Martin, Binding the Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 268.
190
“The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations.” CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.) (translation from the Chan Robles
Virtual Law Library of the Laws of the Philippines, available at http://www.chanrobles.
com/philsupremelaw1.htm).
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number of other countries, such as South Korea, Hungary, and
Azerbaijan, which also have provisions renouncing aggressive
war or war as a means of settling international disputes.191 The
constitution of Sweden provides that the government may
authorize the use of force “in accordance with international law
and custom to prevent a violation of Swedish soil.”192 And, as
touched on above, the constitutions of Denmark and Sweden
require increased parliamentary involvement for decisions
relating to the use force that do not effectively meet the test for
self-defense in international law. But taken together this entire
group of democracies, those that incorporate in some fashion
the principles of jus ad bellum or otherwise impose conditions
with respect to the kind of force that can be used or the basis
for going to war, remains a small minority among all
macrostate democracies.
This may not strike some as altogether surprising, until
it is considered in the context of the broader phenomenon of
convergence between international and domestic legal systems.
In the last sixty years there has been an ever-increasing level
of incorporation or implementation of international law within
the domestic legal systems of all the countries of the world.193
The incorporation of international human rights law within the
constitutions of democracies is only one of the more marked
aspects of that process, but the rules, principles, standards,
and norms from most of the major international law regimes,
from intellectual property and environmental law to
international investment and finance law regimes, are being
implemented domestically. As will be discussed below in Part
IV, such domestic implementation and the increasing
integration of the domestic and international legal regimes is
considered essential for the purposes of enhancing compliance
with the international law regimes in question. And so it is
indeed anomalous that the principles of the jus ad bellum
191

CONST. (1999), art. 9, para. II (Azer.); A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG
ALKOTMÁANYA [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 20, 1949, as amended, art. 6 (Hung.); CONST.
(1962), 68 (Kuwait); 1948 DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (S. Kor.).
For translations, see Tschentscher, supra note 165.
192
REGERINGSFORMEN [CONSTITUTION] 10:9(3) (Swed.).
193
See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights
Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 211 (1998); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of
Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217
(2000); Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and
International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707 (2006) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Locking in Democracy]; Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets
Domestic Constitutional Law, 3 VIENNA ONLINE J. INT’L CONST. L. 170, 174 (2009).
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regime, which form the central purpose of the U.N. system,
find so little domestic expression.
Thus far we have been primarily considering the
absence of constitutional constraints. There remains the
question of whether liberal democracies may have nonetheless
developed a range of sophisticated statutory regimes for the
purpose of controlling the decision making on the use of force.
The War Powers Act in the United States is, on its face, a
perfect example, though as already discussed, that legislation
has been entirely ineffective. A more comprehensive
comparative analysis would have to be undertaken to answer
this conclusively, but existing studies suggest that there is
little effective statutory control in the most representative
Western liberal democracies over the decision to deploy armed
forces or engage in armed conflict.194
Beginning with the separation-of-powers-type controls,
the Geneva Study of twenty-six liberal democracies found that
among the handful of states that were characterized by high or
medium levels of legislative control, there were very few in
which that control was primarily statutory, or in which
legislation played a significant role at all.195 At the other end of
the spectrum, there are many of the most representative liberal
democracies that have virtually no statutory provisions
governing legislative involvement on decisions to use armed
force, or limiting the executive powers in that regard. This
group includes the United Kingdom and most of its former
dominions.196 Moreover, with respect to the second form of
194

See generally DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 114; ROSSIGNOL, supra note 185; McKeown & Jordan,
supra note 185; sources cited supra note 184. See generally WAGNER, supra note 164.
195
In Finland, while the Constitution itself is silent on parliamentary
involvement in military deployments short of war, a “Peacekeeping Act” passed in 1984
and revised in 2001 requires the government to obtain approval from the legislature’s
Foreign Affairs Committee. WAGNER, supra note 164, at 41. Spain, until very recently,
had almost no legislative involvement in the decision to use force, but passed new laws in
2005 in response to the prior government’s contribution to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Id. at 52-53. Italy passed a law in 1997 providing that parliament was to approve all
decisions of the government on defense and security matters involving the deployment of
armed forces prior to their implementation. This law has been rendered largely
ineffective by the government practice of employing emergency decrees pursuant to
Article 77 of the Italian Constitution, and the issue has not yet been resolved by the
legislature. Id. at 45-46. In Germany, new legislation was recently introduced to
implement the constitutional requirement for parliamentary control that had been
mandated by the Constitutional Court in the 1994 judgment on German participation in
the Bosnia mission. Id. at 42-43; see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
196
In Canada, the National Defence Act prescribes how and when the
Canadian Forces can be placed on “active service.” The Act includes requirements for
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constraint, there are virtually no statutory schemes in the most
representative
democracies
that
either
incorporate
international law principles or similarly limit the conditions
under which the government may use force.197 And, as we have
seen, there are very few countries that have constitutional
provisions that provide such limits.
Indeed, the interesting observation that emerges from
this examination of the large representative democracies is that
there appears to be a correlation between the existence of
constitutional provisions governing the decision to use force or
deploy armed forces, and the establishment of underlying
legislation implementing or supplementing such principles.
Where there are no constitutional provisions, there tends to be
no legislation governing the issue either. Having said all that,
there have been very recent developments that suggest an
increasing desire on the part of many legislatures to enhance the
legal constraints on the use of armed force, particularly in terms
of increasing parliamentary involvement in the decision to
deploy forces and engage in armed conflict. In the United States,
the War Powers Act Commission has revived the debate over the
effectively defunct War Powers Act, and it has proposed new
draft legislation.198 In the United Kingdom there were
parliamentary committee hearings after the invasion of Iraq on
the issue of reducing the scope of the Royal Prerogative, and in
particular increasing parliamentary involvement in the decision
to use armed force, and draft legislation was produced.199 There
have been similar movements in Australia200 and France,201 and
some debate on the issue in Canada.202
A final point to be made about statutory controls is that
they are far less effective as controls over the decision to use
notice to parliament, but, despite the terminology, this is not determinative of when
the armed forces can be sent into action. That remains within the exclusive discretion
of the executive. National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, para. 31; see ROSSIGNOL,
supra note 185, at 13-17.
197
See generally WAGNER, supra note 164.
198
See, e.g., BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 6.
199
See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 184, at 79; TAYLOR, supra note 184, at
13. The draft legislation is annexed to TAMING THE PREROGATIVE, supra note 184, at 31.
200
McKeown & Jordan, supra note 185, at 1.
201
Boyer, supra note 174, at 290-91.
202
On the development of a practice of parliamentary debate, see generally
ROSSIGNOL, supra note 185. On the decisions relating to the contribution of Canadian
forces and the extension of their deployment in Afghanistan, see JANICE GROSS STEIN
& EUGENE LANG, THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR ch. 13 (2007)
(discussing increased pressure for parliamentary debate on the decision to extend the
mission in 2006).
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armed force than are constitutional constraints. This is
illustrated by the sad history of the War Powers Act in the
United States, and the operation of the recent legislation in
Italy.203 The War Powers Act has its own particular problems,
with claims that some of its provisions are unconstitutional,
and so is perhaps not the best example.204 But as we will see in
Part IV, there are several arguments that legal constraints on
the use of force, either statutory or constitutional, would not be
respected or obeyed in times of crisis. While I will argue below
that such claims are overstated, it has to be said that they
would be much stronger when directed at mere statutory
controls. Legislation is more vulnerable to being ignored or
subverted in times of crisis, which is one reason that the focus
of this study has been primarily upon constitutional provisions.
There are several points that emerge from this
historical and comparative review that are significant. First,
there is the insight that up until the nineteenth century the
legal constraints on the resort to war in Europe were
understood to operate at both the level of the international
system governed by the new law of nations, and the domestic
level that continued to be subject to legal systems founded in
natural law. But after a hiatus in the nineteenth century there
emerged in international law a more robust jus ad bellum
regime in the latter half of the twentieth century, which has
become the primary legal approach to limiting the use of armed
force. Notwithstanding early developments in constitutional
constraints and the remarkable spread of constitutional
democracy in the last forty years, there is very little domestic
legal control over the decision to engage in armed conflict. And
notwithstanding the considerable and ever-increasing
implementation within domestic legal systems of constitutional
democracies of the international law relating to virtually all
major areas of regulation, there is a remarkable absence of
domestic incorporation or implementation of the principles of
the jus ad bellum regime, the very core of the modern
international law system. As such, the domestic causes of war
are not sufficiently engaged by the national legal systems of
liberal democratic states.

203
204

On the operation of the Italian legislation, see supra note 195.
BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 23.
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THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE

Having looked at the causes of war and the historical
development of the legal constraints on the use of armed force,
we now turn to the theoretical arguments that can be
marshaled in support of the proposed Model. It will be recalled
that the Model is designed to address the insufficient
compliance with the international law regime and the
weakness in domestic-level legal constraints. As will be
described in detail in Part V, the Model comprises three
elements, which would: (1) require decision makers to
adequately consider compliance with international law
principles from the jus ad bellum regime; (2) require that the
executive obtain legislative approval of decisions to use armed
force above a specified threshold level; and (3) provide
jurisdiction and broad standing for a limited judicial review of
the decision-making process. This part of the argument will
explore how the Model is supported by a number of theoretical
perspectives in both international law and constitutional law.
Indeed, while the Model may seem somewhat radical or idealist
at first glance, I will explain how the elements of the Model
flow logically from a number of these established theories.
Moreover, it will be argued that the elements of the Model
would operate to not only fulfill the objectives of each of these
theories as applied to the specific problem of armed conflict,
but also that they would do so in a manner that would engage
the causes of war at each of the three levels, within the
domestic and the international realms.
A.

International Law and Modern Theories of Compliance

We begin with theories from international law that
support the Model. We are primarily concerned with those
theories from international law that attempt to explain, and
make normative claims regarding, those features of domestic
systems that enhance compliance with international law. Part
of the objective of the Model is, after all, to increase compliance
with the jus ad bellum regime. It turns out, as we will see, that
many of those theories focus on, from varying perspectives and
for differing reasons, the importance of the incorporation of
international law into domestic law. This of course relates most
to the element of the Model that calls for incorporation of jus
ad bellum principles. But we will see that there are some

2011]

TAKING WAR SERIOUSLY

663

aspects of these theories that also support the separation of
powers elements of the Model.
Before launching into an exploration of the theories,
however, a few words are necessary regarding the assumptions
of this part of the argument. We start from the proposition that
while the members of the international society rely almost
exclusively on the international legal system to limit the use of
force, the permissiveness of that system is considered to be a
fundamental cause of war. International law is thus
insufficiently effective to prevent the incidence of unlawful uses
of armed force. Many realists in international relations would
of course argue that this is because international law is not
really law at all, and that it is virtually irrelevant to the issues
of war and peace. This view, that international law is neither
law properly so called, nor any meaningful constraint on state
conduct in the realm of armed conflict (at least in terms of jus
ad bellum), coupled with the related normative arguments that
international law ought not to influence rational decisions
regarding the use of force in accordance with “reason of state”
imperatives, is obviously the subject of great debate.205
The argument I am advancing in support of the proposed
Model does not rest upon any specific theory of international
law.206 It does, however, assume that international law
constitutes a legitimate legal system and that it operates with
some degree of effectiveness. This does not require the embrace
of a robust liberal theory of international law. We can take as a
205

George Kennan was one of the most famous and vociferous critics of
allowing international law considerations to cloud judgment on foreign policy decision
making, criticizing such a “legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems”
and “the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous
aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system
of legal rules and restraints.” GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 95 (expanded
ed. 1984). For more recent questioning of the effectiveness of international law, see
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 72. For a good review of the history and development
of aspects of the debate, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?] (review
essay of ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)), and THOMAS M.
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). For one of the
seminal works on the effectiveness and legitimacy of international law, see HENKIN,
HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44. For a more detailed analysis of the various
theoretical perspectives on compliance with international law, including an
examination of the philosophical foundations of each, see MARKUS BURGSTALLER,
THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
206
Again, for a good review of the various contending theories of international
law, see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205. On theories of compliance with
international law, see BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, which includes a critique of each
of the current theories of international law compliance, including Koh’s.
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minimum position the perspective of “liberal-realists” such as
Hedley Bull, whose perspective we reviewed earlier. Liberalrealists accept that international law operates sufficiently in
accordance with Hart’s concept of law, and that international
law is generally observed to a sufficient degree to justify that it
be both recognized as law properly so called, and understood to
be a substantial factor in the operation of the international
system.207 Bull argues that international law functions to identify
the very idea of a society of sovereign states as a fundamental
normative ordering principle, in addition to functioning as the
source of basic rules of coexistence among those state actors—
primarily rules relating to the constraint of violence, agreements
among states, and rules on the sovereignty and independence of
states—and, finally, operating as a mechanism to mobilize
compliance with those rules.208
While the liberal-realists accept that international law
is effective, however, they also argue that there are limitations
in its efficacy. Thus, while it may be, as Louis Henkin has
famously observed, that most nations follow international law
most of the time,209 Bull argues that it is not necessarily the
case that they do so primarily out of respect for the law.
International law is a “social reality” to the extent that there is
a high degree of conformity, but it does not follow that
international law is therefore a powerful constraint on state
action.210 Apparent obedience, or conformity with the principles
207

BULL, supra note 70, at 128-31. While Bull acknowledges that Hart himself
found that international law lacked several of the essential characteristics of
“secondary rules,” which are in turn necessary for a true system of law, Bull writes
that Hart did not thereby conclude that international law was therefore not law. Id. at
135. Thomas Franck also argued that, notwithstanding Hart’s own conclusions,
international law did in fact have secondary rules so as to conform to Hart’s conditions
for a true legal system. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS 187 (1990). But see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2616
(“Until actors within the international system internalize both a rule or recognition
and secondary rules for orderly change and interpretation, Hart argued, international
law will consist only of a set of primary rules with which nations will comply out of a
sense of moral, not legal, obligation.”). While Hart does conclude that the analogy
between international law and municipal law is apt in terms of function and content,
but not in relation to form, he does nonetheless appear to accept Bentham’s argument
that the analogy is essentially close enough to constitute law. H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 231 (1961).
208
BULL, supra note 70, at 134-35.
209
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44.
210
BULL, supra note 70, at 133. For an echo of this argument see GOLDSMITH
& POSNER, supra note 72, at 7-9 (though they go much further, arguing that not only is
international law explicable in terms of state interests, but that any state preference to
comply with international law will be trumped by other interests and preferences to
the extent they are inconsistent with the international law norms).
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of international law, may be a consequence of various factors,
including inertia, a belief that the actions required by the law
in fact conform to state interests, or that compliance will result
in the beneficial reciprocal acts by other states, or finally, by
the coercive power exerted by other states requiring
compliance. As Bull puts it, “the importance of international
law does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its
principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact
that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it.”211
This conception of international law is not being
advanced here as correct or the one upon which this Model is
based, but as a moderate realist position it can serve as a
starting point for our analysis. If one can at least accept that
minimum position regarding the legitimacy and operation of
international law, then the premises of this part of the argument
in support of the Model ought to be accepted as valid: that
international law is a legitimate legal system that is at least
somewhat effective; that international law is not, however,
sufficiently effective, and this is one of the causes of illegitimate
armed conflict; and that greater compliance with the principles
of the jus ad bellum regime would therefore help to reduce the
incidence of such armed conflict. For those more extreme realists
who dismiss international law as being neither law nor relevant
to international relations, and who moreover think that the
internal structures of countries are of little significance in
explaining the incidence of armed conflicts among states,212 then
quite obviously the arguments being advanced here will be
entirely unpersuasive. There is not room here to review that
entire debate, and there would be little point in doing so. On the
other hand, the premises are of course consistent with more
robust liberal theories of international law and international
relations, but it is not necessary to embrace those theories in
order to endorse the arguments here. The point is that
acceptance of the liberal-realist understanding as a minimum
position is sufficient to ground my argument.
I now turn to those theories of international law
compliance that provide descriptive and normative arguments
regarding how domestic implementation of international law
principles and rules is crucial to enhancing compliance with the
international law system. There are a number of strands among
211
212

BULL, supra note 70, at 134.
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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the general theory that domestic incorporation is crucial to the
enhancement of compliance with international law regimes. We
begin with transnational legal process theory. In considering the
question of compliance, this theory focuses on the question of how
obedience with international law is actually mobilized. Obedience
is understood to mean the internalization of norms such that the
actor comes to habitually comply with the norm out of some sense
of obligation and acceptance of its legitimacy.213 The theory
explains such obedience in part by reference to the complex
interaction between the international and the domestic systems—
the “transnational legal process”—which operates through
various mechanisms and institutional points of entry. The process
is developed through an iterative interaction between actors at
the domestic and international levels, with an ongoing
interpretation of the norms according to which such interaction is
conducted, which over time results in the internalization of those
norms within the domestic system. Harold Koh actually refers to
Waltz’ theory of the three Images of the causes of war as an
analogy for the three levels at which the transnational process
plays out, and similarly argues that all three levels are important
to the overall understanding of compliance.214
Norms can be “internalized” through actual incorporation
into the legal system, either via legislation or judicial judgment,
or they can work their way into the political process through
executive action. The norms then become part of institutional
standard operating procedures, or policy norms, thereby
developing to form the fabric of institutional identity, and
domestic decision makers gradually become “enmeshed” in the
international norms. Indeed, over time, when fully internalized
the norm can reconstitute national identity and the perception of
state interests.215 This internalization of international law norms
through ongoing domestic application and interpretation is the
key to compliance, because the norms over time become part of
the fabric of the domestic legal system, and often develop into
strong constitutive norms with the power to shape domestic
policy.216 The incorporation into the Constitution of Japan of the
international law prohibition on the use of armed force resulted
213

Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2616, 2645-46; see also HART,
supra note 207, at 51-61 (discussing the complexities of the notions of “obedience” and
“habit”).
214
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2649.
215
Id. at 2654-55.
216
Id. at 2634, 2655.

2011]

TAKING WAR SERIOUSLY

667

in the development of powerful constitutive norms, providing an
excellent illustration of this process.217
The kind of vertical strategies characteristic of
transnational legal process theory are most likely to be
effective in enhancing compliance with regimes in which the
enforcement mechanisms are weak, but the core customary and
treaty norms are clearly defined and mandatory218—which, it
may be argued, exactly describes the jus ad bellum regime. The
techniques suggested for facilitating the process itself include
the development of strategies for better internalizing the
norms that are targeted for support, and, in particular, seeking
to find ways to effect such internalization at each of the social,
political, and legal levels of the domestic system. By achieving
a high level of social internalization, the norm develops such
public legitimacy that there is widespread pressure for
obedience to it, while political internalization refers to the
embrace or acceptance of the norm by the political elites.219 The
Model’s proposed incorporation of the principles of jus ad
bellum into the constitutions of liberal democracies would
constitute legal internalization of the norm, and as reflected in
the Japanese experience, such constitutional incorporation can
in turn mobilize powerful social and political internalization.220
This internalization of the international law norms would
enhance compliance with the underlying international law rule
in a manner that arguably engages the Image III causes of war.
But given how it gets woven into the fabric of national values
and socio-political norms, such an internalization will also
operate in a manner that would engage the domestic causes of
war. This will become more clear when we consider it in
conjunction with aspects of liberal theories of international law
compliance, to which we turn next.

217

The international law norm incorporated in Article 9 of the Constitution of
Japan (the war-renouncing provision) was “reinterpreted” and embraced by various
institutions within the domestic legal and political systems, and over time became the
source of powerful constitutive norms that mobilized powerful support for the
constitutional provision itself, and consequently the underlying international law
norm, in a manner that effectively shaped national policy. Martin, Binding Dogs of
War, supra note 127, at 304, 334-35.
218
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2655 (using the term
“peremptory” rather than mandatory, but noting nevertheless that he is referring to jus
cogens).
219
Id. at 2656-57.
220
PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NORMS & NATIONAL SECURITY 112
(1996); see also Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 304, 334-35.
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The second strand we rely on here is liberal theories of
international law compliance. This approach also focuses on
the domestic level, both for explanations of why states comply
with international law and as the subject for normative
arguments regarding how such compliance can be enhanced.
Consistent with the liberal theory of the causes of war, liberal
theories of international law compliance suggest that it is not
so much the international system that determines state action,
but rather it is the domestic actors within the state that dictate
how the state behaves within the international society.221
Theorists such as Anne-Marie Slaughter emphasize the
importance of understanding the interaction of the numerous
actors within the domestic socio-political-legal system that
combine to shape the configuration of state preferences. Liberal
theories of international law compliance claim that it is these
domestic level preferences, which in aggregated form represent
the individual interests and preferences of the dominant actors
within the domestic polity at any given moment, that are the
primary influence on shaping the state’s foreign policy.222
Because the government of the state represents and is
responsive to a particular mix of dominant entities and groups
within the domestic society, the formulation of foreign policy by
the government will be influenced by the interests and
preferences of these domestic elements. Indeed, the state’s
preferences and policies will change as the configuration of these
domestic entities change and there are shifts in power among
domestic political arrangements. Moreover, it is not only the
interaction within the state, but also the interaction between
internal state actors among different states—especially other
liberal democratic states—forming multilevel networks that are
increasingly important in explaining state behavior.223
From a normative perspective, liberal international
legal theory proponents argue that in order for international
law objectives to be met, and to increase compliance with the
international legal order, mechanisms have to be developed to
increase the influence of international law on domestic
221

See generally BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 165-79; Andrew Moravcsik,
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG.
513 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995).
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BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 165-79; Slaughter, International Law in
a World of Liberal States, supra note 221, at 508.
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BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 174 (citing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 509 (2004)).
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institutions. This can be achieved by directly strengthening
those institutions through some form of incorporation, backstopping them through such mechanisms as the principle of
complementarity in the International Criminal Court treaty
(which acts as a catalyst to state action by threatening
international law intervention in the absence of domestic
action), or by finding the leverage to compel the institutions to
act in compliance with international law.224 The effectiveness of
international law in dealing with evolving transnational
threats to peace and security are identified in liberal theory of
international law compliance as particularly requiring the
mobilization of domestic institutions.225
There are different strands in liberal theory of
international law compliance regarding how exactly domestic
actors and institutions operate to determine the manner in
which states act within the international system.226 Two of them
in particular are highly relevant to the manner in which the
Model would operate to increase compliance with the jus ad
bellum regime. The first, which has been termed the
“ideational” strand, focuses on the manner in which the
individual interests and preferences, which form the basis of
the aggregated state preferences, are generated and shaped,
particularly by forces of social identity.227 The domestic
legitimacy of policy, including foreign policy, will be
fundamentally determined by the operation of a number of
elements that exercise powerful influences on social identities
within the state. The characteristics of ideology that help shape
the commitment of domestic groups and organizations to
specific institutions are the most important for our purposes.
Variations and shifts in domestic “perceptions of domestic
political legitimacy translate into patterns of underlying
preferences,” which in turn influence the foreign policy that is
representative of dominant domestic shared preferences and
interests.228 Thus, for example, the struggle in the United States
during the last decade over the question of whether torture or
other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment could
ever be consistent with American values and the rule of law
224

Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International
Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 328 (2006).
225
Id. at 343.
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BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 169.
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represented such an ideational conflict that could in turn have
an effect on foreign policy. The successful incorporation and
internalization of the international law principles on torture
would in turn influence the development of ideational norms
that would in turn shape that policy.
The republican liberal theory—the second important
strand or variation of the liberal theory—flows naturally from
the Kantian roots that have already been reviewed. From this
perspective the emphasis is not on how the domestic
preferences are formed, as in the ideational strand, but on the
manner in which the institutions and political structures
operate in response to those preferences.229 That is, in how the
domestic institutions privilege some preferences and discount
others in a process that results in the development of a policy
that represents an aggregation of the interests and preferences
of some particular combination of domestic actors.230 True to
Kant and Madison, the nature of domestic political
representation is central to this strand of the theory.
The form of representation, which of course relates to the
structure of the state and Image II causes of war, will help
determine who within the polity is most represented and how
much political leverage the represented groups have over their
agents within government. The more “biased” a structure is, in
terms of it being representative of narrow interests, the more
vulnerable it is to “capture” by those interests in the formulation
of foreign policy. Conversely, the more broadly representative
the decision-making bodies are in the formulation of foreign
policy, the less vulnerable they are to capture.231 This is of course
at the core of the structural explanations of the democratic
peace. The separation of powers in the decision-making process
on foreign policy is thus not only important for the purposes of
engaging the domestic causes of war, as will be discussed in the
next section, but is also significant from the perspective of
compliance with the international law principles. Indeed, it is a
feature of the Model that the three elements work together in a
mutually reinforcing manner, with each element being
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Id. at 172.
Id.
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Id. It should also be noted, however, that it is not broad representation or
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and capture by concentrated or short term interests. Id.
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explicable for reasons that relate to both international and
constitutional law objectives.
There is yet a third broad theory of international law
compliance, which is Thomas Franck’s theory of “legitimacy.”
According to this theoretical perspective, international law
commands obedience and compliance even in the absence of
powers of coercion, due to the extent to which it is
characterized by the properties of legitimacy.232 There are a
number of properties that lend legitimacy to a particular rule
such that it can exert pressure upon states to comply, but for
our purposes the most important are “adherence” and
“symbolic validation.” The former is simply the perception
among states that there is widespread adherence to the rule or
principle, and the extent to which there is understood to be a
relationship between the primary rule of obligation and a
hierarchy of secondary rules related to the sources,
interpretation, and application of law, along the lines of Hart’s
theory of law.233 The latter, the symbolic validation element, is
the “cultural and anthropological” component of legitimacy,
which relates to the manner in which rituals and other forms of
recognition and validation help to bestow legitimacy and
authenticity upon a particular rule, and operate as a signal
that there is an expectation of compliance with the rule. The
formal aspects of the recognition of a newly formed state or
government would be an example of the ritualized
acknowledgement of the operation of specific principles of
international law.234
The constitutional incorporation of the principles of jus
ad bellum into the highest law of the land of a number of
democratic states would serve both to provide such ritualized
recognition of the validity and legitimacy of those rules, and to
signal the importance placed on adherence to the rules by the
incorporating states. The wider the spread of such
incorporation, the greater the perceived legitimacy of, and the
expectation of adherence with, the rules of jus ad bellum.
Indeed, in a detailed study of the Japanese experience, it has
been explained how this was part of the intuition of those in
232

See generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS, supra note 207. For an overview of the theory, see BURGSTALLER, supra note
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the Japanese Diet at the time of ratification of the new
Constitution, when they embraced the war-renouncing
provision of the Constitution as a new model and example for
the world, one which they hoped would lead to emulation and a
more peaceful international society.235
A final comment is necessary on the issue of compliance
with the jus ad bellum regime in particular, which has less to do
with general theories of international law compliance. This
relates to changes that can be anticipated in the jus ad bellum
regime in the coming decades and the demands that are going to
be placed on institutions for ex ante analysis of compliance
issues. In the last decade there has been considerable concern
over the continued viability of the current jus ad bellum regime,
and how it ought to be adjusted in order to accommodate and
address some of the new realities in the twenty-first century.
The questions raised have focused on a number of specific issues,
or more particularly, on uses of force that are increasingly
thought necessary or legitimate, but which under current
principles are considered illegal. These would include
humanitarian intervention,236 the use of force for “preventive selfdefense” (the so-called “Bush Doctrine”),237 and the use of force
directly against nonstate entities.238 There is increasing pressure
235

Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 289-305; see also RAY A.
MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW
JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR ch. 14 (2002).
236
See generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/CommissionReport.pdf; SEC’Y GEN.’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND CHANGE,
UNITED NATIONS, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (2004);
FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1999); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?:
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); HUMANITARIAN
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“The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of
Preventative War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2004); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo,
The “Bush Doctrine”: Can Preventive War Be Justified?, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
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Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525 (2006).
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for some form of change to the international legal regime to
relax the prohibition on the use of force or otherwise develop
broader exceptions and conditions for the legitimate use of force
in these particular circumstances.
These are only three of the most pressing issues, but the
point to be made is that there is increasing pressure to adjust
the jus ad bellum regime to address these and related issues,
and the regime is likely to evolve over the coming decade in
response to these developments. Given the complexity of the
issues that require these adjustments, it can be anticipated
that the regime will evolve in ways that demand increasingly
complicated and sophisticated standards and conditions
precedent for the legitimate use of armed force. That in turn
requires thinking about how and where such tests will be
applied, and particularly what mechanisms may be developed
to ensure that such tests are employed prior to any final
decision to engage in armed conflict.239 There are insufficient
institutional mechanisms within the international law system
to operationalize such tests and provide the fora for that kind
of ex ante analysis. This is one more reason in support of
harnessing the domestic legal and political systems—with the
established fora and institutions that can provide the space for
the debate, analysis, and determination of precisely these kinds
of issues—to assist in the implementation and application of
the evolving principles of jus ad bellum.
B.

Constitutional Theory—Precommitment, Rule of Law,
and the Role of the Legislature

A number of theories in constitutional law also provide
support for the Model, and help explain how the elements of
the Model would better engage the causes of war at each level
of the three Images. This is of course most obvious in relation
to the second and third element of the Model, the two
separation of powers provisions. But constitutional theory also
provides support for the constitutional incorporation of
principles of jus ad bellum. Indeed, constitutional theory not
only provides further support for the argument that such
Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston);
Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the Annual General Meeting
of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010); Kenneth Anderson,
Targeted Killings in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (May 11, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415070.
239
Benvenisti, supra note 237, at 697-98.
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incorporation would enhance the state’s compliance with the
international law norms, but it also suggests that this element
of the Model would help to achieve domestic constitutional
objectives as well. In this section I will thus begin with
discussion of constitutional theory relating to the first element
of the Model, and then turn to the constitutional law theories
that support the second element, the requirement for
legislative approval of decisions to use armed force.
Constitutional incorporation of international law
principles is not itself novel. Indeed, empirical analysis
suggests an increasing “convergence” of international and
constitutional law, resulting in part from the domestic
implementation of international law norms, as discussed
earlier.240 Many of the constitutions promulgated or
significantly amended in the post-Cold War years have, for
instance, incorporated the language and principles of
international human rights regimes.241 In exploring why this
might be, why states would voluntarily incorporate
international law norms that would constrain government
conduct, it has been argued that modern constitutions,
particularly those adopted in new transitional democracies,
have employed international law to lock in specific democratic
principles and norms.242 One of the methods by which
constitutions have locked in international law commitments is
by directly incorporating the norms of either customary
international law or treaty law into the text of the
constitution.243 It has been argued that these developments
reflect examples of constitutional design being used to employ
international law as a means of strengthening the
precommitment mechanisms of the constitution.244
The
theory
that
constitutions
operate
as
precommitment devices provides support for the Model.
According to the theory, drafters create constitutional
provisions that will bind the government’s behavior in the
future, motivated by expectations that there may be
240

Peters, supra note 193, at 174.
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circumstances that, in the absence of such constraints, could
cause the government of the day to act irrationally, in a
manner contrary to the state’s fundamental values and
interests.245 It is the same idea as when a person gives his car
keys to a friend before entering a bar, thereby making
arrangements while he is still sober to prevent himself from
driving later when he is drunk. It is captured in the metaphor
of Ulysses from Greek mythology, who, to protect himself from
later jumping to his death while in thrall to the Sirens’ song,
ordered his men to bind him to the mast, stop up their ears
with beeswax, and refuse any subsequent order to release him
until they had passed the danger.246
Treaties may similarly operate as precommitment
devices. To the extent that the motive in entering into a treaty
is to create constraints on the state’s own future conduct, out of
concern that it may otherwise behave in a manner that is
contrary to its welfare (as opposed to being a strategy to
constrain or otherwise influence the behavior of other states),
the entry into a treaty constitutes a genuine form of
precommitment.247 Indeed the use of international law as a
precommitment device enjoys the advantage of not being
susceptible to change by local actors, so that abrogation or
violation are the only options available to avoid the
precommitment mechanisms. To the extent that the costs of
doing so may be perceived by local actors as being high, it may
successfully operate as intended to constrain policy.
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JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
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The use of constitutions to implement the principles of
treaties already entered into, however, serves to internalize the
precommitment and subject the commitment to domestic
enforcement mechanisms, thereby increasing the costs and
difficulty of violating the bonds.248 While Tom Ginsburg, in his
study on how constitutions have been used to lock in
democratic norms, focused on this device of incorporating
international law principles as a means of strengthening the
constitutional precommitment to democratic norms, it can be
extended more generally, and employed in a normative
argument in line with liberal theories of international law.
That is, the constitutional incorporation of international law
norms can be used for the purpose of strengthening the bind of
the international precommitments, and thereby enhancing
compliance with international law. To put it another way,
while Ginsburg and others argue that international law is often
used to strengthen the already existing precommitment
mechanisms of the constitution, the corollary that I am
advancing here is that the precommitment devices of the
constitution can be used to enhance compliance with
preexisting commitments in international law.
The constitutionalizing of international law principles
increases the likelihood of compliance because it raises the
difficulty and costs of noncompliance. The costs of
noncompliance with the norm will not only be incurred in the
international arena by reason of the violation of the
international obligation already entered into, but also
domestically as a result of the concurrent violation of the
constitutional provision that incorporated the international law
norm. The costs of constitutional violation, or the difficulty of
avoiding compliance, can be that much higher, or at least more
immediate and certainly quite different in nature, than those
associated with the corresponding violation of international
law, particularly when the issue is subject to judicial review
and other such constitutional enforcement mechanisms. The
constitutionalizing of a prior international law obligation
creates a double bind.
Aside from judicial review and other explicit
enforcement mechanisms, it will be apparent that the
incorporated norms will also operate on other levels, in a
manner that may be more effective than their operation as
248
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purely legal rules enforced by the courts. This ties into the
earlier discussion of transnational legal process theory and the
ideational strand of liberal theories of international law, which
emphasize the process of interpretation and internalization of
the international legal norms, such that the norms begin to
operate not only as legal rules but also as political and social
norms within the domestic system.249 Constitutions can, more
than any other laws, generate and shape the contours of the
norms that operate on the social and political level, and indeed
shape culture and the collective identity of nation states.250
The foregoing discussion involves the use of the
constitution for the purposes of enhancing compliance with
international law and employing constitutional theories in
support of the efficacy of doing so. This may seem somewhat
anomalous. Constitutions are fundamentally inward looking,
not internationally oriented, and the operation of the
international legal system is not typically a constitutional
concern. But the incorporation of the principles of jus ad
bellum is also, quite fundamentally, for the benefit of the
nation itself, and constitutional theory provides support for the
Model in terms of achieving purely constitutional objectives.
As discussed earlier, Madison and Kant thought war to
be often ruinous for the state; an unnecessary squandering of
the nation’s blood and treasure. And while they both argued
that democracies would be less likely to wage war precisely
because the citizens of the state would be less inclined to
embrace the hardships of war, they also understood that other
structural checks would nonetheless have to be created.
Madison argued that constitutional impediments were required
to prevent that class of war that originated with the will of the
people, against which the mechanism of the separation of
powers alone would not be sufficient.251 The constitutional
incorporation of the principles of jus ad bellum, as
contemplated by the Model, would by itself serve to create an
additional check on the government and the people’s ability to
engage in rash military adventures. In addition to the reasons
provided above in the discussion of international law
compliance theory and precommitment theory, we will below
249
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examine how the Model further operates in conjunction with
the core functions of the legislature to influence public debate
and the decision-making process within the legislature in a
manner likely to reduce irrational or unsound judgments on
the use of force. In creating such a check, this element of the
Model would help to protect the people from the loss of blood
and treasure caused by the illegitimate use of armed force,
which would serve the constitutional objectives that Madison
had in mind.252 It would constitute a constitutional check that
would help resolve the Kantian dilemma, reducing the
tendency of democracies to illegitimately use force against
illiberal states, without undermining the factors that give rise
to the democratic peace.
There is also a relationship between constitutional
theory as it relates to the domestic objectives of constitutional
law and the conduct of the state in the international society.
For a foundational element in the constitutional theory of
liberal democracy is the commitment to the rule of law.253 As an
extension of that value system, the liberal democracies of the
world have committed to an international legal system that is
similarly founded upon notions of the rule of law. But that
system itself lacks many of the institutional forms and features
that are characteristic of a thick rule of law system, and some
would argue that even the features of clarity and certainty that
define a thin understanding of the rule of law are rather weak
in international law.254 This element of the international law
system is thus fundamentally dependent upon the commitment
of the participating states—and particularly the liberal
democratic states—to over time provide substance and form to
its rule of law features.

252
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I have not, however, reverted here to a discussion of
how the Model achieves international law objectives. What is
being suggested is that the incorporation of international law
can further the fundamental rule of law project within the
domestic legal system, and that there are domestic rule of law
imperatives that require compliance with international law.
This is not new or novel. Such arguments have been made in
different forms in the context of both human rights and
administrative law.255 And John Rawls has argued that the
constitutions of liberal states oblige compliance with a range of
international law norms for related reasons.256 The claim that I
am making here is that these arguments should be extended
more explicitly to the use of force regime—that the failure of
liberal democratic states to comply with the most fundamental
principles of the international legal system undermines that
entire project and erodes the already thin framework of the
rule of law at the international level. And that, in turn, has an
impact on the integrity of the much thicker rule of law regime
in the liberal democratic state that has so violated the
international law norm. The constitutional incorporation of the
international law principles of jus ad bellum, serving as a
check on uses of force in violation of international law
commitments, can be understood as a mechanism for further
protecting and enforcing the rule of law features of the
domestic legal system.
Turning to the second element of the Model—the
provision that would require legislative approval of decisions to
use force—there is of course considerable theoretical support
for such a constitutional structure. As we have already
discussed, the concept dates back at least to the development of
the American Articles of Confederation, and the war powers
provisions of the U.S. Constitution continues to be a model of
the principle. It is also one of the central issues in the war
powers debate that has been raging in the United States for
over a hundred years. But much of the modern debate in the
United States is over the precise meaning and exact scope of
the war powers provisions of the U.S. Constitution, and the
particulars of many of those arguments need not concern us
255

See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus et al., The Principle of Legality in
Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation, 1 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 5 (2001).
256
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES ch. 13 (1999). This point is emphasized
by Patrick Gudridge in his book review, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 714, 716-17 (2001).

680

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

here.257 As we have already reviewed, however, the primary
motive of many of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, as
expressed most clearly by Madison, was to reduce the
likelihood of war.258 And the theoretical arguments of Madison,
Kant, and others in support of such a separation of powers
related to both the domestic objectives of the state: putting an
important check on the state’s rush to war and increasing the
democratic accountability of the process of deciding on war; and
the broader goals of reducing the incidence of war generally in
the international system. In this sense, the arguments in
support of this element of the Model again relate to the causes
of war at both the domestic level and the international level.
The starting point is the insight that requiring
legislative approval of executive decision making on the use of
force will likely reduce the risk of rash decisions to go to war
for the wrong reasons. This argument was initially advanced
by Madison and Kant, among others, and indeed can be traced
all the way back to Thucydides.259 Madison and John Jay both
argued that the executive is more likely to be motivated by
parochial self-interest and narrow perspectives, and thus more
likely to enter into armed conflict than the legislature.260
Madison further argued that there ought to be a separation
between those who are charged with the conduct of war, as the
President is as the Commander in Chief, and those who have
the authority to decide on the commencement of war.261 But the
argument becomes more compelling when unpacked and
explained in a little more detail, with the support of more
modern theory. We need to explore the question of how exactly
the legislative involvement improves decision making or
257

As a starting point for some of the sources on the war powers debate
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engages the causes of war in a manner that would reduce the
incidence of war.
It is helpful to begin by recalling the functions of
legislatures.262 In addition to passing legislation, the legislature
in virtually all liberal democracies, whether parliamentary or
presidential in structure, performs the core functions of
representation, oversight, and control over government
expenditure.263 Representation and oversight in particular are
important to the argued benefit of legislative involvement in the
decision to use force. Both functions are tied to the core notions
of democratic accountability and to deliberative democracy,
which overlap in important ways. Democratic accountability is
understood to include the idea that the people who are likely to
be impacted by decisions ought to be able to participate in the
decision making. Participation in this sense means not only
having some expectation that the collective will of constituents
will be taken into consideration in the decision-making process,
but that the public debate and deliberation that is part of the
parliamentary process of decision making will also serve the
vital function of informing constituents and affording them some
sense of access to the decision-making process.264
Obviously, this process of debate and information
exchange is also at the heart of ideas of deliberative democracy.
The perspective here, though, is not so much on the importance
of making the process accountable to and representative of the
people, but on the extent to which the very process of
deliberation among the representatives of disparate stakeholders and interests will result in the generation of sounder
judgments. The argument is that the process results in better
decisions due to the attenuation of extreme positions, the
canvassing of a wider range of perspectives and sources of
information, and the vigorous public interrogation of reasons

262

Heiner Hänggi argues that the term “parliament” is a better general term
than “legislature,” in order to capture the diverse functions of this branch of
government, since “legislating” is only one of its core functions. Heiner Hänggi, The Use
of Force Under International Auspices: Parliamentary Accountability and ‘Democratic
Deficits,’ in THE ‘DOUBLE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT’ 3, 11 (Hans Born & Heiner Hänggi
eds., 2004). Here, I use the terms interchangeably, unless otherwise noted.
263
Id. (discussing these functions in the context of the democratic deficit
relation to the use of force); Owen Greene, Democratic Governance and the
Internationalisation of Security Policy: The Relevance of Parliaments, in THE ‘DOUBLE
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT,’ supra note 262, at 19.
264
Greene, supra note 263, at 28-30; Hänggi, supra note 262, at 13-15.
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and motives underlying proposals.265 More specifically, theories
of deliberative democracy hold that the deliberative process, of
which the parliamentary debate and decision-making process is
a key feature, actually involves the transformation of
preferences through the consideration of the justifications
offered by various perspectives, rather than merely serving as
a means by which society can aggregate preferences.266
The oversight function of legislatures also feeds into
both these aspects of democracy, in that the employment of
specialized committees to engage in public inquiries into policy
choices or proposed courses of action, provides a deeper level of
deliberation that ensures a more thorough interrogation of
policy justifications and the underlying information upon which
policy proposals are based. Senate committee hearings during
the Vietnam War illustrate how such oversight can reveal
important information underlying policy debates, which in turn
can influence public opinion and better inform the policy
preferences of the representatives of the people. In 1967, the
Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on the
escalation of the strategic bombing of North Vietnam. After the
representatives of the Joint Chiefs, and in particular the Chief
of the Air Force, had testified before the committee on the
necessity of the continued strategic bombing, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara stunned the committee, the
government, and the public by testifying that the bombing was
entirely ineffective.267
The performance of these functions of the legislature, to
the extent that they are permitted or required to operate in the
decision-making process on the use of force, engage the
domestic causes of war in important ways. The fuller
realization of the representative and oversight functions—
serving as they do to both incorporate the will of the broader
population and to arguably contribute to the arrival at sounder
judgments through the deliberative process—would result in
those structural aspects of democratic states that comprise the
Image II factors most related to the causes of the “democratic
265

See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY? 1-20 (2004). See generally DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
266
Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 266, at 1,
1; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 265, at 13. Professors Diehl and Ginsburg make
this point in the specific context of war powers and the legislative role in decisions to go
war. Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to
Professors Nzilebe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1249-50 (2006).
267
TUCHMAN, supra note 25, at 345.
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peace,” being brought to bear more directly on the decisionmaking process. In other words, the structure would thus more
perfectly reflect the theoretical ideal that is part of the
structural explanations of the democratic peace.268
The institutional structure of the decision-making
process created by the Model’s separation of powers element
would also affect the political costs of going to war in a manner
that would further engage the Image II causes of war. Absent
an overwhelming or obvious threat, the procedural
requirements to obtain the support of the majority of the
legislature would impose significant political costs upon the
executive.269 The structure would effectively create a sliding
scale, in the sense that the greater the threat or the more
obvious the case for war—such as the use of force in selfdefense against an ongoing armed attack—the lower the costs
would be in obtaining legislative approval. Conversely, the
more tenuous the case for engaging in armed conflict, the more
268

The modern history of the process by which democratic countries have
decided to engage in armed conflict reveals a significant degree of executive branch
deception, of both the public and the legislature, as to the facts and reasons justifying
the decision. A constitutional requirement that the legislature approve the use of force
would not necessarily provide a guarantee against the executive misleading the nation
down the path to war, but the mechanism would help to ensure that probing questions
are asked, that facts and motives are subjected to some rigorous review, and, most
importantly, that the issues involved are argued and examined from a range of
different perspectives. As an example of such deception, the White House obtained
Congressional approval to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam after the second
“attack” in the Gulf of Tonkin, when it was already known within the executive that
the attack had likely never occurred and that Congress was operating on the basis of a
false account of the incident. See DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM
AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS ch. 1 (2002); ELY, supra note 169, at 19. Another is the
decision by the British Cabinet to intervene in Egypt in 1956 when many members of
the Cabinet, and none of the remainder of the members of Parliament, were aware that
the government had entered into a conspiracy with the governments of France and
Israel pursuant to which Israel would create the pretext for intervention. TURNER,
supra note 155, at 296-315. The final determination of the extent to which the Bush and
Blaire Administrations were duplicitous in their characterization of the reasons for the
invasion of Iraq will have to await later historical work, but it is already clear that there
was some deliberate deception of the public and the legislature in both the U.S. and U.K.
See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004); Elizabeth Manningham-Buller, Dir.
Gen. of Sec. Serv., Testimony Before the U.K. Iraq Inquiry (July 20, 2010), available at
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/100720.aspx; Clare Short,
Int’l Dev. Sec’y, Testimony Before the U.K. Iraq Inquiry (Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Short
Testimony], available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/
100202.aspx.
269
Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49, at
2530-32 (examining how the political costs of the process of obtaining Congressional
approval can serve to send signals to potential adversaries in this context); see also
Damrosch, Interface, supra note 114, at 58-60 (making the point that the increased
political costs of obtaining parliamentary approval can help to generate public support
and signal the depth of commitment to potential adversaries).
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politically costly it would be to win over the majority of the
legislature for support. This is precisely the kind of structural
characteristic that reduces the Image II causes of war.
The second element of the Model would also engage the
Image I causes of war, which include particular psychological
traits that are common in many executive officers, systemic
problems of misperception among decision makers, and the
irrational behavior of small-group decision making reflected in
“groupthink” and the “bureaucratic politics model” of decision
making.270 The risks that such tendencies could lead to
irrational or suboptimal decisions to use armed force would be
reduced, in the case of each of these particular phenomenon, by
spreading the decision-making process more widely through
the inclusion of the legislative body. The requirement to obtain
legislative approval, bringing to bear the core functions of
deliberative democracy on the decision-making process, such
that a wider set of perspectives and criteria are brought to the
process, as well as a more public interrogation of reasons and
rationales, would significantly reduce the potential for these
potential features of government decision making to manifest
themselves in the form of unsound or dangerous decisions
regarding the use of force.271
The requirement to consider the legality of the proposed
action under international law, as mandated by the first
element of the Model, would of course inject precisely the kind
of exogenous criteria and divergent perspectives that could
operate to reduce the effects of the domestic causes of war. And
conversely, the requirement for legislative approval, bringing
to bear the foregoing parliamentary functions on the
considerations of legality, would vastly increase the traction of
that aspect of the process. Evidence has recently emerged, for
instance, on the extent to which disputes within the British
cabinet over the legality of the contemplated invasion of Iraq
270

See supra Part II.A.
The spreading of decision making across different institutions would by
definition reduce the possibility of groupthink, which afflicts decision making within
smaller groups characterized by high levels of cohesion and group loyalty, shared
values, and the dominance of a strong leader. The broadening of perspectives, public
debate, introduction of exogenous criteria, and deeper interrogation of rationales would
all help to reduce the problems of misperception caused in part by the assimilation of
ambiguous information to pre-existing assumptions and hypotheses. Similarly, the
cross-institutional decision making attended by public debate and inquiry into
rationales would likely reduce the more obvious problems of the bureaucratic politics
model of decision making, since the self-interested departmental interests will tend to
be laid bare in such debate.
271
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severely complicated the prime minister’s decision making,
even in the absence of any constitutional or statutory to
consider such issues. Had there been such a legal obligation,
and in addition a requirement to take the debate of that issue
to parliament, it is quite conceivable that the decision would
have gone the other way.272
Finally, the requirement to obtain legislative approval
will also serve to enhance international law objectives and
engage the Image III causes of war. Thus far in our discussion
of this element of the Model we have been looking primarily at
the domestic perspective—the extent to which legislative
involvement assists the state in avoiding the ruinous costs of
military misadventure. But Kant in particular contemplated
the benefits that such a government structure would provide to
the international system as a whole.273 The spread of a
constitutional system that included representative government
and a separation of powers between the executive and the
legislature would lead to an ever-widening circle of peace
among these like-minded states. It is ironic that he has been
proved prescient, with the actual spread of constitutional
democracy and the realization of the democratic peace, while at
the same time the feature of his model involving the separation
of powers with respect to the decision to go war has been very
imperfectly realized among the world’s community of liberal
democracies.274 It has been argued that this is changing, and
indeed as already discussed, there is some significant evidence
that a trend is developing, with legislatures in many liberal
democracies around the world increasingly addressing the

272

Prime Minister Tony Blair reacted very negatively to a one-page
memorandum from Attorney General Lord Goldsmith on the likely illegality of any
invasion of Iraq, and to similar advice from legal counsel in the Foreign Office. Blair
ultimately brought considerable pressure to bear on Goldsmith to prepare a more
positive opinion. Moreover, the head of the British Army indicated reluctance to
participate in the invasion without a legal opinion as to the legality of the operation.
See Peter Goldsmith, Attorney Gen., Testimony Before the U.K. Iraq Inquiry (Jan. 27,
2010), available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/
100127.aspx; Short Testimony, supra note 268; see also Rosa Prince, Government Knew
‘No Leg to Stand On’ Legally to Go to War in Iraq, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Jan. 26, 2010
10:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/7079895/Governmentknew-no-leg-to-stand-on-legally-to-go-to-war-in-Iraq.html; John F. Burns, Blair Called
a Liar in Iraq Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A6.
273
See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
274
This fact, of course, feeds into the debate in the democratic peace literature
over whether structural-institutional or normative-cultural explanations best account
for the phenomenon.

686

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

issue and mobilizing for change.275 The proposed Model merely
builds on the theory and seeks to encourage this actual trend.
Many arguments, already well developed as part of
ongoing debates such as constitutional war powers and the
operation of the constitution in times of emergency, will be
raised in objection to much of the foregoing discussion on
constitutional support for the Model. I will address a few of the
more likely critiques in order to round out the analysis.
The most fundamental objection, grounded in the
theories of Carl Schmitt, is that it is simply not possible to
develop effective constitutional constraints on the use of armed
force, for in moments of crisis such constitutional provisions
will be simply ignored.276 This form of argument comes in a
number of variations. It is reflected in the U.S. war powers
debate, in which it is frequently argued that requiring
Congressional approval of the use of armed force would not
really provide for a sober second look, and thereby reduce the
incidence of imprudent wars, because Congress would either be
just as prone as the executive to patriotic fervor or other
inflamed emotions in the midst of a severe crisis.277 An
analogous form of argument, much more explicitly grounded in
or responsive to the theories of Schmitt, is to be found in much
of the post 9/11 theoretical literature regarding the impact of
national security imperatives on the normative power of
constitutional protections, and the role of the judiciary in times
of national crisis or emergency—what Schmitt called the
moment of “exception.”278
275

Lori Fisler Damrosch, Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common
Core of Accountability in Democratic Societies?, 50 MIAMI L. REV. 181, 182-83 (1995);
Damrosch, Interface, supra note 114, at 58-60. See supra notes 173-202 and
accompanying text regarding trends in Germany, Spain, Italy, the U.K., Australia,
France, and Canada.
276
Schmitt’s theory is, of course, much deeper than this proposition, attacking
the entire foundation of liberal legal theory with the argument that law and the
constitution cannot function during moments of exception, and that liberal legal theory
is incapable of explaining or accommodating this reality. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY, FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans.,
2005). For a critical analysis of Schmitt’s theory, see, for example, David Dyzenhaus,
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2005 (2006); Oren Gross, The Normless and the Exceptionless
Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the ‘Norm-Exception’
Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825 (2000).
277
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 169, at 8-9 (considering the argument before
criticizing it).
278
Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and
the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004). For a discussion of such
arguments, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004);
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David Dyzenhaus and others have marshaled several
persuasive arguments to refute the Schmittian attack on the
idea, central to liberal legal theory, that the law, and more
importantly the rule of law, can operate effectively in periods of
emergency.279 Dyzenhaus draws upon the theories of Dicey to
argue that the continued operation of a thick substantive
notion of the rule of law during the period of emergency is not
only possible, but that cooperation among the executive,
legislature, and judiciary to ensure that legal responses to the
emergency comply with the rule of law is crucial to the liberal
democratic idea of the state being constituted by law.280 Under
this theory of the liberal democratic constitution and a thick
conception of the rule of law, the exception does not provide the
justification for the creation of legal black holes or the
suspension of constitutional constraints at all, and neither does
it operate so as to necessarily create such lawlessness. On the
contrary, it is feasible to develop constitutional provisions that
can survive the exception and operate to govern the response to
national security emergencies.281
It is not necessary, however, to refute Schmittian
theoretical arguments to defend the Model. This is because the
Model is designed primarily to constrain conduct in the
moment of true exception. The rationales advanced to justify
the use of armed force cover a broad spectrum, from protecting
national interests as ephemeral as national prestige and
credibility, to the desperate need to repulse a massive invasion
of the homeland. It may be true that when a state is suddenly
confronted with an immediate existential threat, one that truly
threatens the “life of the nation,” it might be less likely that a
constitutional provision prohibiting any use of armed force will
effectively govern state behavior.282 Thus, while the warStanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L.
REV. 699 (2006); Kim Scheppele, We Are All Post-9/11 Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 607
(2006); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095
(2009).
279
Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 276, at 2035, 2037-38; see also
Gross, supra note 276, at 1851-53 (providing an analysis of the structural flaws in
Schmitt’s theoretical attack on liberal constitutionalism).
280
Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 276, at 2008, 2030-33, 2037.
281
Both Dyzenhaus and Gross do acknowledge, however, that as a descriptive
matter the response to the threat of terrorism after 9/11, particularly in the United
States, has not been encouraging, with significant erosion of the rule of law and
weakening of fundamental constitutional protections. Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey,
supra note 276, at 2015-16; Gross, supra note 276, at 1853-63.
282
For a useful discussion of what constitutes a threat to the “life of the
nation,” see the House of Lords decision A(FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for
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renouncing provision of the Constitution of Japan operated
effectively to constrain Japanese policy on the use of armed
force even in moments of perceived crisis, the provision “would
not likely have exercised much influence over national policy in
the event of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.”283 But the Model
being developed here is not intended to prevent or even hinder
the use of force in such dire circumstances.
First, the constitutional incorporation of principles of jus
ad bellum being proposed here would not actually operate to
prohibit an appropriate response to such existential crises. The
jus ad bellum regime itself provides for the exercise of the right
to self-defense, and since most true existential threats would
more than satisfy the conditions for the exercise of self-defense
in international law, the requirement to consider compliance
with international law would not create any constraint on
government action. Similarly, requiring legislative approval
would not operate as any constraint in such circumstances. So
quite aside from the argument that the constitutional provisions
will not operate in moments of existential crisis, this Model is
neither intended to be, nor would it actually operate as, a
constraint in such circumstances.
The Model is intended, rather, to operate as a constraint
with respect to the use of force when the life of the nation is not
at stake, but where “vital interests” and other such imperatives
provoke calls for action. For the fact remains that few armed
conflicts that have involved Western constitutional democracies
in the last 60 years have been responsive to existential threats.
Rather, they range from such low-level operations as the U.S.
invasions of Grenada and Panama at one end of the spectrum,
which were defended as being for the purpose of protecting
nationals overseas,284 to such larger conflicts as the Korean
conflict, the Vietnam war, the first Gulf war, the Kosovo war,
the Falklands war, or the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
since 2001, all of which were justified as being exercises of
collective or individual self-defense. None of these, however,
were in response to existential threats to the Western
the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.), particularly id.
para. 88 (Lord Hoffman).
283
See Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 288.
284
The protection of nationals overseas is not a generally accepted
justification for the use of force under international law, and the facts necessary to
establish such a claim in these two instances are very much in dispute. See DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 232; GRAY, supra note 141,
at 57-58, 91, 157-58, 390-91.
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democracies central to the conflicts. Some were consistent with
international law, some were not, but with the possible
exception of the invasion of Afghanistan in response to 9/11,
none was a reaction to a national security crisis of such a scale
that constitutional provisions would likely be ignored in liberal
democracies engaged in the conflicts.285
Another set of anticipated objections will be that the
executive branch needs to be left free from the encumbrances of
domestic legal constraints on its ability to make the appropriate
decisions in the realm of national security. These arguments,
quite contrary to Schmittian theory, assume that constitutional
constraints may indeed hinder the effective response of the
executive in times of crisis, and that, normatively, such
constraints should be eliminated. According to this view, the
government may enter into an international convention that
commits the state to observe certain obligations, but that still
leaves the government free to breach those obligations in some
future circumstance in which it decides that the benefits to be
derived from breach are greater than the costs of doing so. To
import the obligation into the constitution, however, would be to
vastly complicate that option, increasing the costs of breach, and
reducing the discretion of the government—which of course,
according to the argument I am advancing, is the very point of
doing so. But for some, such binding of the hands of the
executive in advance, and possibly invoking the involvement of
the judiciary by embedding the international law principles into
the constitution, would be to interfere unwisely with the scope of
executive powers, and at some gut level, with the sovereignty of
the nation.286
285

This is not to say that 9/11 constituted a true existential threat to the U.S.,
for it clearly did not, but it was certainly perceived as a national crisis, and the
national response was one that reflected a readiness on the part of the executive to
disregard certain constitutional provisions and international law commitments in the
name of national security. While Kuwait is not typically grouped among liberal
democracies, it is true that the Gulf War was a response to an existential threat to that
state, and to a naked act of aggression on the part of Iraq.
286
The term “gut level” is used here, since the state has already voluntarily
entered into the relevant treaty regimes. Thus, domestic implementation to enhance
compliance with those regimes cannot be any real additional sacrifice of sovereignty.
Nonetheless, there are many who feel that any such limitation on the freedom of the
nation to act in the future constitutes an infringement of sovereignty. See Robert J.
Delahunty & John Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 73 (2006), for an example of an argument that the President is not, and ought not
to be, constrained by international law as a constitutional matter in the U.S.; see also
Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49. For a very good
analysis and critique of the range of instrumentalist arguments more generally, see
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There are a range of arguments in this category, and in
the United States many of them are intertwined with the
constitutional war powers debates. One line of arguments
makes the claim that the executive is the best positioned and
most competent branch to make the determinations of what is
in the national interest when it comes to war, and that
involvement of other branches would interfere with and
degrade the effectiveness and soundness of the decision-making
process. We see here a sharp disagreement over the definition
and meaning of “sound decisions.” For I have made the
argument above that legislative involvement, and the addition
of exogenous criteria such as compliance with international
law, will lead to decisions that are “better” or “sounder” than
unilateral decisions made by the executive. Much of the
disagreement can be traced to the criteria that are used in
determining the wisdom or soundness of judgment.
John Yoo and Jide Nzelibe, for instance, in their
functional analysis of the war powers issue, apply a very
narrow cost-benefit analysis that employs the criteria of
winning wars as the primary basis for assessing which branch
will make the “better” decisions.287 They quite explicitly argue
that Congressional involvement is likely to increase errors of
omission in which the state will miss opportunities to engage in
“good” wars.288 As Tom Ginsburg has pointed out, implicit in
their analysis is the argument that under the current
arrangement there are too few wars, or at least there is the
potential for failure to capitalize on the possible gains through
war.289 This relies in part on an excessively narrow and
simplistic understanding of the costs and benefits of armed
conflict.290 As the term “Pyrrhic victory” reminds us, many wars
that may have been “won” in purely military terms, were not
necessarily worth the cost to the nation in terms of human life,
resources, damage to the domestic political system and the

Deborah Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009).
287
Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49, at 2525.
288
Id. at 2517-19, 2522-26.
289
Diehl & Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design, supra note
266, at 1240.
290
See, for example, Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design,
supra note 49, at 2525, which labels past wars “won,” “lost,” or a “draw” as a basis for
assessing the relative merits of congressional approval of presidential decisions to use
force. This suggests an exceedingly simplistic and narrow understanding of the true
strategic, political, economic, social, and human costs and benefits of going to war.
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cultural fabric of the society, and the state’s standing in
international society.291
Aside from pure competency arguments, another claim
of the executive power proponents such as John Yoo is that the
executive ought to be free from any domestic legal obligation to
adhere to international law commitments when it is in the
“national interest” to violate those commitments.292 This claim
is often made quite explicitly, but it is also implicit in the
arguments that the executive should have exclusive power to
initiate war, on the grounds that it has the advantages of rapid
decision-making
capabilities
and
superior-but-secret
information, all of which is crucial (so the argument goes) to
the use of force in circumstances requiring speed and surprise.
The problem with this, however, is that the circumstances in
which the use of force could be initiated with such speed and
strategic surprise, and be nonetheless consistent with the
principles of jus ad bellum, would be rare indeed.293

291

These functionalist arguments have been dismissed in more detail
elsewhere. See, e.g., Diehl & Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design,
supra note 266; Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350
(2006); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1230 (2007); Pearlstein, supra note 286. Also, it should be noted that not all
functionalist arguments approach the issue with the same assumptions, or employ the
same narrow criteria. The arguments referred to above can be classified as those of the
“effectiveness functionalists,” who in this context focus primarily on which institution
would be most effective at achieving the narrowly defined objectives of winning wars. A
second category, what has been termed the “purposive functionalists,” more
appropriately bring a functional analysis to bear on the question of which institution
would be best suited to realize the original or intended purpose of the constitutional
provisions in question. This latter group, guided as they are by the primary function of
constitutional and institutional structures, are less inclined to get caught up in
excessively narrow considerations of which branch is best able to win wars. See
Pearlstein, supra note 286, at 1556-57.
292
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 170; Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational
War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (arguing for greater
deference with respect to executive decisions related to foreign relations law, even
decisions in violation of international law).
293
This is to be distinguished, of course, from the need for speed, secrecy, and
the element of surprise once the state is engaged in armed conflict, as opposed to in the
course of deciding whether to initiate the use of armed force. For those who argue that
the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 constituted a legitimate exercise of anticipatory selfdefense, with Israel launching a surprise attack to pre-empt a potential first strike by
the deployed Egyptian and Jordanian forces, this would constitute one of those very
rare circumstances. Most international law scholars, however, do not view the ‘67 War
as having been a legitimate act of self-defense. Even former Prime Minister Menachem
Begin publicly stated in 1982 that Israel had other options when deciding whether to
launch its attack, undermining any argument that the action met the necessity
element of the test for self-defense. See RICHARD N. HAASS, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF
CHOICE 9-10 (2009).
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At a much more fundamental level, however, the
overarching argument that the state ought to be left free to
violate international law whenever it is in the national interest
to do so, without qualification, suggests an underlying refusal
to take seriously international law and the obligation to limit
the use of armed force. It reflects the “realist” view that states
only comply with international law when it is convenient or
beneficial to do so, which is obviously a view that is at odds
with the assumptions of this entire project.294 But if one does
accept the legitimacy of the collective security system and the
jus ad bellum regime, and one takes seriously the
commitments that states have made to that regime in
becoming party to the U.N. Charter and other treaties that
underlie the regime, then it is difficult to see how one can
argue in a principled fashion that governments should avoid
any domestic implementation of the commitment to the regime
in order to leave room for its violation at the international
level. It is like arguing that one should join Alcoholics
Anonymous, but ought not to tell anyone at home for fear that
they might lock up the liquor cabinet. And when one considers
the litany of armed conflicts engaged in by liberal democracies
since the establishment of the U.N. system, many in apparent
violation of that regime,295 some form of effective domestic
mechanism to enhance compliance with the regime would seem
desirable.296 Moreover, as discussed earlier, developing a
national policy predicated upon the “efficient breach” of the

294

Moreover, this is not a view that is universally embraced by realists and
has to be seen as a more extreme view even among them. See, e.g., BULL, supra note 70.
295
Examples include the Suez crisis of 1956; the 1967 Israeli-Arab war,
though many argue that this was a valid exercise of the right to self-defense; the
Vietnam war, including the U.S. bombings of Cambodia and operations in Laos; the
U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989; the U.S. intervention in
Nicaragua in the early 1980s; the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986; the NATO bombing in
the Kosovo war in 1999; the second invasion of Iraq in 2003; not to mention smaller
scale attacks by the U.S., such as the recent operations against purported terrorists in
Somalia in 2007.
296
There has been recent work suggesting that the international law of armed
conflict already informs the proper interpretation of congressional approval under the
U.S. Constitution for executive use of armed force. In this very limited manner, the
current domestic mechanism could be said to provide such compliance, though scholars
differ on the extent to which the international laws of war (primarily jus in bello) can
thereby exercise a real constraint on executive power. See generally Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 170; Delahunty & Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law,
supra note 286; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization:
International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2653 (2005).
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most fundamental international law obligations is corrosive of
the domestic commitments to the rule of law.
Ronald Dworkin has made the now famous argument
that to take rights seriously is to enforce them even though
doing so will impose real costs on the society as a whole.297 It is
grounded in a recognition that we are prepared, as a liberal
democratic society founded on certain values and beliefs, to
incur such costs in order to structure our society according to
those values, as expressed in the respect for and enforcement of
individual rights.298 The analogy can be made to the costs
associated with avoiding war and structuring our society—both
the individual societies of liberal democracies, and the broader
international society within which democracies now form the
majority—in such a way that better constrains our ability and
propensity to make war. There may indeed be times when
those constraints will exact very real and even painful costs,
but if we are to take war seriously, or to be more precise, if we
are to take the reduction of war seriously, we should be
prepared to incur such costs. Aharon Barak, the former
President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has in the context of
judicial decisions relating to constitutional constraints on the
conduct of armed conflict, noted that the laws may seem to
require democracies to fight with one arm tied behind their
back, but that in fact democracies must indeed remain true to
these laws, even if it handicaps them in war, in order to remain
true to the values that make them democracies in the first
place.299 This can be extended to the realm of jus ad bellum. If
we are to remain true to the international rule of law, we ought
to accept the costs of domestic constraints that merely bind us
closer to the commitments we have already made to the most
fundamental principles in international law.
C.

Constitutional Theory—The Role of Judicial Review

The second branch of the separation of powers elements
of the Model is the provision of some limited measure of judicial
review of the decision-making process. Including the third
branch assists in providing a further check on the “second class”
297

DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 204.
Id.
299
CA 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of
Israel 53(4), 37 HCJ [1999] (Isr.); see also AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY
ch. 16 (2006).
298
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of war that worried Madison, those driven by the passions of the
people, and it provides further assistance in addressing the
Kantian dilemma. For the problem identified in this context is
the proclivity of the people, and their representatives in the
legislature, to be just as inflamed and bent on action as the
executive in certain circumstances, particularly when dealing
with illiberal states.300 By providing for yet another check, in the
form of potential judicial review of the decision-making process
to ensure that the proper procedure was followed, and that the
required factors and criteria were sufficiently considered, the
Model can further ameliorate this weakness in the democratic
process of going to war.
To better appreciate the manner in which judicial
review would operate as an effective check on improper
decision making of both the executive and the legislature, it is
useful to place the discussion in the context of the broader
theoretical justifications for judicial review as a fundamental
component of constitutional democracy. One of the central
justifications for judicial review flows from the idea that
constitutions comprise the formal terms of a social contract.
The people surrender power and authority to governmental
institutions in return for a commitment that such authority
and power will be exercised in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.301 Even for those who view this as being more of a
useful fiction rather than any empirical explanation of the
formation of constitutions, it reflects the principle of popular
sovereignty that is fundamental to constitutional democracy,
and captures the principal-agent problems that characterize
democratic governance. To the extent that the government
constitutes the agent for the voting population as principal, the
relationship is likely to suffer from agency problems, with the
interests of the agent diverging from those of the principal in
various circumstances.302
The courts play an important role in reducing these
agency problems. Informational agency problems are
particularly
significant
in
the
people-government
relationship.303 It is extremely difficult for the population to
obtain information regarding government malfeasance or even
300

See supra Part IV.B.
For a good review of this theoretical explanation of judicial review, see David
S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723 (2009).
302
Id. at 723.
303
Id. at 745.
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misjudgment. We have already discussed this in the context of
the role of legislative oversight of the executive in deliberative
democracy, but the judicial review of government conduct also
serves a vital monitoring function that helps to attenuate this
problem. The courts provide information to the population
regarding the extent to which either branch is engaging in
activity that is outside of its constitutional authority, or in
conduct that violates specific limits or constraints on how it is
to exercise power.304 Indeed, the judgments of courts provide
particularly accessible and legitimate opinions regarding
government action, which tend to be given wide publication by
the media. These not only provide information in the form of
both findings of fact and judgments relating to the conduct of
the other branches of government, but they serve an important
coordination function as well. Judicial decisions help to shape
public beliefs, both in terms of the factual circumstances
alleged to constitute a violation of the constitutional terms, and
the normative views as to what ought to constitute legitimate
exercises of authority under the constitutional arrangement.305
These two functions of the courts in the exercise of
judicial review—the monitoring and informational role, and the
coordinating and opinion-shaping role—dovetail in very
obvious ways with the theoretical analysis that has been
developed thus far in support of the Model. To the extent that
the courts are forced to actually engage in judicial review of
government decisions on the use of force, the monitoring and
informational role amplifies and reinforces the elements of
deliberative democracy. Moreover, over time the process of
judicial review, in considering and interpreting the manner in
which the international law principles were applied in
governmental decision making, will internalize those norms in
precisely the manner contemplated by transnational legal
process theory. And of course, the mere potential for such
judicial review, because of the well-understood capability of the
courts to judge the legitimacy of government decisions and
their power to shape public perceptions, can operate to
influence the behavior of both the executive and the legislature.
While theoretically and ideologically appealing, the
social-contract theory may not fully explain why political
entities engaged in the development of a new constitution, or
304
305

Id. at 745-55.
Id. at 756-57.

696

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

for that matter contemplating the amendment of an existing
one, entities which themselves expect to exercise political
power within the new polity, would confer such power upon the
third branch of government. An alternative explanation is that
they do so as a form of insurance, to entrench the political and
legal arrangement about which there is now consensus against
the possible interference by subsequent regimes. Judicial
review thus serves as a hedge against the loss of power in the
near to medium term, and insurance against successors acting
in ways inimical to the currently agreed-upon structure.306 This
may be a better explanation for why new democracies entrench
the power of judicial review within constitutions as a factual
matter, but it does not deny the agency problems inherent in
democratic governance, nor does it negate this understanding
of the role courts and judicial review play in providing
information and shaping public opinions.
The judicial review of the decision-making process
provided for in the Model would bring to bear these monitoring
and coordinating functions of the judiciary on the crucial process
of deciding on the use of armed force, and in so doing it would
engage the Image I and Image II causes of war in a manner very
similar to that of the deliberative functions of the legislature
already discussed. Yet because it is limited to a review of
whether the decision has been made with adequate
consideration of specified principles, and that the decision was
made with the requisite authority and approvals, the provision
for judicial review is not nearly as radical a move as it might
seem at first glance. Rather, it is entirely within the scope of
what courts are already understood to have full authority to do
in most constitutional democracies. What is novel about the
Model is the substance of those criteria or factors to be
considered by government in its decision making—that it
mandates the consideration of the principles of jus ad bellum as
part of the decision-making process. But it does not require the
court to apply those principles substantively, and the court need
not agree with the decision makers’ judgment that the proposed
policy complied with the international law principles—so long as
the court is satisfied that the principles were sufficiently and in
good faith considered in the process, then the court will have no
grounds to interfere with the decision.
306

TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22-33 (2003).
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Including judicial review also addresses a structural
weakness in the decision-making process on the use of armed
force. The argument above was that the legislature’s
involvement can bring to bear the core parliamentary functions
on the decision-making process. As discussed, that separation
of powers on the decision to use force is underdeveloped in most
democracies. This is in large measure due to the executive
branch jealously guarding what is seen as its prerogative in the
absence of clear constitutional requirements to involve the
legislature.307 But another aspect of the problem is the natural
proclivity of legislatures to abdicate any responsibility for such
decision making. Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo make the
argument, grounded in agency theory, that legislatures will
always have incentives in hard cases to sit on the fence, and so
will avoid committing to any position in up-or-down votes,
thereby permitting the executive to go it alone and take the
blame if things go poorly.308 John Ely, arguing from the other
end of the spectrum in the executive powers debate, similarly
excoriated Congress for its failure to exercise its constitutional
function effectively or responsibly during the early years of
escalation in Vietnam.309 This was reflected in the passage of a
notoriously ambiguous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, only to have
senior Congressmen later argue that they never intended to
authorize various aspects of the war as it began to unfold
badly.310 Thus, the clear requirement for legislative approval
would not only force the executive’s hand, but it would help
prevent the legislature from shirking its duty. It is the
provision of jurisdiction and broad standing for judicial review,
307

This is reflected in the U.S. in the stance of every President since Truman
on the war powers provision of the Constitution.
308
Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49, at
2524-25. Ironically, Nzelibe and Yoo make this argument as part of a broader argument in
favor of clear executive control over the power to engage in armed conflict. See id. at 2516.
309
ELY, supra note 169, at chs. 2-3.
310
Id. at 16-17. The “intentions” of a deliberative body like Congress can be
somewhat misleading, and its voting behavior can seem bizarre if viewed from the
perspective of any unitary intent. This is exquisitely reflected by the voting on the U.S.
participation in NATO air strikes in the Kosovo war of 1999. On April 28, Congress voted
on four related resolutions. First, it overwhelmingly rejected a declaration of war, by a
vote of 427 to 2. It also rejected, by a tie vote, a resolution authorizing the President to
conduct air operations and missile strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But it
then went on to reject a resolution requiring the President to terminate U.S. participation
in the NATO operations immediately. Finally, it voted to provide all necessary funds for
that operation. In terms of “intention,” one could say that Congress did not want to
authorize the war, did not want to stop it, and was happy to pay for it. For the voting
record, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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however, that gives this aspect of the Model real bite, since the
potential for judicial review would likely reduce legislative
resistance to fulfilling its responsibilities.
There is, of course, a final institutional weakness, which
is the reluctance of the judiciary itself to be drawn into cases
involving high-stakes national security issues. And this lies at
the heart of what are likely to be significant objections to this
aspect of the Model. General arguments are often raised against
judicial review of government conduct that does not implicate
individual rights.311 But there have also been many arguments
made in the context of the American war powers debate to
suggest that the courts are reluctant to, and that normatively
they ought not to, play any role in decisions on the use of force.312
And indeed, there are numerous appellate court cases in the
U.S. in which judges have made precisely such claims, typically
on the basis that such issues are not justiciable due to the
operation of the “political question doctrine.”313
Beginning with the descriptive claims, the argument is
that courts will employ such devices as the “political question”
doctrine, excessively narrow standing rules, or the employment
of standards of review that are relaxed or “dialed down” so far as
to reduce the judicial review to a mere façade when dealing with
national security issues.314 Recent empirical research, however,
including analysis of the decisions of the U.S. federal courts in
national security related cases in the post-9/11 context, suggests
that these descriptive claims are not accurate—that the courts
are no more reluctant to exercise judicial review of such issues
than they are in any other public law cases.315
I would argue that when courts have appeared
reluctant, it has most frequently been when there was
311

E.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria,
54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1497-1505 (2005).
312
E.g., id.; Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra
note 49, at 2536-38; Vermeule, supra note 278, at 1098, 1106-25.
313
See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring).
314
See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87 (2009), for a good review of these arguments. The
reference to “dialing down” the level of review comes from Vermeule, supra note 278,
which relates more specifically to judicial review in administrative law and the
creation of “gray holes” and “black holes” in the legal order—but the same arguments
apply to judicial review in the constitutional context.
315
Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism (Univ. of Chicago,
Public Law Working Paper No. 299); Kent Roach, Judicial Review of the State’s AntiTerrorism Activities: The Post 9/11 Experience and Justification for Judicial Review, 3
INDIAN J. CONST. L. 138 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post9/11: An Empirical Investigation, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269.
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ambiguity as to either what the precise issue was, or where the
lines of authority lay with respect to the exercise of power that
was in question. Where there is a lack of sufficient clarity, it
permits an unfortunate mischaracterization of the question
that is properly before the court, appearing in the arguments
advanced before the courts, the reasoning in the resulting
judgments, and in subsequent scholarly analysis. The issue is
all too frequently articulated as being a substantive inquiry
into what is, in the particular circumstances, the optimal
strategic or tactical policy to achieve national security
objectives. The objection is then made that the courts do not
have sufficient competence to assess such questions, and that it
is not in any event within their proper jurisdiction to be
second-guessing the political branches of government on
decisions relating to the deployment of forces in the national
security of the nation.316 But this is usually a
mischaracterization of the issue, and it is typically not the kind
of question that is actually before the court. The issue before
the court in these cases is more often whether a decision that
has been made or action taken in respect of the deployment of
armed forces has been made with the requisite authority, or
whether it has violated some constitutional provision.
Those are questions that are entirely within the proper
purview and competency of the judiciary.317 Many common law
courts have indeed noted the distinction between the nonjusticiability of questions relating to the substance of the
government’s defense policy on the one hand, and on the other
hand, questions as to whether a branch of government had the
requisite authority to make the decision in question, and
whether there is evidence that the decision was made on the
basis of the specific considerations required by the authority

316

See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 27-28 (Silberman, J., concurring);
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973). To be fair, there are times
when the courts mischaracterize the question even when there does not appear to be
any real ambiguity, as reflected in the famous Sunakawa case in the Japanese
Supreme Court: Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, 1959(A) No. 710, 13 KEISHŪ
3225, sec. 2, para. 4 (Japan), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/
text/1959.12.16-1959-A-No.710.html [hereinafter the Sunakawa case]. In the context of
the war powers cases in the United States the issue is complicated further by questions
of whether the terms “war” and the scope of the phrase “declare war” are sufficiently
clear standards upon which the court may make judgment. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 2426 (Silberman, J., concurring).
317
ELY, supra note 169, at 56; Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question”
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 606 (1976) [hereinafter Henkin, Political Question].
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under which the decision was said to be made.318 The point was
made by Judge Tatel, concurring in Campbell v. Clinton:
Resolving the issues in this case would require us to decide not
whether the air campaign was wise . . . but whether the President
possessed legal authority to conduct military operations. Did the
President exceed his constitutional authority as commander in chief?
Did he intrude on Congress’s power to declare war? Did he violate
the War Powers Resolution? Presenting purely legal issues, these
questions call on us to perform one of the most important functions
of Article III courts: determining the proper allocation of power
among constitutional branches of government.319

The House of Lords in the United Kingdom and the Supreme
Court of Canada have similarly held that while courts may not
second-guess the substance of national security decisions in the
government’s exercise of the Royal Prerogative, they may still
review the decision for the purpose of determining whether the
government had the requisite authority to take the action in
question and whether the action was in violation of any
limitation on that authority or other constitutional provision.320
In short, while a more exhaustive analysis of case law is
not possible here, an examination of these cases from different
jurisdictions provides some basis for two important and related
arguments. First, they suggest that courts are not reluctant to
exercise their powers of judicial review where the question
318

E.g., Council of Civil Serv. Unions & Others v. Ministers of Civil Serv.,
[1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.); Chandler v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 763 (H.L.);
Aleksic v. Canada, [2002] 215 D.L.R.4th 720 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Operation
Dismantle, Inc. v. R, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.).
319
Campbell, 203 F.3d at 40-41 (Tatel, J., concurring); see also Mitchell v. Laird,
488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the courts do not lack the ability or the
authority to determine whether the actions of the executive constitute war-making for the
purposes of the war-powers provision of the Constitution); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
1141, 1145 (D.D.C. 1990) (“If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any
particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute warmaking but only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will
be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the executive. Such an ‘interpretation’ would
evade the plain language of the Constitution, and it cannot stand.”).
320
Council of Civil Serv. Unions, [1985] A.C. (H.L.), at 401-02 (Lord Fraser of
Tullybelton) (holding that the courts will only defer to the government’s opinion as to
the necessity of the policy for national security purposes, in so far as it is not patently
unreasonable); id. at 405-06 (Lord Scarman); Operation Dismantle, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
(S.C.C. Can.), at para. 65 (Wilson, J.). The Operation Dismantle case involved U.S.
cruise missile testing in Canada, and the claim was dismissed on the grounds that the
risk to the life and security of the person that the policy was alleged to have raised, by
reason of making missile strikes against Canada more likely in the event of war with
the Warsaw Pact, was too speculative. The majority implicitly accepted that the issue
was justiciable, but Justice Wilson explicitly dealt with the issue in her concurring
opinion, which has been relied upon in subsequent cases, including Aleksic, [2002] 215
D.L.R.4th 720 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
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before them is whether the impugned government action was
exercised with the requisite authority. Or, to put it another
way, where the question is whether the political branch in
question has the constitutional authority to do what it proposes
to do. Second, the courts are less reluctant to exercise judicial
review where the constitutional provisions (or even statutory
provisions for that matter) that form the basis of the claim
being advanced are clear and unambiguous—whether they
delineate the authority at issue, or establish specific limitation
on the exercise of government power. It is partly with this
insight in mind that the provisions in the Model would make
quite explicit the limited scope of the question that the court
can address, and the broad standing for advancing the claim.
The “political question” doctrine would not frustrate the
operation of the provision. In the constitutional jurisprudence
of the United States, the “political question” doctrine suggests
that certain categories of issue will be nonjusticiable. The most
important and widely accepted categories of constitutional
issues that fall within the scope of the “political question”
doctrine include: those over which other branches of
government have been given specific authority to decide by the
constitution; those for which there are no judicially manageable
standards available to resolve the question; and those which
are impossible to decide without first making an initial policy
determination that is clearly outside of the court’s
jurisdiction.321 There continues to be considerable controversy
regarding the actual scope, continued viability, and legitimacy
of the “political question” doctrine in the United States.322 We
need not delve into that debate here, but because the Model
321

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962). The remaining “categories”
according to the court, were: questions the resolution of which was impossible without
expressing lack of respect for another branch of government; questions that involved
circumstances in which there was an unusual requirement for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; and questions which raised the
possibility of embarrassment caused by the different positions taken by coordinate
branches of government. Id. at 211-17. There is, however, much less agreement on
these criteria, and, indeed, some scholars do not even accept the criteria I have set out
as most widely accepted. See authorities cited infra note 322. In my view, there is no
principled basis for foreclosing judicial review of any decision simply because it might
cause embarrassment or reflect a lack of respect for another branch of government,
where the decision potentially constitutes an unconstitutional act.
322
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 169, at 55-56; THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL
QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992); Choper, supra note 311; Henkin, Political
Question, supra note 317; Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justicibility:
The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1203 (2002).
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would provide clear issues for the courts to determine, for the
reasons explained above it would not, run afoul of the most
widely accepted criteria of the “political question” doctrine.
Turning to the normative arguments against judicial
review of national security issues, many of these are similar to
the functionalist claims for executive power in the war powers
debate. These claims are a subset of undertheorized and often
internally inconsistent “special deference” doctrines, according to
which the courts ought to defer entirely on foreign affairs
issues.323 The reasons given include the need for secrecy in
decision making; the courts’ lack of access to crucial information
to resolve complex issues relating to national security; the
courts’ lack of professional competency to decide such issues; and
from the political question doctrine itself, the need to avoid
“embarrassment” flowing from conflicting decisions from
different branches of government in foreign affairs, and the lack
of manageable standards for the judiciary to apply in resolving
disputes, particularly given the allegedly political and dynamic
nature of international norms (in contrast to the stable and legal
norms in the domestic system).324
All of these claims have been dismissed at some length
elsewhere,325 and many of the more general counterarguments
to broader functionalist claims have already been addressed in
the previous section on the legislative role. To address briefly a
few of the criticisms specific to the judicial role, the arguments
advanced on the lack of judicial competency do not bear
scrutiny when placed in the context of the demands made of
courts for the resolution of incredibly complex, large scale, and
hugely significant domestic issues. The problems relating to
judicial access to information, specialized knowledge and
competency, and the development of sufficiently manageable
standards are no less problematic in various kinds of
environmental, securities, insolvency, and similarly technical
issues arising in a regulatory context, some of which may
include constitutional aspects and even impact the state’s
foreign affairs.326 Yet the advocates of special deference on
national security issues do not object to judicial review of these
323

Knowles, supra note 314, at 89, 130-38.
Id. at 130-38. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and
Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 659-63 (2000); Jinks & Katyal, supra note 291;
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 292.
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sorts of complex domestic cases. Moreover, those who suggest
that there is some fundamental difference between these kinds
of cases and those relating to national security issues again
mischaracterize the question at issue in national security
cases. As already discussed, the courts are not seeking to
second-guess the policy determination as to what is in the
national interest on the basis of highly classified information—
they are simply assessing whether such decisions were made
with the requisite authority, based on a sufficient consideration
of the required criteria, and not otherwise in violation of
constitutional rights or limitations.
The notion of “special deference” is inconsistent with a thick
conception of the rule of law, as David Dyzenhaus has argued, and
even champions of “special deference” such as like Adrian
Vermeule have conceded.327 The idea rests in part on the theories of
Carl Schmitt regarding the ineffectiveness of constitutional law
constraints in moments of crisis—arguments that were ultimately
intended to prove the invalidity of liberal democratic theory, as we
have already examined. And it will of course be clear by now that
this entire project is premised upon the legitimacy and validity of
liberal democratic theory and the importance of a thick or
substantive conception of the rule of law.328
Claims for deference to the executive in foreign affairs
are also grounded in an anachronistic adherence to the most
conservative versions of realism in international relations.
They flow from the belief in a Hobbesian world characterized
by an anarchical international system in perpetual conflict, in
which unitary sovereign states are the sole actors and selfpreservation is the prime directive.329 That worldview does not
comport with the reality of an increasingly interconnected and
globalized international society, with growing networks of
transnational relations at various levels and involving nonstate
actors, governed by an increasingly integrated web of
international and domestic legal systems. Descriptively, the
international society does not reflect the Hobbesian conception
of the world, and normatively, this project is predicated upon
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DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN TIME OF
EMERGENCY (2006); Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 276, at 231, 235, 237-38;
Vermeule, supra note 278, at 1132-33.
328
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see supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
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the need to move us further away from the vestigial remnants
of that pre-twentieth century understanding of the world.
In short, as an empirical matter, the evidence casts doubt
on the extent to which courts are reluctant to engage national
security issues. The normative arguments for such deference are
neither persuasive nor grounded in theories of international
relations and constitutional law that are consistent with a
liberal understanding of international law and explanations for
the democratic peace, or indeed deliberative democracy and the
place of the rule of law in liberal democracy. There is evidence to
suggest that courts will quite willingly engage in judicial review
where there are clear constitutional provisions regarding the
distribution of authority and the establishment of limits on the
exercise of such authority in national security matters. And the
kinds of questions that are presented to courts in such situations
do not attract many of the objections, such as technical
competence and the nature of standards to be applied, that are
often raised by opponents of judicial review in the realm of
national security.
In closing, it should be emphasized how the three
distinct elements of the Model would operate together in a
mutually reinforcing fashion, and indeed the extent to which
the theoretical rationales for them are complimentary and
interlocking. Taken as a whole the Model has a certain Gestalt
character, with the combined effect of these mutually
reinforcing elements being greater than the sum of the
individual benefits that each could provide alone. This becomes
clearer with a consideration of the actual design of the Model,
to which we turn next, and at the end of that discussion I will
revisit the importance of the combined operation of the
elements of the Model.
V.

DESIGN OF THE MODEL

The last question to consider is exactly how the Model
would be structured in practical terms, and to explain briefly
why certain choices were made in developing the suggested
design. Moreover, in this discussion of the specific provisions
comprising the Model, I shall explore further how the elements
would operate to effectively achieve the theoretical objectives
previously outlined. To facilitate this discussion, I have
developed draft language for a constitutional provision. The
entire Model would be comprised of one article, divided into
three sections or clauses, with each section constituting one of
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the elements of the Model. This is a generic proposal to serve
as a vehicle for illustrating the conceptual design of the Model.
It is not aimed at any specific constitution.
A.

A Process-Based Constitutional Incorporation of Jus ad
Bellum

The article begins with the incorporation of the
principles of jus ad bellum. The first section provides:
(1) Any decision to use armed force, or to deploy armed forces in
circumstances likely to lead to the use of armed force, of a level in
scale, duration, and intensity equal to that constituting an armed
attack in international law, shall be made only after sufficient and
demonstrable consideration of whether the proposed action is
consistent with the applicable principles of international law
relating to the use of armed force, as found in the United Nations
Charter, other relevant treaties to which the State is a party, and
the related principles of customary international law.

The key elements of this section, which require some
further discussion and explanation, are that: (i) it incorporates
both conventional international law (that is, treaty law) and
customary international law; (ii) it specifies the regime of law
from which the principles are drawn, with reference by name to
the most important governing convention (the U.N. Charter);
(iii) it incorporates the relevant principles of international law
by reference only, rather than explicitly stipulating the
substance of those principles; (iv) it is process based rather than
substantive, in the sense that it does not purport to incorporate
and impose the actual prohibitions from international law, but
rather it only creates an obligation for decision makers to
sufficiently consider compliance with those prohibitions (and the
exceptions thereto); and finally, (v) it provides a threshold level
of force that would trigger the operation of the provision, with
some criteria for defining that trigger.
Beginning with the first element, there are a number of
reasons underlying the decision to incorporate both treaty and
customary international law. There is a wide range of
approaches among constitutional democracies regarding the
manner in which international law is treated within their
domestic legal systems, and great variation in the extent to
which there is already some constitutional provision for such
treatment. This not only relates to the classic theoretical
division between monist and dualist perspectives, but also
relates, in practical terms, to the significant differences among
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states regarding how the different forms of international law
are received and the status each is afforded within the
domestic legal system.330 The mechanisms and processes by
which states incorporate (or transform, as the case may be)
customary international law are typically different than those
used for the incorporation of conventional international law,
and many states also afford one a higher status within the
domestic legal system than the other. Moreover, these
differences themselves vary considerably across states, even
among liberal democracies, with some such as the Netherlands
placing a primacy on treaty law,331 while others such as
Germany, Austria, and Italy giving customary international
law higher status.332 States vary as well on how each of these is
to be received by the domestic legal systems.333
All of this suggests a couple of inferences. First, there
are clear examples of constitutional democracies incorporating
within their constitutions both conventional international law
and customary international law, and indeed examples of each
being afforded a higher status than domestic statutes and even
a national constitution. Second, given the very uneven
treatment among democracies for the purposes of developing a
universal model of incorporation, and given that there are
principles from both a treaty and custom that are thought to be
330

For a more extensive review of the various permutations of how monism
and dualism are reflected in the legal systems of a number of constitutional
democracies, and the varying ways in which treaty and custom are ranked in different
systems, see Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy, supra note 193, at 713-19.
331
GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [CONSTITUTION] Feb.
17, 1983, arts. 91, 93, 94 (Neth.); see also Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy, supra note
193, at 713. The French Constitution of 1958 ranks ratified treaties above statute,
subject only to a condition of reciprocity. 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.). The Constitution of
Costa Rica of 1968 has a similar provision. CONST. Nov. 8, 1949, art. 7 (Costa Rica). See
generally Buergenthal, supra note 193, at 215-20.
332
Buergenthal, supra note 193, at 215-20. See GERMAN BASIC LAW, supra note
187, art. 25 (“The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal
law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the
inhabitants of the federal territory.”) The Constitution of Austria includes only the first
clause of Article 25 of the German Basic Law. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ
[CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (Austria). The Constitution of Hungary similarly provides that “the
legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized principles of
international law, and shall harmonize the country’s domestic law with the obligations
assumed under international law.” A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁANYA
[CONSTITUTION] Aug. 20, 1949, as amended, art. 7, para. 1 (Hung.).
333
The principle in the United Kingdom was articulated most famously by
Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1997] Q.B. 529,
553-57; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; GIBRAN VAN ERT, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CANADIAN COURTS 142-50 (2002). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist
Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999);
Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy, supra note 193, at 109.
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important, the incorporation mechanism should explicitly
incorporate the principles of both systems as part of the Model.
That way, regardless of the more general approach within the
particular constitutional system, the provision would make
quite clear that the principles of both systems are being
incorporated directly into the constitution for the purposes of
this constraint on the use of armed force.
This of course raises the question of whether there are
significant differences between the principles of jus ad bellum
to be found in conventional international law and custom.
There is in fact very little difference, as the International Court
of Justice went to some pains to establish in Nicaragua v.
United States (Merits).334 And the most fundamental principles
of the jus ad bellum regime, the incorporation of which is
central to the Model, are essentially found in Article 2(4) and
Chapter VII (which includes Article 51) of the U.N. Charter.
Nonetheless, it will be recalled that one of the theoretical
arguments in support of adopting the Model to begin with is
that the jus ad bellum regime is coming under pressure to
change, leading to the possible development of new principles
and new legal tests to determine their application. The extent
to which there is indeed some change to the jus ad bellum
regime in the near to mid-term, it is unlikely to come in the
form of amendments to the U.N. Charter or the adoption of any
new treaty. It is much more likely to come in the form of
changes to customary international law. In such circumstances,
it will be important that the Model will have been structured so
as to incorporate the relevant principles of customary
international law, and to require that the decision making on
the use of armed force be informed by the most current
developments in the law.
The second element of this subsection of the provision is
the manner in which it refers specifically to the principles of
the jus ad bellum regime, and refers even more explicitly to a
particular treaty regime, namely the U.N. Charter. This is in
contrast to the option of a much broader incorporation of
international law as a whole, as many national constitutions
already have. Some of the reasons for a more narrow and
specific incorporation will be obvious and were discussed
earlier.335 In addition, given fairly widespread concerns about
334
335

Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
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the legitimacy in permitting international law to trump
domestic law—concerns grounded in arguments about the
democratic deficiency of the international law-making process,
the erosion of national sovereignty, and the negating of the
democratic will of the state’s citizenry—it may be considerably
easier in practical terms to mobilize support for a carefully
tailored provision than a blanket incorporation of international
law along the lines of the Netherlands.
In addition to this, however, the incorporation of specific
principles or regimes of international law provides a much
more fertile basis for the internal interpretation and
internalization of the associated norms, which as was discussed
earlier is an important aspect of the process of enhancing
compliance with international law according to transnational
legal process theory. Moreover, by identifying particular
regimes and specifying the precise treaty from which principles
are drawn, examples from a number of countries suggest that
the constitutional provision will thereby create the legitimate
basis for courts and other domestic institutions to consider how
those principles have been interpreted by international
tribunals and organizations. This can be an important factor in
insuring that the principles that are incorporated remain
organically connected to the international law sources from
which they were drawn.
One of the best examples of this approach is the
constitutional incorporation of human rights principles by a
number of countries over the last few decades. For instance,
Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides that
“the norms relative to basic human rights and liberties which
are recognized by the constitution, shall be interpreted in
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the international treaties and agreements on those
matters ratified by Spain.”336 This has been interpreted to mean
that such human rights conventions as the European
Convention on Human Rights and the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights337 have constitutional
status within the Spanish legal system; or, to put it another
way, the relevant provisions of those conventions have
effectively been incorporated by reference into the

336

CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, art. 10, para. 2, Oct. 26, 1978 (Spain).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
337
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Constitution.338 What is more, this incorporation by explicit
reference to the conventions themselves has provided a basis
for the Spanish courts to not only interpret the constitutional
provisions in light of the principles in the conventions, but also
to draw upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of
the conventions by international courts and other
interpretative bodies.339
The third element of this subsection of the Model relates
to the manner in which the provision incorporates the principles
of jus ad bellum by reference only, rather than specifying the
content of those principles as part of the constitutional text. In
other words, the provision requires decision makers to consider
the applicable principles relating to the use of force, as found in
the U.N. Charter and other sources, but it does not provide an
explicit list of what those principles are. An alternative approach
would have been to provide a set of subsections detailing the
content of each principle and rule taken from international law
that decision makers had to consider before taking action. Aside
from the sheer awkwardness of trying to stipulate all the
relevant rules and principles, the reasons for employing the “by
reference” mechanism are similar to those discussed above in
relation to the importance of including general references to
customary international law and treaty sources. That is,
incorporation by reference preserves the flexibility of the Model,
such that the provision can essentially evolve as the underlying
international law principles change over time, and it retains the
organic link to those principles for purposes of interpretation. As
already discussed, that has its own inherent risks, but given the
likelihood that the jus ad bellum regime will develop over the
next few decades, coupled with the difficulty associated with any
constitutional amendment, building in that kind of flexibility is
important.
An example of this approach, albeit in a regular statute
rather than a constitutional context, can be found in the Alien
Tort Statute in the United States, the key clause of which states
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
338

Buergenthal, supra note 193, at 217.
Id. A number of Latin American countries have followed a similar path.
See, e.g., Art. 75, para. 22, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL (Arg.). For a discussion of similar
developments among the new democracies of Eastern Europe, see Eric Stein,
International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern
European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 427 (1994).
339

710

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”340 This does
not incorporate international law norms per se, but as the
Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the statute
confers subject matter jurisdiction and creates a cause of action
for the violation of the “laws of nations,” which is a reference to
customary international law.341
Two advantages of the incorporation by reference are
well illustrated by this example. The first is the flexibility of the
legislative provision, as its content can essentially evolve over
time without requiring any change to statutory language. Thus,
in Sosa it was recognized that the content of the “narrow set of
violations of the law of nations” today is certainly not the same
as the narrow set of violations that were contemplated back in
1789 when the statute was enacted. Rather, the range of what
types of violations within the law of nations was defined, but the
content of those violations was not specified, and is left to be
ascertained according to the current principles of customary
international law.342 Second, but very much related, is the
advantage of maintaining an organic connection to the
international law principles, which thus continue to be the living
source of the rules. The employment of the term “in violation of
the laws of nations” constituted an intermediary within the
statute, or a trigger, for the application of the primary norms
that are promulgated in detail somewhere else—in this instance
in the sources of the laws of nations. In the sense of Hart’s
primary and secondary rules, therefore, the reference in the
statute is merely a secondary norm, and leaves the primary
norm as the source of the content.343

340

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (enacted as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789).
341
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
342
Id. at 720, 724, 732.
343
Patrick Gudridge explains how the Retaliation Act of March 1813
employed this device to incorporate the laws of war. The Act conferred authority upon
the President to retaliate against any “violations of the laws and usages of war, among
civilized nations.” Law of March 3, 1813, ch. LXI, 2 Stat. 829-30 (1813). Gudridge
makes the argument that use of legislation as an intermediary was a common device at
the time, and it essentially rendered available to the President an entire body of law,
the international laws of war; and as a secondary norm, did not attempt to specify the
content of the primary norms it thus incorporated. Patrick O. Gudridge, Ely, Black,
Grotius & Vattel, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 85-86 (1995); see also Bernard H. Oxman,
The Relevance of the International Order to the Internal Allocation of Powers to Use
Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 133-34 (1995) (arguing that the changes to the
international law regime on the use of force should inform our understanding of the
relationship between the constitutional war powers provisions and international law).
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As explained earlier, this retention of an organic
connection with the underlying international law principles also
ensures that there will be full access to the associated
interpretations and understanding of those principles, including
the decisions of international tribunals and organizations, as
they have developed over time. This relationship tends to be lost
when the contemporary understanding of customary
international law rules is taken or the language of a rule is lifted
from some treaty and then dropped into the text of a constitution
(often in some slightly revised form). Moreover, the juxtaposition
of the revised language with other provisions, severed as it is
from its conceptual source, can lead to significant unintended
consequences.344
The fourth element of the subsection is that it is
process-based rather than substantive in nature. In other
words, the provision does not incorporate the prohibitions (and
corresponding exceptions) of the jus ad bellum regime as
substantive clauses in the Constitution. Rather, it merely
requires that the decision makers contemplating the use of
force sufficiently and demonstrably consider whether the
proposed action is consistent with the international law
principles that have been incorporated.
There are several reasons for choosing to develop the
mechanism in this fashion, but they largely relate to the
practical issues of implementation. It can be anticipated that
there would be significant political objection in many
jurisdictions to any contemplated adoption of this Model. The
foundation of many of these objections, principled and
otherwise, would be a resistance to the idea of incorporating
international law principles to bind the hands of government
on issues of national security—issues relating to selfpreservation and defending “vital interests.” As has already
been suggested above, the arguments behind many of these
objections are misplaced. But the fact remains that if the Model
proposed the incorporation of the principles as binding
constitutional prohibitions, which would also entail conferring
upon the judiciary the power to decide whether a proposed use
of force did or did not comply with the exceptions to the
prohibition as a matter of both constitutional and international
344

Both these problems are reflected in the history of the drafting and
operation of the war renouncing provision of the Japanese Constitution, one clause of
which was developed using adapted language from principles of jus ad bellum. See
Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 289-327.
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law, then the volume of these objections would likely be
overwhelming. Such implementation of binding prohibitions
may be possible and desirable in the future, but for now a
process-based model may serve as an initial and more viable
step along the road to that objective. And for the reasons
already discussed in the previous Part, a process-based
provision will still have a significant effect.
The final element in the subsection is the initial gatekeeping mechanism, which limits the application of the
provision to only those decisions regarding the use of armed
force that could constitute an “armed attack,” as that term is
understood in international law. This is to ensure that there is
a de minimis level below which the government would not be
bound by the provision. Moreover, as will be discussed in the
next section, the same trigger would apply to the other
elements of the Model, thus ensuring that the various elements
of the Model operate in harmony, and the domestic elements
are triggered by criteria that are consistent with valid concepts
in international law.
The parameters of this threshold test are not novel. As
explained briefly in the discussion of the modern system of jus
ad bellum, the occurrence of an armed attack is a condition
precedent to the exercise of the right of self-defense (or, for the
exercise of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense, that an
armed attack is imminent, in the sense that it is irrevocably in
Similarly,
the
current
understanding
in
motion).345
international law is that the use of force against a state must
reach a certain level—or be of “sufficient gravity,” to use the
language of the U.N. Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression—before it can be considered an act of aggression.346
The International Court of Justice has adopted this language
in holding that the use of armed force must rise to a certain
level before it constitutes an “armed attack” justifying the
exercise of the right of self-defense, and it is clearly well above
the mere use of force that would violate the prohibition in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.347 Where that line is actually
drawn, or what criteria are to be used to determine exactly
where to draw the line, has not yet been clearly established in
international law, but the principle itself has been. It is no
345

DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 187.
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29(1) RGA 142, 143 (Dec. 14, 1974).
347
Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at 110; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 42
I.L.M. 1334, 1355 (Nov. 6, 2003).
346
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more uncertain or incapable of determination than any number
of other constitutional principles. Dinstein suggests that an
armed attack requires that the use of force must be of a
magnitude that is likely to “produce serious consequences,
epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties, or
considerable destruction of property.”348
The trigger mechanisms in current constitutions, in
legislation such as the War Powers Act, and proposed
legislation such as that in the War Powers Commission Report,
are not any clearer, and what is more, they often employ terms
that are not related to known and valid concepts in
international law. We have already seen that the constitutions
of many countries, including that of the United States, require
legislative approval of any “declaration of war.” While
declarations of war continue to be theoretically part of the
international law on the use of force, they are no longer
reflected in state practice, and are certainly no longer
considered necessary to trigger the operation of the laws of war
or bring into existence the legal state of war.349 To the extent
the term is interpreted to mean anything other than a formal
declaration that triggers a technical state of war, it becomes
highly ambiguous, as the war powers debate in the United
States illustrates.
The War Powers Act lowered the threshold significantly,
using as the trigger “any case in which United States Armed
Forces are introduced: . . . into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances.”350 There is no definition of “hostilities,”
and so there is no indication of what scale, intensity, or
duration of armed conflict that would be required to constitute
“hostilities” for the purpose of the provision. It could arguably
encompass peace-keeping operations, or the lowest-level border
skirmishes, yet could potentially be interpreted to exclude such
uses of force as cruise missile strikes on foreign targets.
The proposed legislation of the War Powers Commission
Report, in contrast, tries to raise the threshold by requiring a
“significant armed conflict” as a condition precedent, which is
defined as being “any combat operation by U.S. armed forces
348

DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 193.
Id. at 30-34; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 15 (2004).
350
War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006)).
349
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lasting more than a week or expected by the president to last
more than a week.” It explicitly excludes a number of activities,
such as “limited acts of reprisal against terrorists or states that
sponsor terrorism,” “covert operations,” and “missions to protect
or rescue American citizens or military or diplomatic personnel
abroad.”351 Again, “combat operation” remains undefined, creating
uncertainty as to what precisely is contemplated. More
significantly, not only does this formulation similarly employ
concepts for the trigger that do not equate with the principles of
jus ad bellum, but the provision also explicitly endorses unilateral
executive action for purposes that could very well violate the
prohibition on the use of force in international law. Reprisals, as
the term is understood in international law, are illegal.352 Covert
ops and missions to protect nationals abroad would easily
encompass the support provided to the Contras in Nicaragua, and
the invasions of Grenada and Panama, all actions that are widely
seen as having been unlawful.353 Moreover, aside from the explicit
exceptions, the threshold would not be crossed by such uses of
force as extensive missile or air strikes, including strikes with
nuclear weapons, so long as they would not be expected to lead to
“combat” lasting more than one week. There is little apparent
relationship between the requirements of international law and
that which the War Powers Commission Report considered
important enough to require Congressional involvement.
The trigger that is contemplated in the Model, while it
admittedly contains some uncertainty as to its precise scope, is
a concept understood in international law. By employing it in
the Model, we ensure that the same criterion is used for both
requiring consideration of international legality and for
obligating the government to obtain legislative approval, and
that the criterion itself is comprised of concepts taken from
international law. It is the kind of principle that courts are in
any event well accustomed to working with, and it is necessary
to have some threshold to ensure that the government is able
to act more freely in circumstances that would not implicate
the jus ad bellum regime in international law. It is only the use
351

BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 45 (proposed War Powers
Consultation Act of 2009 § 3(A)-(B)).
352
GRAY, supra note 141, at 150-51. Professor Dinstein makes some allowance
for “defensive reprisals,” as being actions short of war taken in self-defense that would
otherwise meet all the conditions for legitimate self-defense. DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 221-22.
353
Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at paras. 75-126, 227-28; GRAY, supra
note 141, at 57 (Panama), 157-58, 390-91 (Grenada).
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of force constituting an armed attack, whether legally justified
or not, which is likely to escalate into an armed conflict. Armed
attack, therefore, is arguably the appropriate level of force to
trigger the requirement to involve the other branches of
government and focus consideration on the questions of
whether that use of force will comply with international law.354
A final word should be said about whether the trigger
makes any distinction between the use of force for individual
self-defense and that used for other purposes, be it collective
self-defense or collective security operations. Constitutional
controls of some countries do make such a distinction, as
discussed in Part III. The Constitution of Denmark, for
instance, provides that “[e]xcept for purposes of defence against
an armed attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King
shall not use military force against any foreign state without
the consent of the Parliament.”355 This clearly limits the
exception to the exercise of individual self-defense.
The trigger as it is employed in both this element of the
Model and in the separation of powers element to be discussed
next, makes no such distinction. In this element, the whole
point is to force the decision makers to consider whether the
proposed action complies with the principles of jus ad bellum—
that is, to determine whether it falls within the scope of either
self-defense, individual or collective, or collective security
operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council (to state
the current exceptions on the prohibition on the use of force). It
would simply beg the question to suggest that they could avoid
such a requirement in the event that the contemplated use of
force was to be an exercise of self-defense. Whether it is legally
a case justifying self-defense is the very thing to be determined
by considering compliance with international law principles.
In the context of the next element of the Model, the
requirement to obtain approval of the legislature, the trigger
would serve the same function. Permitting the government to
avoid obtaining legislative approval in the event the force is to
be used for self-defense would simply create further incentives
354

The jurisprudence of the ICJ has made clear that there is a gap between
the minimum use of force that would violate the prohibition on the use of force in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the scale, intensity, and effect that is required of
any specific use of force in order for it to rise to the level of constituting an “armed
attack” for the purposes of triggering the right to use force in self-defense under Article
51. See Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at paras. 191, 210-11, 230-32; Oil Platforms
(Iran v. U.S.), 42 I.L.M. 1334, paras. 51, 64 (Nov. 6, 2003).
355
DANMARKSRIGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] June 5, 1953, sec. 19, para. 2 (Den.).
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for the government to manipulate the record to provide support
for a claim that the action is in fact an exercise of self-defense.
It would thereby defeat the very objective of having such
assertions subjected to inquiry and debate in the legislature. If
the case is obvious and pressing, the analysis will be easy and
the approval from the legislature quickly forthcoming; if it is
not easy, than there is all the more reason for having the
legislature involved in the deliberations, with all the
advantages that such deliberation brings to the exercise. In the
event of an invasion or the like, there is an emergency
exception, as will be discussed in the next section.
B.

Separation of Powers: Legislative Approval and Judicial
Review

The second element of the Model would require
legislative approval of any decision to use force, while the third
element would explicitly confer jurisdiction and establish
standing for judicial review of the decision-making process.
Together they form the “separation of powers” component of
the Model, and as such they will be considered together here.
The two provisions would read as follows, allowing, of course,
for the necessary changes to conform to the circumstances of
each jurisdiction:
2. (i) Any decision to use armed force, or to deploy armed forces in
circumstances likely to lead to the use of armed force, of a level in
scale, duration, and intensity equal to that constituting an armed
attack in international law, shall be approved by both houses of the
legislature by a simple majority of votes cast.
(ii) In the event of an armed attack against the territory or armed
forces of the state, or other such national security emergency
requiring the urgent use of armed force, making prior approval from
the legislature impractical, the government may use armed force
without prior approval, but shall immediately provide notice of such
determination to the legislature, and it shall obtain approval from
each house of the legislature in accordance with the terms of
subsection (i) above within 14 days of providing such notice, failing
which the executive shall cease any such use of armed force.
(iii) The approval of any use of force by the legislature in accordance
with subsections (i) and (ii) above shall also constitute a decision to
use force, subject to the requirements of Section 1 above.
3. (i) Any person may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain a declaration, injunctive relief, or damages, or any other
remedy that the Court may consider just and appropriate in the
circumstances, for any violation of this Article.
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(ii) Any person who has made application under subsection 3(i)
above shall have standing so long as the issue raised is a serious
issue to be tried, the person has a genuine interest in the issue, even
if only as a representative of the general public, and there would be
no other reasonable or effective means for the issue to be brought
before the Court.

Again, a number of the elements of these two sections require
further explanation, namely, (i) the terms of the requirement for
legislative approval of the use of armed force; (ii) the trigger for
the provision, being the same de minimis level that was
provided for in the first section of the Model; (iii) the emergency
exception and ex post approval requirement; (iv) the fact that
the approval of the legislature is a “decision to use force,” thus
triggering the application of the requirements of Section 1 of the
same Article; (v) the provision of specific jurisdiction for judicial
review, and the remedies provided for; and (vi) the creation of
broad standing for applications for judicial review.
The first element, legislative approval for the use of
armed force, is obviously an explicit move away from a
“declaration of war,” and it does not even require that the
approval be in the form of a law. But it does require “approval,”
expressed through a formal vote. This is in contrast to the
“consultation” that is contemplated by the draft legislation
proposed in the War Powers Commission Report.356 As
discussed earlier, legislatures may have natural tendencies to
avoid making difficult decisions in these kinds of situations,
but that is precisely why the Model should require the
executive to work to obtain the legislature’s approval. At the
same time, while in some jurisdictions such approval requires
supermajorities of some form, a simple majority of votes cast
should be sufficient for the purposes of a general model, albeit
in both houses if the system consists of a bicameral
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Under that proposed scheme, there is no affirmative requirement for the
executive to do anything more than consult, and there is no requirement that Congress
actually vote on the issue. Rather, Congress must on its own initiative vote in
disapproval of any proposed or undertaken action by the President if it does not agree
with the policy on which it is being “consulted.” This reverses the onus contemplated by
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution and significantly reduces the probability
that Congress would act as any check on the executive. While the Commission states
that it was making an effort to remain entirely agnostic on the long-standing
constitutional debate, its recommended legislation by default reverses the onus in a
manner that entirely undercuts the “congressional power” argument. This effectively
endorses the “executive power” side of the debate. BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note
168, at 43-48. On the problems of mobilizing support of Congress, see the voting of
Congress on the Kosovo war, supra note 310 and accompanying text.
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legislature.357 The requirement to obtain a majority vote in each
house should be sufficient to engage the deliberative and
representational features of the parliamentary process in a
manner that will have an impact on the operation of the
domestic causes of war.
The second element is the employment of the same
trigger or threshold level of force as was used in the first section
of the Article. The reasons for employing this particular concept
as the threshold has already been discussed at some length in
the explanation of Section 1 so will not be repeated here. It is
perhaps helpful to emphasize yet again, however, how important
it is to use a concept that has real meaning in international law
for the purposes of triggering the involvement of the legislature
in the decision to use armed force.358 Even if a provision
providing for the separation of powers with respect to the use of
force does not have as one of its objectives an increased
compliance with international law, the principles of jus ad
bellum would naturally serve as a good proxy for the kinds of
armed force that are likely to both escalate conflict and attract
international censure. The trigger employed in this Model is
taken directly from international law, based on precisely the
kind of action that is most likely to lead to wider armed conflict,
which are exactly the types of action that should be subject to
legislative deliberation and oversight. Moreover, it still provides
the executive with significant scope for limited use of force that
falls below that threshold.
The third element is the emergency carve out. As
mentioned earlier, this too is not a novel concept, and various
forms of such an emergency exception with ex post approval
requirements can be found in a number of constitutions,
though more frequently with respect to the power to declare
emergencies and thus trigger emergency powers domestically.
An early example of such a mechanism can be seen in the
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E.g., CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 23, para. 1 (Phil.) (requiring a two-thirds
majority in each house to approve a declaration of war). Article 115a of the German
Basic Law requires a two-thirds majority of votes, and votes cast by at least a majority
of the Bundestag, to determine that the territory of Germany is under attack or
immediately threatened with such an attack, and to thereby declare a state of defense.
GERMAN BASIC LAW, supra note 187, art. 115a.
358
It is striking that the draft legislation proposed in the War Commissions
Report not only uses a concept that has little meaning in international law, but also
explicitly excludes several uses of force that could, in many foreseeable circumstances,
constitute violations of the principles of the jus ad bellum regime. See BAKER &
CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 43-48.
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Constitution of France of 1791.359 A variation on this form of
emergency carve-out is also the cause of much of the
controversy regarding the structure and operation of the U.S.
War Powers Act of 1973. Upon closer inspection, however, the
War Powers Act provisions in question are not so much an
emergency carve out as the grant of a carte blanche for up to
ninety days, followed by an effective legislative veto of further
action if Congress does not move to approve the operation.360
That is very different from what is contemplated by the Model.
Many of the criticisms of the War Powers Act may be
quite valid, but they ought not to be extended to constitutional
provisions that require the executive to obtain legislative
approval, and which include an automatic termination
mechanism in the event that approval is not obtained within a
specified period following an emergency use of force. Precisely
because the provision is constitutional rather than statutory, the
legislature would be less able to shirk its obligations to take up
the issue when approval is sought by the executive. And
requiring the executive to overcome the difficulty of mobilizing
support within the legislature is a key element of the Model.
That it is difficult and costly is not a basis for criticism, but one
of the virtues of the structure. If the executive cannot galvanize
the legislature to approve the use of force by a simple majority,
particularly where the use of force has already been undertaken
in what are alleged to be urgent circumstances, then that by
itself ought to raise significant questions about both the
necessity and legitimacy of the use of force in question.
The fourth element of this subsection of the article
specifies that any approval to use force enacted by the
legislature constitutes a “decision to use force” as contemplated
by the provisions of section 1 of the article, thus being subject
to the requirements of that section. This means that the
legislature too, in deliberating on the question of whether or
not to approve the use of force, must sufficiently and
demonstrably consider whether the use of force in question is
in compliance with the relevant prevailing principles of
international law. This is key to the combined operation of the
distinct elements of the Model, as it is the mechanism through
which the Model effectively causes the deliberative functions of
359

1791 CONST., ch. III, sec. 2 (Fr.).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(a)(1), 1544(a)-(b) (2006). For criticism of the operation of
these provisions, see BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 21-25; ELY, supra note
169, at 115-31.
360
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the legislature to engage the issues of international law
compliance, and which causes the criteria of legitimacy under
international law to be integrated into the deliberative process
of the legislature. It is only by requiring both branches of
government to grapple with the question of compliance with
international law that the Model can ensure that this
perspective will be brought to bear in a meaningful and serious
fashion in the decision-making process, and that over time the
international law norms will be internalized and subsequently
exercise influence, in the manner contemplated by
transnational process theory and the ideational strand of the
liberal theories of international law compliance.
The next element is the first subsection of the judicial
review provision of the Model. It establishes specific jurisdiction
for judicial review of the decision-making process. This aspect of
the separation of powers component of the Model is likely to be
the most controversial. As already discussed, there are many
who argue that the courts should have little involvement in
matters of national security policy generally, and particularly
with respect to broader strategic questions relating to the use of
force. We have already reviewed at some length the theoretical
justification for it,361 so here the discussion will be focused on the
specifics of the structure of the provision.
First, we must address why a specific section on judicial
review would be required at all, once the substantive aspects of
the Model are adopted into any given constitution. For it might
be supposed that once made part of the constitution, these
provisions would be enforceable through judicial review in the
normal course. The reason is quite simply to make it more
difficult for the courts to evade their responsibility by avoiding
the issue. The courts in some jurisdictions have shown
themselves to be reluctant to engage in review of issues
relating to national security policy, in some cases employing
perceived ambiguity as to jurisdiction as the grounds for
denying claims.362 This reluctance might be unfounded, and I
have argued above that such judicial reluctance is neither as
great as some would suggest, nor as likely when the lines of
authority and the precise constitutional limits in issue are
clear.363 But there have been examples of courts avoiding their
361

See supra Part IV.C.
See, e.g., the Sunakawa case, supra note 316; Campbell v. Clinton, 203
F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring).
363
See supra Part IV.
362
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responsibility, and indeed the more extreme versions of the
political question doctrine constitute an attempt to deny the
jurisdiction of courts on most issues having any bearing on
foreign relations.364 The creation of specific jurisdiction, like the
creation of clear provisions, will help ensure that courts do not
abdicate their authority or avoid their responsibility to provide
oversight of the decision-making process.
The second aspect of the first subsection of the judicial
review provision relates to the kinds of remedies that ought to
be available. The provision is broad in this sense, and many
will no doubt take particular issue with the idea of courts being
given the authority to grant injunctions in respect of decisions
to use force. The idea that a court could enjoin the executive
from deploying military force, when the executive has made a
determination that the use of force is necessary for national
security reasons, smacks of the judiciary being given the
authority to second-guess the government on the soundness of
its judgments relating to national defense. But that is simply
not the case under the provision being proposed here. As
discussed above, the issues before the court would be whether
the executive obtained legislative approval as required, and
whether the decision makers in both branches sufficiently and
demonstrably considered the principles of international law. It
is well established that courts have jurisdiction to consider
whether a branch of the government has exceeded its
constitutional powers, and to issue injunctions to prevent the
execution of a policy that the government has no constitutional
authority to undertake.365
While the availability of the injunctive remedy is
important, the reality is that courts may be very reluctant to issue
an injunction for the obvious reason that in circumstances in
which the stakes were that high (and depending on the
institutional power of the courts in whichever country we might
be talking about), there could be a real fear that the injunction
might be ignored, with a resulting constitutional crisis or at least
a serious weakening of the judiciary.366 Thus the subsection also
364

See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962); Choper, supra note
311, at 1497-99; Henkin, Political Question, supra note 317, at 610-12 (critiquing such
interpretations).
365
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990) (claim ultimately
failing for reasons of ripeness).
366
As discussed in Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 341, this
is one of the arguments made to explain the posture of the Supreme Court of Japan in
Article 9 litigation.
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provides for declaratory relief and other remedies that the court
might find more appropriate in the circumstances. And it should
not be thought that these lesser remedies are insignificant.
Declarations can have a considerable impact in national
security cases. For instance, the Nagoya High Court in Japan
handed down a judgment in 2008 on the constitutionality of
Japan’s deployment of air forces to support coalition forces in
Iraq.367 While the court dismissed the application for an injunction
on standing grounds, it nonetheless opined that the deployment of
troops to Iraq was a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution, the
provision that provides for the prohibition on the use of force.
That judgment, which was not even a formal declaration, but
merely an opinion incidental to the dismissal of the claim,
nonetheless had a significant impact in Japan, and arguably
played a role in the formulation of national policy in the
immediate aftermath.368 And of course, this is entirely consistent
with the theoretical explanation of judicial review outlined above
in Part IV. That is, the issuing of declarations such as this are
examples of the courts functioning to monitor government
conduct and provide information to the population on the
legitimacy and propriety of the government’s exercise of power,
potentially shaping public opinion on the issues in the process.
The second subsection of the judicial review element of
the Model is the explicit provision of broad standing to
commence an application. The reasons for this are likely rather
obvious. From the United States to Japan, courts have used
standing as a mechanism to avoid being dragged into the
minefield of adjudicating controversial public policy issues. And
even when lower courts have not been reluctant to engage the
issues, they have nonetheless been bound by narrow standing
rules established by higher courts. The Japanese courts, for
instance, have developed a doctrine on standing that has
367

Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Apr. 17, 2008, Heisei 19 (Ne) no. 58,
http://www.haheisashidome.jp/hanketsu_kouso (Japan) (unpublished decision).
368
Id. The remaining Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Iraq were withdrawn
by the government ahead of schedule. ASDF’s Iraq Mission to End by December, JAPAN
TIMES (July 30, 2008), http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20080730a2.html; Japan’s
Iraq Aid Mission Officially Ends, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 16, 2009), http://search.
japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20090216a2.html; see also Martin, Binding Dogs of War,
supra note 127, at 352-54; Kobayashi Takeshi, Jieitai iraku hakken—iken Nagoya
kōsai hanketsu no igi [Unconstitutionality of the Iraq Deployment: The Significance of
the Nagoya High Court Judgment], 80 HŌJI JIHŌ 8, 1 (July 2008). Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Canada recently issued a declaration on the government’s complicity
in the violation of the human rights of a Canadian detainee being held in Guantanamo
Bay, which created considerable pressure on the government to act. See Canada (Prime
Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
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rendered the war-renouncing provision of the Constitution
effectively unenforceable, as virtually no one outside of the
military could ever demonstrate the narrow and direct legal
interest in the issues sufficient to ground a claim.369 Similarly,
the courts of the United States have dismissed many of the war
powers lawsuits on the basis of standing, the conditions for
which have been construed very narrowly by the courts.370
Without getting into the intricacies of standing doctrine
in any one country, one of the key problems common to many
jurisdictions is that standing for constitutional litigation often
requires some direct legal interest in the issues, flowing from
some personal harm, such as would arise from being the direct
victim of a violation by the state of a constitutionally protected
right. Because a use of force provision such as that
contemplated here does not create any individual rights, these
requirements will typically render the provision unenforceable
by the courts. The government decision will be insulated from
judicial review, which seriously undermines the normative
effectiveness of the provision.
By way of contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has
formulated a test for determining when courts may grant
standing in constitutional cases in which there is a broader
public interest that will be advanced by the claim, but the
claimant lacks a direct and substantive legal interest in the
issue, or has not suffered an exceptional prejudice. According to
the test, the courts will grant standing so long as the applicant
can demonstrate that (i) the issue is a serious one; (ii) the
applicant has a genuine interest in the issue; and (iii) there is
no other reasonable and effective manner for the issue to come
before the court.371 The term “genuine interest” here is defined
broadly, not requiring a direct legal interest, but rather
including an interest that may be shared by the public at large.
The genuine interest in cases likely to be advanced
under the proposed Model would be similarly shared by the
public at large, in that the policy being undertaken would not
only be allegedly in violation of the constitution, but would
indeed embroil the country in armed conflict—something in
369

See Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 338-39.
E.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), though courts have
also held that members of Congress have standing to commence an application. E.g.,
Dellums, 752 F. Supp. 1141.
371
Thorson v. Attorney Gen., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (Can.); Nova Scotia Bd. of
Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (Can.); see also PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA 776-80 (5th ed. 2007).
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which the entire nation surely has an interest. It is the third
element of this Canadian test, therefore, that is the key, for it
permits the court to grant standing even when the genuine
interest is no more specific than a shared public interest in the
enforcement of a fundamental constitutional provision—the
consideration that there is likely no one else who would have a
more narrow and direct legal interest in the issues who could
commence the claim.372 It will often be the case that only
members of the armed forces would have the kind of direct
legal interest that would meet many typical standing
requirements, and it is unreasonable to look to members of the
armed forces to bring constitutional claims against their
commander in chief.
In closing the discussion on this aspect of standing, it
should be noted that this broadening of standing is entirely
consistent with the theoretical justification for judicial review
outlined above in Part IV. If we agree that the courts serve an
important function in monitoring government conduct and
providing information to the public on the legitimacy of the
government’s exercise of power, we should want a broad
standing doctrine. The fact that there is no one person who has
a narrow legal interest in the issue is irrelevant to the role of
the judiciary as a check on the improper or excessive exercise of
power by one of the political branches.
Finally, I have described the judicial review here as
being “limited.” It might be thought, given the breadth of both
the remedies available and the basis for standing, that this
provision for judicial review is anything but limited. But it is in
fact limited by the nature of the rest of the Model. All that the
courts are being given jurisdiction to review here is whether
the legislature has approved the use of force as required by the
provision, and whether the decision makers in both the
legislature and the executive have sufficiently and
demonstrably considered whether the contemplated action is
consistent with the prevailing principles of international law. It
372

As Chief Justice Laskin wrote for the majority in one of the cases
establishing this test,
The substantive issue raised by the plaintiff’s action is a justiciable one; and,
prima facie, it would be strange and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in
which a question of alleged excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally
within the scope of the judicial process, could be made the subject of
adjudication.
Thorson, [1975] 1 S.C.R. at 145.
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does not require, nor does it provide jurisdiction for, the courts
to engage in any inquiry into whether the decision arrived at is
actually consistent with international law, or whether it is a
sound judgment, or whether it is in the national interest. It is
simply a question of whether the mandated process was
followed such that the authorized branches of government
made and approved the decision, and that it was made on the
proper basis. It is in this respect that the judicial review is
limited, and indeed is limited to the types of questions that are
entirely within the competence and constitutional authority of
courts to decide.
The objection may be made that it is a small step for
courts to take, in their examination of whether the decision
makers have sufficiently considered the principles of
international law, to engage in impermissible substantive
review of the decision itself. In other words, a court could find
that the substance of the government’s decision was so patently
inconsistent with the principles of international law that no
reasonable person could conclude that the government had
sufficiently considered those principles in reaching its decision.
Thus under the cover of process, the courts will be engaging in
substantive review. And it is conceded that such a “patently
unreasonable” test could indeed evolve. At least one of the Law
Lords in the House of Lords has suggested that such a test
could apply in cases involving the exercise of the Royal
Prerogative in respect of national security issues.373
On the one hand, this would still give the government a
very large margin of appreciation, and it could be argued that
it would be a positive development to have a judicial check on
decisions that are so blatantly in violation of principles of
international law that it could not satisfy such a test. But it is
in any event unlikely. The better argument is that under the
language of the provision it would be open for the government,
in circumstances where it was clearly acting in a manner
inconsistent with the principles of jus ad bellum, to argue that
it had indeed sufficiently considered the principles, but that in
the circumstances, and all other things having been considered,
it had nonetheless decided that it was in the national interest
to proceed with the proposed policy. Under the language of the
Model, which only requires adequate consideration of the
373

Council of Civil Serv. Unions & Others v. Ministers of Civil Serv., [1985]
A.C. 374, 401-02 (H.L.) (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton); id. at 405-06 (Lord Scarman).
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principles of international law rather than compliance with
them, a court would not be able to interfere with that
determination. In this way, the Model would actually create
incentives for the government to be more open and forthright
about its position.
The final objection might be that the courts will have to
decide the threshold issue relating to whether the impugned
policy rose above the de minimis level of force so as to trigger
the operation of the provision. A court would have to ask
whether the contemplated action was of such a scale, duration,
and intensity so as to constitute an armed attack under
international law. This, it may be argued, is a question that is
beyond the competence of domestic courts to decide, and
involves a test that is too vague to be justiciable. This is the
stuff of the political question doctrine, which has already been
discussed.374 But the concept of “armed attack” has meaning in
international law, and is not so vague that the ICJ has been
unable to work with it. Nor is the concept any more vague than
other constitutional concepts that courts have developed
standards to interpret and enforce, as Judge Tatel eloquently
argued in Campbell v. Clinton:
To begin with, I do not agree that courts lack judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for “determining the existence of a
‘war.’” . . . Whether the military activity in Yugoslavia amounted to
“war” within the meaning of the Declare War Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11, is no more standardless than any other question
regarding the constitutionality of government action. Precisely what
police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment guarantee “against
unreasonable searches and seizures?” When does government action
amount to “an establishment of religion” prohibited by the First
Amendment? When is an election district so bizarrely shaped as to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of “equal protection of
the laws?” Because such constitutional terms are not self-defining,
standards for answering these questions have evolved, as legal
standards always do, through years of judicial decisionmaking.
Courts have proven no less capable of developing standards to
resolve war powers challenges.375

Finally, the courts of all common law countries, even those of
the United States, as illustrated most recently in the line of
Supreme Court decisions on detainee rights,376 have shown
374

See supra notes 314-24 and accompanying text.
Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring).
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See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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themselves willing and able to interpret and apply concepts
drawn from the principles of international law.
In closing this discussion of the operation of the entire
article, it should be emphasized that each of the elements of
the Model will operate in combination in ways that will provide
cumulative benefits and mutually reinforcing effects greater
than the sum of the individual benefits of the three sections of
the provision. The first element of the Model is the
incorporation of the principles of jus ad bellum for the purposes
of enhancing compliance with the international law regime.
But that provision is vastly strengthened by virtue of the
operation of the separation of powers elements of the Model.
For while the first section of the Model alone would operate to
require the executive to consider the international law
principles, if such consideration were conducted in a secret
process among a small number of individuals, the prospect for
it being paid only lip-service while being entirely glossed over
would be much higher. The public debate likely to accompany
any legislative consideration of the issues, and the obligation
that two separate political branches independently consider the
issue of international legality—resulting in publication of
widely different perspectives and interpretations of the issues
from varying ideological approaches—would make for a much
more meaningful satisfaction of the requirement.377 In the short
run, with respect to any particular situation, this combined
operation would make it much more likely that compliance
with the governing international law principles would be a
serious factor in the decision-making process. In the long run,
however, it would also contribute to the process of
internalization and reinterpretation of those international law
norms, in the manner that transnational process theory and
ideational strands of liberal theories of international law
suggest is so important in enhancing compliance with any
given international legal regime.
Similarly, the Model is further strengthened by making
the decision-making process subject to limited judicial review,
because this element maximizes the extent to which the
domestic constitutional enforcement mechanisms are employed
to assist in the implementation of the international law
principles. Moreover, yet again, to the extent that the judiciary
becomes involved in interpreting these principles in the course of
377

See supra note 272.
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judicial review, the Model would provide for the increasing
institutional internalization of those norms. The very prospect
that the judiciary might be called upon to review whether the
legislative and executive decision makers considered in good
faith the extent to which the proposed use of force complied with
the prevailing international law norms would serve to increase
the likelihood that the decision-making process would be
conducted in a conscientious and genuine manner. And turning
full circle, such enforcement, or even potential for enforcement,
of international law principles by the central and highly
respected institutions of the state, only serves to increase the
legitimacy of those principles, which in turn enhances their
overall effectiveness at the international level.
CONCLUSION
The prevention of armed conflict is central to modern
international law, and reducing the prevalence of war one of
the enduring philosophical problems with which man has
grappled. The causes of war are understood to operate at three
levels—that of the individual, the state, and the international
system. It follows that we need mechanisms that are capable of
addressing causes within all three levels. In legal terms, that
requires legal constraints at both the domestic and the
international level. Yet in the twentieth century, we have left
the legal constraint of armed conflict entirely to a positivist
international legal system, one with thin theoretical and
philosophical foundations, and without any of the domestic
implementation that is necessary to improve compliance with
international law regimes.
The proposed Model would be a significant step towards
the development of more robust and multi-dimensional legal
constraints on the use of armed force, thereby reducing the
prevalence of war. The domestic implementation of the
international law principles on the use of force would be
consistent with the ever increasing penetration of international
law into domestic legal systems, and the use of domestic law
mechanisms to enforce and enhance compliance with the
international law regimes. This incorporation of international
law principles would not only operate to ameliorate the
permissiveness of the international system, the primary cause
of war at the international level, but it would also engage
significant domestic causes of war as well. The move is
consistent with and supported by international law compliance
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theory and constitutional law theory, operating to realize both
international law and constitutional law objectives.
The requirement for legislative approval of government
decisions to use armed force would amplify and strengthen the
operation of the first provision. Such legislative involvement
would also enhance democratic accountability and bring to bear
the deliberative and oversight functions of the legislature on
the decision-making process, making it both more transparent
and subject to diverse perspectives and arguments. It would
more fully realize the structure originally thought to make
republics less likely to wage war, and would engage the
domestic causes of war in important ways. Subjecting the
entire process to a limited form of judicial review would place a
further check on the system, helping to ensure that the
decision-making process was conducted as required, and
genuinely based on the mandated considerations. Together, the
separation of powers elements of the Model would operate to
resolve aspects of the Kantian dilemma, reducing the tendency
of democracies to engage in armed conflict with illiberal states,
while strengthening the features of democracies that help
explain the democratic peace. This would not only be a benefit
to the international society more generally, but it would
fundamentally benefit the states that adopt the Model, not only
by increasing democratic accountability and strengthening the
rule of law, but ultimately by protecting them from
involvement in illegitimate and unwise military adventures.
At first glance the proposal might seem both somewhat
radical and rather utopian in nature. But in considering more
closely both the theoretical foundations of the Model and the
manner in which it would be expected to operate, the moves
contemplated are not so extreme as might first appear. Each of
the elements is entirely consistent with current established
theory. What is more, it may be entirely timely, and responsive
to concerns that are growing in a number of countries. With
debates in Japan over the possible amendment of the war
renouncing provision in its Constitution, draft legislation and
formal reports in Britain and Australia on revising
parliament’s role in decision making on the use of force, new
proposals in the United States for amending the War Powers
Act, to name only a few examples, the time is surely ripe for
serious consideration of these issues. There may be theoretical
difficulties still to overcome and problems of implementation to
resolve, and indeed it is not suggested that the Model is the
optimal arrangement. It is a proposal intended to advance the
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debate and contribute to the consideration of these issues. For
in the spirit of Madison’s exhortation with which I began this
article, war continues to be such cause of horror in the world
that everything should be tried in the effort to reduce the
prevalence of armed conflict.

